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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal 
matters from two perspectives. It argues that the framework upon which this 
principle is built has become increasingly problematic and that the issues 
questioning its justification could undermine the results achieved in the pre-
accession policy, where the values that support the mutual recognition 
framework are vigorously employed upon candidate countries. First, the 
thesis addresses the functioning and legitimacy of the principle of mutual 
recognition internally, in relation to the Union’s current Member States, with a 
particular focus on the most prominent mutual recognition instrument in the 
area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the European Arrest Warrant. 
In recent years, the application of the principle of mutual recognition in this 
area, has become more challenging due to serious violations of the values 
which undermines mutual trust and the legitimate application of mutual 
recognition. Secondly, the thesis examines the principle of mutual recognition 
externally, vis-à-vis the EU’s pre-accession policy where key values for the 
application of mutual recognition have obtained a prominent place and 
should in principle build ground for the application of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters. The thesis analyses the two pillars upon which the concepts 
of Normative Power Europe rests: the EU’s normative identity and its 
normative influence to examine the principle of mutual recognition from both 
sides. It demonstrates that, internally, the non-commitment to the 
foundational values which lie at the heart of the EU’s normative identity are 
very vulnerable and the EU does not have the necessary influence to enforce 
compliance with the values. It is argued that this undermines the justifiability 
of the mutual recognition framework. In stark contrast with the internal 
situation, in the pre-accession policy the EU has strong tools to enforce 
transformation in the candidate countries to assure that they adhere to the 
EU’s foundational values and share its identity. However, the results 
achieved in the pre-accession policy can be easily undermined upon 
accession due to the problematic internal situation regarding the foundational 
values.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In 1999, the principle of mutual recognition was formally adopted as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in EU criminal matters.1 It was introduced 
to support the objective to develop an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ) and enhance integration in the sensitive area of EU criminal law. 
Mutual recognition was perceived as a more effective concept to meet these 
aims in comparison to the more challenging task of pursuing detailed 
harmonisation of national law.2 Under the principle of mutual recognition 
Member States are required to recognise judicial decisions from other 
Member States as equivalent to their own and give effect to them. Due to 
less discretion and grounds for refusal, judicial decisions of Member States in 
criminal matters are enforced more rapidly and with greater certainty beyond 
their own territory.3 This is justified on the premise that all Member States 
adhere to the EU’s foundational values listed in Article 2 TEU and that 
therefore Member States can have trust in each other’s criminal justice 
systems.4 The principle of mutual trust is thus a pre-requisite for the 
application of mutual recognition. It is therefore essential that Member States 
respect the values, in particularly fundamental rights and the rule of law, 
because a high level of trust is necessary for the successful operation of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters.  
Non-compliance with the EU values undermines mutual trust among 
Member States and therefore rebuts the trust presumption upon which 
mutual recognition is built. Serious and persistent fundamental rights and rule 
of law violations are particularly problematic, because this significantly 
challenges effective judicial coopearation based on mutual recongtion and 
mutual trust. Indeed, whilst minor and occasional breaches question  
 
1 European Council in Tampere, Presidency Conclusions (15-16 October 1999) para 33. 
2 S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council got it 
Wrong?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5, 9; V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications 
of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277, 
1277-1278.  
3 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM(2000) 495 final, 2. 
4 See for example, Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12/10, 15 January 2001, 1. 
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protecting the effectiveness of mutual recognition instruments by enforcing 
the application of those instruments, it is argued that gross and systematic 
violations cannot justify effectiveness to prevail at the detriment of the values 
upon which the EU is founded. It is thus apparent that the foundational 
values have a vital role in EU criminal law integration.  
Any European State that would like to become a member of the EU is 
also required to respect and promote its foundational values.5 With the level 
of EU integration increasing and the experience of previous enlargement 
rounds, values such as fundamental rights and the rule of law obtained a 
more prominent place in the pre-accession policy. This, in principle, should 
build trust in the prospective Member State’s judicial system and allow for the 
application of mutual recognition in criminal matters upon accession.  
This thesis analyses the principle of mutual recognition from two 
perspectives. First, it addresses the functioning and legitimacy of the 
principle of mutual recognition internally among the Union’s current Member 
States with a particular focus on the most prominent mutual recognition 
instrument in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW).6 In recent 
years, this has become more problematic due to serious violations of the 
values which undermines mutual trust and the legitimate application of 
mutual recognition.7 Secondly, the thesis examines the principle of mutual 
recognition externally, vis-à-vis the EU’s pre-accession policy and focuses on 
how and to what extent the EU successfully exports the foundational values 
to candidate countries. It addresses two main questions: first, is the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition still justified in criminal 
matters, in light of the profound violations of the values by some Member 
States? Secondly, does the pre-accession policy build ground for the 
application of mutual recognition, and if so, what are the effects of the EU’s 
internal situation on the results achieved in the enlargement policy?   
 
 
5 Article 49 TEU. 
6 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
7 Due to the ongoing and fast developments in this area, this thesis has endeavoured to state the law 
and relevant events as of 15 November 2019. 
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Conceptual framework: the EU’s normative identity and normative 
influence  
 
The conceptual framework and theoretical lens adopted in the thesis rests 
upon the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) by Ian Manners.8 The 
concept of NPE is founded on two fundamental claims. The first claim is that 
the EU is normatively different from other international actors and has a 
normative identity. This notion is based on the combination of the historical 
context of the Union, the hybrid nature of the EU as a polity and its political 
and legal framework which led to a commitment of placing certain norms ‘at 
the centre of its relations with its Member States and the world’.9 These 
norms provide the EU with a normative identity and its commitment to these 
norms pre-disposes the Union to act in a normative way.10 The second claim 
of the EU’s normative power concerns the normative influence that the EU 
has in the international system. Manners argues that the EU has the ‘ability 
to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations’.11 The EU diffuses 
these norms and influences others through its policies and procedures 
(substantive transmission) and by leading as a virtuous example that others 
replicate (symbolic transmission).12 It is this ability to spread these norms and 
influence others that allows the EU to be characterised as a normative 
power. 
The findings of Manners and the claims regarding the EU’s normative 
identity and normative influence upon which normative power is based are 
 
8 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 235. Whilst the concept was first introduced by Manners in 2002, some of his later 
scholarly contributions aim to explain it more fully and refine the concept due to the responses in 
academia, see for example, I. Manners, ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’ (2008) 84 
International Affairs 45; I. Manners, ‘The Normative Power of the EU in a Globalised World’ in Z. 
Laïdi (ed.) EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences 
(Routledge 2008) 23; I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Transdisciplinary Approach to 
European Studies’ in C. Rumford (ed.) The SAGE Handbook of European Studies (SAGE 2009) 561; I. 
Manners, ‘The Social Dimension of EU Trade Politics: Reflections from a Normative Power 
Perspective’ (2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 782. 
9Ibid, (Manners 2002) 241.  
10 Ibid, 242. The normative identity that Manners identifies consist of five ‘core’ norms (peace, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-
discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance).  
11 Ibid, 239. 
12 Manners identifies six mechanism through which the EU spreads its norms (contagion; informal 
diffusion; procedural diffusion; transference; overt diffusion; cultural filter), see ibid, 244-245.  
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applied in the thesis to analyse the principle of mutual recognition in EU 
criminal matters both internally and externally, vis-à-vis the pre-accession 
policy. The framework was chosen for three reasons. First, the declaration in 
Article 2 TEU that the EU is founded on values expresses a normative frame 
of reference for the whole of the EU’s political and legal order.13 By referring 
to these values as foundational it is clear that they ‘underlie and inform the 
purpose and character’14 of the European integration process and are the 
driving forces of the ‘Union’s politico-legal system as a whole’.15 This is also 
evident by the change introduced in the Lisbon Treaty from principles to 
values which reflects the constitutionalisation development of the EU and 
importance of these values. Whilst the EU legal order is built on many 
principles, the foundational values indicate that these are the roots of the 
EU’s legal order.16 The change of wording, however, does not mean that the 
values are purely ‘fundamental ethical convictions’.17 Similar to the Union’s 
principles they are legal norms because they have legal consequences and 
can therefore be considered as principles.18 For example, the legal 
commitment to these values can be found in: Article 3 TEU which expresses 
a legal mandate to promote the values; Article 49 TEU which requires that 
any European state that applies for membership respects these values and is 
willing to promote them, and Article 7 TEU which lays down certain 
consequences for the Member States if a serious and persistent breach of 
the values has been determined.19 The foundational values thus underpin the 
EU’s normative and constitutional identity and a strong commitment to these 
values is required by its Member States. 
 
13 A. von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutional Principles’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2006) 9. 
14 T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 
2003) 4.  
15 L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review, 359, 362. 
16 O. Mader, ‘Enforcement of EU Values as a Political Endeavour: Constitutional Pluralism and Value 
Homogeneity in Times of Persistent Challenges to the Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law 133, 137. 
17 Bogdandy (n 13). 
18 Ibid.  
19 See also Article 8 and 21 TEU.  
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Consequently, the EU’s foundational values provide a basis for and are 
also the result of a normative integration process.20 Internally, this is 
apparent in the field of EU criminal law where the principle of mutual 
recognition serves as an instrument to enhance judicial cooperation. 
Effective judicial cooperation was thus at the heart of the introduction of 
mutual recognition in this field. However, the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition itself is based and justified on a three-tiered framework 
which can challenge the enforcement of mutual recognition instruments to 
protect their effectiveness. The first building block and base on which the 
mutual recognition framework is built is the Member States’ adherence to the 
foundational values in Article 2 TEU. This, in turn, leads to and justifies the 
second tier of the framework that Member States have trust in each other’s 
criminal justice systems. The presumption of mutual trust, in its turn, is the 
basis for the principle of mutual recognition which requires Member States to 
recognise judicial decisions of other Member States and to execute the 
issuing Member States’ decision. Both the concept of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust are linked to the principle of sincere cooperation listed in Article 
4(3) TEU. On the basis of this principle, Member States are required to trust 
each other and refrain from adopting any measures that may affect trust and 
therefore are required to recognise each other’s judicial decisions in criminal 
matters.21 The mutual recognition framework thus adopts a normative 
approach where mutual trust is treated as a mechanism to enhance 
integration in criminal matters based on the common values listed in Article 2 
TEU.  
The second reason why the conceptual framework was chosen, is the 
influence that the EU has to support this normative approach adopted in 
criminal matters. This is important, because mutual trust as the basis for 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, reflects an 
acceptance of a high level of integration among Member States and a 
presumption of compliance with foundational values, such as respect for 
 
20 Mader (n 16) 134.  
21 C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring in the Rule of Law. Normative Arguments, Institutional 
Proposals and the Procedural Limitations’ in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 17. 
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fundamental rights and the rule of law.22 On the basis of this presumption, 
mutual recognition introduced a system of legal pluralism in the field of EU 
criminal law, where ‘foreign’ judicial decisions need to be recognised and 
executed with speed, minimum formalities and limited grounds for refusal.23 
Therefore, this normative integration approach in EU criminal law, becomes 
problematic if Member States do not comply with the values and indicates a 
moral distance between the law’s normative expectations and the Member 
States who are regulated by it.24 If this distance becomes substantial due to 
serious violations of the values then the enforcement of mutual recognition to 
enhance judicial cooperation and protect the effectiveness of trust-based EU 
law can no longer be justified. Thus, whilst on paper the EU’s normative and 
constitutional identity and the Member States’ commitments to these 
foundational values justify this normative approach to increase the 
effectiveness of judicial cooperation, in practice the normativity of these 
values and justification for the mutual recognition framework depend on the 
extent at which compliance with the values can be enforced by the EU.25  
Thirdly, every European state that wishes to join the EU should represent 
the foundational values and should be committed to promoting them.26 The 
enlargement policy should therefore ultimately lead to prospective Member 
States sharing the EU’s normative and constitutional identity and its 
commitment to the values. Yet, in order to reach this stage, the pre-
accession policy should provide the EU with the necessary tools to influence 
countries seeking to join the Union and transfer the common values. This is 
of particular importance in the field of EU criminal law matters, where a 
genuine commitment to the rule of law and fundamental rights should 
develop trust in the prospective Member States’ judicial systems. The latter, 
 
22 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Conceptualising Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law: The Evolving Relationship 
Between Legal Pluralism and Rights-Based Justice in the European Union’, in E. Brouwer and D. 
Gerard (eds.), Mapping Mutual Trust: Understanding and Framing the Role of Mutual Trust in EU Law 
(2016) EUI Working Paper MWP 2016/13 Max Weber Programme, available at: 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/41486/MWP_2016_13.pdf?sequence=1, last 
accessed 29 August 2019, 24. 
23 Ibid, 25. 
24 R. Cotterrell, Law’s Community. Legality Theory in Sociological Perspectives (Clarendon Press 1995) 
304-305. See also, Ibid, 26.  
25 Mader (n 16) 137. 
26 Article 49 TEU. 
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as is clear from the discussion of the mutual recognition framework, is a 
prerequisite for the successful application of the principle of mutual 
recognition introduced to enhance judicial cooperation.   
 Overall, the conceptual strand provides a tool to analyse whether the 
mutual recognition framework, which relies on the presumption of trust that 
Member States comply with the common values, is justified and its 
application legitimate. The latter depends on the Member States’ adherence 
to the foundational values and the EU’s machinery to enforce compliance 
with the values, because trust based law cannot be forced upon Member 
States to enhance the effectiveness of judicial cooperation based on mutual 
recongnition instruments in situations that involve serious fundamental rights 
and rule of law violations. Moreover, it allows for the pre-accession policy to 
be examined in order to verify whether it provides the EU with the necessary 
tools to export those values and build ground for mutual recognition. The 
analysis of both the internal and external situation in relation to the principle 
of mutual recognition, provides a basis to evaluate the possible impact of the 
internal situation on the results achieved in the pre-accession policy.  
At this stage, it is important to specify more precisely how Manners’ 
findings will be used in this thesis. Among scholars NPE has become a 
popular concept to analyse the EU’s role as an international actor and 
examine its foreign policy and external relations.27 The thesis, however, will 
use the notions of the EU’s normative identity and normative influence to 
examine the EU’s internal situation first and explore whether the normative 
approach adopted in the mutual recognition framework is justified. In this 
 
27 See for example, R. Young, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External 
Identity’ (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 415; T. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and 
Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe” ‘ (2005) 33 Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 613; H. Sjursen, ‘The EU as a ‘Normative Power’: How Can This Be?’ (2006) 13 
Journal of European Public Policy 235; A. Hyde-Price, ‘ “Normative” Power Europe: A realist Critique’ 
(2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 217; M. Pace, ‘The Construction of EU Normative Power’ 
(2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 1041; G. Balducci, ‘The Limits of Normative Power 
Europe in Asia: The Case of Human Rights in China’ (2010) 27 East Asia 35; R. Whitman (ed.), 
Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan 2011); I. 
Nunes, ‘Civilian, Normative and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and EU Discourses’ (2011) 16 
European Foreign Affairs Review 1; M. Neuman (ed.) Democracy Promotion and the Normative 
Power Europe Framework. The European Union in South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (Springer 2019). 
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context, the norms which together constitute ‘the normative’ are listed in 
Article 2 TEU which refers to ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. In line with the terminology of 
article 2 TEU, the thesis will refer to values instead of norms. In the thesis the 
focus lies on the rule of law and fundamental rights values,28 two key values 
for the successful operation of the mutual recognition framework in EU 
criminal law. As such the term ‘normative identity’ refers to foundational 
values of the EU which are common to the Member States and should be 
adhered to by all Member States.29 Indeed, on paper the Member States 
should share the EU’s constitutional identity. However, Member States’ 
behaviour does not always suggest that this is indeed a reality in practice 
which undermines the legitimate application of mutual recognition to enhance 
effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This is where the concept of 
‘normative influence’ comes in, which in the thesis refers to the means 
available to the EU to enforce Member States to comply with the foundational 
values.  
Externally, the thesis will focus on the EU’s enlargement policy and in 
light of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, the exportation 
of the fundamental rights and rule of law values. The concept of ‘normative 
influence’ in this context refers to the mechanisms available to the EU in the 
pre-accession policy to transform candidate countries, export the values and 
build a shared commitment to these values. Therefore, ‘normative identity’ 
refers to the end result of what the pre-accession policy should lead to, i.e. 
respect for the values so that on accession the new Member States share 
the EU’s constitutional identity based on the foundational values.30  
 
28 The terms ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘human rights’ will be used interchangeably in the thesis.  
29 In addition of using the terminology ‘normative identity’ the thesis will also refer to ‘constitutional 
identity’. The latter will also mean the EU’s identity based on the foundational values listed in Article 
2 TEU and as such both phrases will be used interchangeably.  
30 The two paragraphs preceding seek to explain the scope of how Manners’ findings will be used. 
The thesis will not refer to the ‘EU as a normative power’ in the context of the mutual recognition 
analysis, because the scope of the thesis is limited and certainly from the internal perspective this 
does not coincide. From the enlargement perspective ‘normative power’ would undermine other 
interests such as economic and security interests both from the EU’s and prospective Member 
State’s side. Moreover, it requires a discussion of the different types of power (civilian, economic, 
military, soft); criteria of normative power, and different mechanisms of normative power, which 
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The thesis will build on Manners’ concepts and apply them in a 
number of ways. First, an analysis of the functioning of mutual recognition in 
EU criminal matters demonstrates the importance of the EU’s normative 
identity that Member States are supposed to share and their commitment to 
the foundational values.31 The adherence of the Member States to the values 
allows for trust in each other’s criminal justice systems, which in turn justifies 
the application of mutual recognition instruments. This indicates that trust 
cannot be forced upon Member States, but needs to be earned. It is 
therefore argued that, a lack of trust because of serious and persistent 
fundamental rights and rule of law violations undermines the functioning of 
the mutual recognition framework and does not justify its application in order 
to protect the effectiveness of mutual recognition instruments.32  
Secondly, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is used as a case 
study to examine further the trust of Member States in each other’s criminal 
justice system based on a commitment to the values and the EU’s normative 
identity, with a focus on the fundamental rights value. This will demonstrate a 
lack of trust among Member States and illustrates that this is justified 
because of fundamental rights violations.33 This, in turn, indicates problems 
with the EU’s normative and constitutional identity upon which the mutual 
recognition framework rests and challenges the application of this mutual 
recognition instrument to enhance judicial cooperation. An assessment on 
the rule of law value by focusing on Hungary and Poland who do not honour 
their European commitments reiterates this. Moreover, it is argued that due 
to the gross nature of the violations by these Member States, the 
enforcement of this mutual recognition instrument to protect its effectiveness 
and promote judicial cooperation would not be legitimate. Indeed, in those 
two countries protecting fundamental rights should prevail protecting the 
effectiveness of mutual recognition instruments.34  
 
exceeds the scope of the thesis. See, most illustratively, T. Forsberg, ‘Normative Power Europe, Once 
Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type’ (2011) 49(6) Journal of Common Market Studies 1183 
and the literature referred therein.  
31 See chapter 1.  
32 See chapter 2. 
33 See chapter 3. 
34 See chapter 4. 
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The thesis will then analyse the influence the EU has internally to 
enforce compliance with the values to support the mutual recognition 
framework by examining article 258 TFEU and article 7 TEU. It will 
demonstrate that the EU’s normative influence is not sufficient to address the 
values crises and support the mutual recognition framework adequately.35 
The research then moves to the pre-accession policy, and analyses how the 
EU diffuses the values to candidate countries, and transform those countries 
so that they share the EU’s normative identity and commitment to the Article 
2 TEU values. This will be conducted through an examination of the 
Copenhagen political criteria and chapter 23 and 24 of the EU acquis which 
cover key rule of law and fundamental rights issues. The Commission’s 
benchmarking and annual reports in relation to Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro will be analysed to verify the extent of the EU’s influence in the 
enlargement policy. Finally, the thesis will reflect on the potential influence 
that the EU’s internal problems, with the adherence of the values and the 
current enforcement tools could have on new Member States.36  
 
Contribution of the thesis  
 
In the field of EU criminal law, the challenges of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition, in relation to fundamental rights and the Court’s approach 
towards the presumption of trust in order to protect the effectiveness of 
mutual recognition instruments - have been a debatable topic and 
encountered a substantial amount of criticism.37 Similarly, the problems with 
the foundational values regarding violations of the rule of law by current 
 
35 See chapter 5. 
36 See chapter 6. 
37 See, most illustratively, V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the 
Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 319; E. Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in 
EU Criminal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind 
Trust’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 489; V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship 
Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 6 New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 457; A. Williams, ‘Mutual Trust as a Term of Art in EU Criminal 
Law: Revealing its Hybrid Character’ 9 European Journal of Legal Studies (2016) 211; S. Alegre and M. 
Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study – 
the European Arrest Warrant (2004) 10 European Law Journal 200; W. Van Ballegooij and P. Bard, 
‘Mutual Recognition and Individual Rights. Did the Court get it Right?’, (2016) 7 New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 439; A. Efrat, ‘Assessing mutual trust among EU members: evidence from the 
European Arrest Warrant’ (2019) 26 Journal of European Public Policy 656. 
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Member States and the importance of this value for EU integration and 
mutual trust among Member States has also been a matter of concern.38 
Therefore, merely to suggest in the thesis that this undermines the 
successful application of mutual recognition and challenges the legitimacy of 
the mutual recognition framework for judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
would certainly not be surprising. The thesis, however, adds value to the 
discussions on mutual recognition and mutual trust for the following three 
reasons.  
 First, by examining whether the fundamental rights and rule of law 
agenda in the pre-accession policy builds ground for mutual recognition, the 
thesis contributes to the mutual recognition debate in criminal matters from a 
different angle. The latter has been insufficiently examined to date.39 
Secondly, the theoretical lens relied on in the thesis to analyse the mutual 
recognition framework and the normative integration approach adopted in the 
field of EU criminal law is a novel methodology.40 Finally, the thesis brings 
together two usually separate dialogues. On the one hand, a discussion on 
the functioning of the principle of mutual recognition within the EU itself and, 
on the other hand, the pre-accession conditionality which should provide a 
solid foundation for mutual trust, and therefore mutual recognition after 
accession. Yet, the six chapters that follow demonstrate that a combined 
analysis of the principle of mutual recognition internally and externally, 
concerning the pre-accession policy, adds value to the analysis on whether 
the enlargement policy builds ground for mutual recognition in EU criminal 
matters in the long-term. The argument unfolds in the following manner.  
 
 
38 See, most illustratively, A. von Bogandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: 
What is it, What Has been Done, What can be done (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59; C. 
Closa and D. Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge 
University Press 2016); L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the 
EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3; D. Kochenov and L. Pech, 
‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2015) 11 European 
Constitutional Law Review 512; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values – Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017). 
39 See for two studies on the pre-accession conditionality, D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the 
Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law 
(Kluwer 2008) and E. Gateva, European Union Enlargement Conditionality (Palgrave Macmillan 
2015). 
40 Manners findings are primarily relied on to examine the EU’s role internationally. See (n. 27). 
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Structure of the thesis  
 
Chapter 1 discusses the substantial and rapid developments in EU criminal 
law in more detail and sets out the legislative and institutional changes in this 
field. In particular, it focuses on one of the key concepts of this project, the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition for judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, and the prominent role mutual recognition has obtained as 
a concept underpinning EU integration in this area. It recognises that mutual 
recognition is indeed an attractive tool to enhance progress in this field, 
especially considering the nature of this policy area which makes detailed 
harmonisation rather challenging. Yet, whilst the rationale of adopting this 
concept as the cornerstone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters is 
understandable at first, the second half of this chapter adopts a more critical 
stance. It conducts a cross-policy analysis between EU criminal law and the 
internal market where the concept was first introduced and draws some 
important distinctions which provide a background to the main problems 
surrounding mutual recognition in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Firstly, the level of integration reached in the internal market was 
significantly further advanced than EU criminal law at the time the principle of 
mutual recognition was introduced. Secondly, the principle in the internal 
market was introduced by the Court of Justice whilst the Council endorsed 
this concept for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Most importantly, it 
discusses the fundamental differences in the functioning and purpose of 
mutual recognition in both policy areas. In the internal market the concept 
serves and supports the individual’s freedom, whilst in criminal law matters 
the principle serves the state, and limits the freedom of the individual. As a 
result, it is argued, that the level of trust required is much higher in EU 
criminal law and respect for and adherence of the foundational values, such 
as fundamental rights and the rule of law, are vital for the successful 
application of the principle of mutual recognition.  
 Chapter 2 examines in more detail the principle of mutual trust which 
is a prerequisite for the principle of mutual recognition, and discusses the 
presumption of trust that Member States allegedly can have in each other’s 
criminal justice system, based on their compliance with the EU values. It 
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argues, that whilst mutual recognition is an objective and normative concept 
that can be enforced upon Member States, mutual trust is subjective and 
needs to earned. The chapter continues with an assessment of the Court’s 
mutual recognition case law and its approach regarding the presumption of 
trust. The case law demonstrates that the Court is a strong defender of the 
presumption of trust and prioritised the effectiveness of mutual recognition. 
Although, the more recent case law demonstrates a more nuanced 
approach, the Court set high thresholds in relation to the EAW for the refusal 
to surrender to be allowed. To some extent, this can be justified as it protects 
the effectiveness of the mutual recognition instrument. However, this 
becomes problematic if the lack of trust is justified due to serious violations of 
the foundational values. Indeed, in those situtions the Court of Justice should 
place its role to act as a guarantor of fundamental rights at the forefront of its 
judgments and defend this constitutional value which plays a key role for the 
legitimate application of mutual recognition. The remainder of the chapter 
focuses on the need to strengthen trust in practice. To an extent, this has 
been achieved through the adoption of the procedural rights Directives. Yet, 
especially in relation to the EAW, trust issues go beyond the harmonisation 
of national law. While recommendations made by the European Parliament, 
such as including a proportionality check and a fundamental rights ground in 
the FDEAW, could contribute to enhance trust in this mutual recognition 
instrument and address the problems with fundamental rights, the 
Commission was reluctant to amend the EAW legislation. This is unfortunate, 
as it could have supported the mutual recognition framework. 
 Chapter 3 delves deeper into the European Arrest Warrant which is 
an important EU integration tool based on mutual recognition, and explores 
the problematic trust assumption more thoroughly. It discusses the most 
important changes in the extradition procedure between Member States 
introduced by the Framework Decision. Due to the nature, functioning and 
lack of a refusal ground based on fundamental rights violations, it is argued 
that genuine and earned trust based on real evidence that other Member 
States comply with fundamental rights is especially important for this mutual 
recognition instrument. The chapter then analyses the transposition of the 
EAW into national legislation which demonstrates two important points in 
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relation to trust. Firstly, the Constitutional Court rulings against the national 
implementing acts, and the amendments of the actual substance of the EAW 
by the national implementing acts, such as including a fundamental rights 
refusal ground, show that Member States’ trust in the mutual recognition 
instrument itself is limited. Secondly, that the lack of trust in the legislative 
instrument is justified due to real and serious violations of fundamental rights 
which undermine the legitimacy of the EAW as a mutual recognition 
instrument. The final part of this chapter seeks to deepen the Court’s case 
law on the EAW. It argues that, while the acceptance of the Court in 
Aranyosi41 that the trust presumption is rebuttable - is a positive and much-
needed step, the judgment does not eliminate all the concerns regarding the 
justification of mutual recognition. Moreover, in light of the values crisis, the 
Court’s approach in LM42 cannot be justified and undermines the legitimacy 
of the mutual recognition framework.  
 Chapter 4 brings the discussion about the problems with the EU 
values upon which mutual trust is based within the rule of law context. It 
demonstrates the importance of adherence to the rule of law for EU criminal 
law integration based on mutual trust and therefore argues that a strong 
commitment by all Member States to the rule of law is necessary to support 
the mutual recognition framework. The chapter then strengthens the 
justifications for a lack of trust among Member States in each other’s criminal 
justice systems, by examining the serious problems with the rule of law in 
Hungary and Poland. In both countries the government deliberately seeks to 
dismantle the rule of law and have significantly weakened the independence 
of the judiciary. It is argued that the fundamental rights violations and rule of 
law issues in the current Member States question the EU’s constitutional and 
normative identity as a Union based on values. Moreover, it undermines the 
legitimacy to pursue judicial cooperation in criminal matters, through the 
principle of mutual recognition which has as its foundation respect for the so-
called ‘common’ values. 
 
41 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198. 
42 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:586. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the EU’s normative influence to enforce 
compliance with the foundational values. This needs to be sufficient to 
address the profound violations of the values by some Member States and 
support the mutual recognition framework in criminal matters. The chapter 
first examines Article 7 TEU and argues that due to the political nature of this 
mechanism and the high thresholds, it is an ineffective tool to repair the 
fractures in the mutual recognition footing caused by the serious rule of law 
problems. In addition, the rule of law initiatives from the EU institutions have 
also not contributed to the strengthening of the EU’s normative influence. 
The second enforcement tool that is analysed is the Article 258 TFEU 
infringement procedure. The chapter demonstrates that up until recently, the 
infringement procedure was largely ineffective to address the values crises. 
The Court’s judgements concerning the independence of the Polish Supreme 
Court43 and Ordinary Court44 have to some extent strengthened the Article 
258 TFEU procedure and therefore the EU’s normative influence, but not to a 
degree to provide the mutual recognition framework with the support that it 
requires. Therefore, the values crises that the EU is confronted with and the 
lack of efficient enforcement tools to address this satisfactorily, undermines 
the legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework and the normative 
approach adopted.   
 Notwithstanding the profound violations of the values by some 
Member States, compliance with these values is vigorously employed upon 
candidate countries. Having discussed the EU’s internal problems with the 
mutual recognition framework in criminal matters, the final chapter focuses 
on the EU’s trust building mechanisms externally by examining the pre-
accession policy. The latter should in principle establish a solid foundation for 
the application of mutual recognition once countries accede to the EU. It 
thereby seeks to answer whether mutual recognition is an exportable 
commodity. Chapter 6 discusses how the developments in the enlargement 
process clearly reflect a more prominent role for fundamental rights and the 
rule of law. It argues that this is in line with the increasing integration of the 
 
43 Case C-619/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531. 
44 Case C-192/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:924 
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Union, including judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the importance 
of mutual trust between Member States. Moreover, it is also a result of the 
experience from previous enlargement rounds and the ineffectiveness of the 
CVM as a tool to influence Bulgaria and Romania to make further progress in 
areas which are key for having trust in their criminal justice systems. This led 
to an amendment in the negotiation framework for Croatia where the rule of 
law and fundamental rights had a more prominent role, which was further 
enhanced by the new approach adopted in the pre-accession negotiations 
with Serbia and Montenegro. The chapter further argues that, with the 
incentive of membership in mind, the different conditionality mechanisms 
available to the EU in the pre-accession policy provide the EU with some 
strong tools to influence prospective members and transfer the values. 
However, a comparative analysis of the standards adhered to internally by 
the current Member States and expected externally in the pre-accession 
policy as well as the powers to enforce these standards triggers criticism of 
the EU’s double standards which could jeopardise the credibility of the EU as 
a value exporter.  
 Overall, the thesis argues that, whilst the accession criteria and 
conditionality in principle build ground for mutual trust and mutual 
recognition, in the long-term the internal situation could undermine this 
potentially short-term achievement. Building trust is a continuous process 
and can easily be lost. Therefore, the impact on new members that have 
acceded to the EU and that are experiencing violations of fundamental rights 
and rule of law backsliding by their fellow Member States should not be 
underestimated. Firstly, it could have a negative impact on the 
accomplishments of the pre-accession policy through the symbolic 
transmission, i.e. the power of example, regarding the disrespect of these 
foundational values. Secondly, it could undermine the level of trust that the 
new Member States have in their fellow Member States’ criminal justice 
system and thereby undermine the successful application of mutual 
recognition. It is therefore essential that the EU adopts a more effective 
approach to address the values crises.  
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1.  The Introduction of the Principle of Mutual Recognition in 
EU Criminal Law 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
EU criminal law is a rapidly evolving field where the developments are 
significant and the growth of EU measures is striking. This is quite significant 
bearing mind that only a quarter of a century ago the Union received limited 
competence in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters by the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Maastricht.1 Criminal justice is a challenging field, but 
this is intensified when it involves several states, cross-border elements and 
affects state sovereignty. Given the contested nature and sensitivity of these 
issues it was one of the last policies to be included in the European 
integration project.  
The Amsterdam Treaty changed the approach to judicial cooperation 
by introducing the objective of the development of an area of freedom, 
security and justice in the European Union and strengthened the powers of 
the EU in criminal matters.2 Progress in the field of EU criminal law became 
more important, but it was also recognised that detailed harmonisation of 
substantive national law across the Member States would be a very  
time-consuming and challenging process. In the internal market integration 
process, issues due to a lack of harmonisation were addressed through the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition which is generally accepted 
as an efficient tool in this policy area.3 Having worked well for the internal 
market, in 1999 the European Council embraced a new approach in the EU 
criminal law area and introduced the principle of mutual recognition in order 
to enhance integration in this field.4 Soon after the launch of this new 
approach the Council adopted several measures to implement this new 
 
1 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1. 
2 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ C 340/1, Part VI. 
3 European Council in Cardiff, Presidency Conclusions (15-16 June 1998) doc SN150/11/98 Rev 1, 
para 39. 
4 European Council in Tampere, Presidency Conclusions (15-16 October 1999) para 33. 
  
 
25 
strategy. 5 Moreover, with the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Union’s powers in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters were strengthened considerably and it was the first time that 
primary legislation made specific reference to the principle of mutual 
recognition.6 
   This chapter discusses the developments of EU criminal law as a 
policy area and the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in this 
field by examining the institutional and legislative framework (section 1.2). It 
then compares the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
internal market of the EU with judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
highlights some key differences in both policy areas. First, it examines the 
different stages of integration reached in both fields before the introduction of 
the principle of mutual recognition Secondly, it discusses the importance of 
the different EU actors who introduced the principle in the two respective 
areas. It concludes the cross-policy analysis by focusing on the vital 
differences in the functioning of the principle of mutual recognition in the field 
of EU criminal law and the EU’s internal market (section 1.3). It argues that 
the combination of the significant developments in the field of EU criminal law 
in a relatively short amount of time, combined with the substantial differences 
in relation to the application of the principle of mutual recognition in this field 
compared to the internal market demonstrate that a higher level of trust in 
each other’s criminal justice system is required among Member States. It is 
therefore essential for the application of the principle of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters that Member States are committed to the foundational 
values and share the EU’s normative identity.  
 
 
5 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission, How best to implement the provisions of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice OJ C 19/1, 23 January 1999; Programme of 
measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 
12/10, 15 January 2001. 
6 See Articles 67(3) TFEU, 70 TFEU, 81 TFEU and 82 TFEU. 
  
 
26 
1.2 The development of judicial cooperation in criminal matters: from 
informal cooperation to the principle of mutual recognition under the 
Lisbon Treaty 
 
1.2.1 From Council of Europe Conventions to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
The first developments concerning judicial cooperation within Europe began 
with the Council of Europe Conventions in the late 1950s.7 Informal 
cooperation in this field among Member States started in the 1960s and 
1970s. There was no formal role for Union institutions during the negotiations 
of these Conventions relating to criminal matters. The negotiations were 
seen as discussions between the Member States and when an act was 
agreed upon they were classified as international law.8 Member States 
wanted the EU to become involved in criminal cooperation because some 
Council of Europe Conventions were not ratified by several Member States 
and the Conventions contained exceptions to the rules which Member States 
wanted to reduce.9 It was not until the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 that a Union 
competence in the field of JHA was established by creating a formal 
intergovernmental system10, generally known as the third pillar of the EU. 
The rationale behind the three-pillar structure was to extend the Union’s 
authority to controversial issues, but at the same time to ensure that they 
would not fall under the supranational elements of the first pillar.11 The 
concessions made in relation to JHA during the negotiations of the 
Maastricht Treaty effected the functioning of the third pillar and created 
 
7 See for the Convention on extradition 1957, European Treaty Series 24, 86 and 98, and for the 
Convention on mutual assistance 1959, the European Treaty Series 30 and 99. These Conventions 
were followed by the Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons 1983, European Treaty 
Series 70 and 122; Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime 1990, European Treaty Series 141.  
8 S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law. Volume II: EU Criminal Law, Policing, and Civil Law 
(Oxford University Press 2016) 8. 
9 See for more detail on the Conventions D. McClean, International Cooperation in Civil and Criminal 
Matters (Oxford University Press 2002) 172-196; G. Corstens and J. Pradel, European Criminal Law 
(Kluwer International 2002) 63-177. 
10 See Title VI Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, Articles K-K.9 TEU 
(Maastricht Treaty)  
11 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, (Hart Publishing 2009) 9; D. Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of 
the Union: A Europe of Bits and Peaces’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 17. Under the third 
pillar the powers of the EU institutions, including the Court of Justice were restricted.  
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deficiencies. An assessment of the Maastricht third pillar in 1995 pointed out 
the inactivity in the field and noted that: 
 
Many of the reasons for this inactivity or lack of concrete progress are to be 
found in the structure of the Third Pillar itself. Other failures to achieve 
consensus seem to derive from an unwillingness to change the patterns of 
intergovernmental cooperation existing prior to the entry into force of the Third 
Pillar. A further disturbing trend is that the Third Pillar structure seems to have in 
no way assisted in making intergovernmental cooperation in this area more 
transparent, precisely at a time when transparency has become one of the major 
concerns at Union and Community level.12 
 
In the intergovernmental conference leading up to the adoption of the 
Amsterdam Treaty the sphere of justice and home affairs and the third pillar 
insufficiencies were a topic of concern. By focusing on the citizens of Europe 
and the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services, the Council 
emphasized the need to strengthen fundamental rights and the improvement 
of the protection of these rights.13 Especially, the lack of clearly-defined 
objectives, insufficient protection of the Union’s citizens against international 
crime, such as terrorism and drug trafficking and the disputes over judicial 
control by the Court of Justice in the field of justice and home affairs were 
seen an key issues were improvement was required.14 In addition, the 
predominance of unanimity in the legislative procedures, lack of transparency 
and ineffective and time-consuming decision making process, were all 
highlighted as contributing to the lack ‘of any comprehensive policy-making in 
justice and home affairs and a distinct preference of the Member States for 
the adoption of non-binding texts’.15  
During the negotiations of the intergovernmental conference Member 
States were divided over the question whether to transfer matters falling 
 
12 D. O’Keeffe, ‘Recasting the Third Pillar’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 893, 894.  
13 See European Parliament’s White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference Volume II: 
Summary of the positions of the Member States of the European Union with a view to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, 13.  
14 Ibid. 
15 J. Monar, ‘Justice and home affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: reform at the price of 
fragmentation’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 320, 320-321. See also, ibid, 13-15. 
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under the third pillar to the first pillar. Although most Member States were for 
the communitarisation of certain JHA parts, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in particular, believed that the intergovernmental pillar should 
remain the norm for all JHA matters.16 In addition, there was the Schengen 
Group’s strong insistence on integrating the Schengen Convention and the 
Schengen acquis into the Union, the Irish and British non-participation in the 
Schengen system, and Denmark as a Schengen Member but against 
communitarisation.17 As a result of the different national positions, the 
reforms introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the third pillar were 
complex and resulted in differentiation in the EU framework.18 Some fields of 
JHA policy making, immigration, asylum, external border controls and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, were transferred to the first pillar in the 
framework of title IV of the EC Treaty. Rules on the adoption of policing and 
criminal law measures remain under the third pillar, but the rules were 
comprehensively amended and new provisions were introduced on 
instruments, procedures and the Court of Justice.19 Overall, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam increased the role of the Union institutions in JHA matters, but 
Member States still had more control than they had over the economic 
integration matters. 
 
1.2.2 Creating an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the introduction 
of the Principle of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters 
 
The approach to judicial cooperation changed with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty introduced a new objective in Article 29, 
the development of the Union as an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. 
Associated with the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into Union law,20 
free movement in an area without internal frontiers was the objective for an 
area of freedom, security and justice and this became the framework in 
 
16 See for an overview of the Member States positions and viewpoints, White Paper (n 13). 
17 Ibid. 
18 See for a detailed discussion of the institutional and legislative framework, its developments and 
need for differentiated integration, Peers (n 8) Chapter 2.  
19 Previous Articles 29-42 of Title VI TEU. 
20 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 [2000] OJ L 239/19. 
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which EU action on JHA matters was interpreted.21 In order to realise an area 
of freedom, security and justice, mutual recognition evolved as the main 
principle. 
In 1998, the United Kingdom, during its EU presidency, proposed to 
apply the mutual recognition principle in order to enhance judicial 
cooperation. The United Kingdom referred to similarities between Article 29 
TEU and the objectives underlining the single market and that “a possible 
approach, comparable to that used to unblock the single market, would be to 
move away from the attempts to achieve detailed harmonisation to a regime 
where each Member State recognised as valid decisions of other Member 
States’ courts with a minimum of formality”.22 The introduction of the principle 
of mutual recognition in this field was thus seen as a way forward in the 
European integration project without the need for Member States to 
harmonise substantive aspects of their national laws.23 It is supposed to 
‘strike the right balance between unity and diversity’.24 This led to the 
recognition at the Cardiff European Council of ‘the need to enhance the 
ability of national legal systems to work closely together and asks the Council 
to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each 
others’ courts.25 This approach for improving judicial cooperation in the EU 
via mutual recognition was upheld in the following years.26  
With the new AFSJ objective under the Amsterdam Treaty, effective 
judicial cooperation became even more important. However, the European 
Council recognised that new tools to enhance judicial cooperation in this field 
were needed. In 1999, the European Council in its Tampere Conclusions, 
setting up a five year agenda for EU JHA matters, adopted a new strategy by 
 
21 Mitsilegas (n 11) 13.  
22 S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has the Council got it 
Wrong?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5, 9. 
23 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ 
(2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277. 
24 K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ The 
Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever Lecture All Souls College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, 
available at: 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_f
reedom_judge_lenaerts.pdf, accessed 20 March 2017, 2.  
25 Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 June 1998, doc SN 150/11/98 
Rev 1, para 39. 
26 Mitsilegas (n 23) 1279.  
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borrowing a concept that had worked well in the creation of the internal 
market. It held that:  
 
enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and the 
necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate cooperation between 
authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights. The European Council 
therefore endorses the principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should 
become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters 
within the Union. The principle should apply both to judgments and to other 
decisions of judicial authorities.27 
 
The Commission and the Council very quickly developed the European 
Council’s new strategy.28 In 2000 the Commission also acknowledged the 
importance of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters by 
referring to the Amsterdam Treaty which inserted Article 31 TEU and stated 
that ‘common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: 
facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and 
judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to 
proceedings and the enforcement of decisions’.29 With this new provision in 
mind the Commission held that:  
  
traditional judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based on a variety of 
international legal instruments, which are overwhelmingly characterised by what 
one might call the "request"-principle: One sovereign state makes a request to 
another sovereign state, who then determines whether it will or will not comply 
with this request. Sometimes, the rules on compliance are rather strict, not 
leaving much of a choice; on other occasions, the requested state is quite free in 
its decision. In almost all cases, the requesting state must await the reply to its 
request before it gets what its authorities need in order to pursue a criminal 
case. This traditional system is not only slow, but also cumbersome, and 
sometimes it is quite uncertain what results a judge or prosecutor who makes a 
request will get.30  
 
27 Tampere Conclusions (n 4) (emphasis added). 
28 Action Plan (n 5). 
29 Article 31(a) TEU.  
30 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM(2000) 495 final, 2. 
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As requested in the Tampere Conclusions31 the Council adopted a 
programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters. In order to implement the new strategy a 
programme of 24 measures, ranked by priority, was agreed upon by the 
Council in 2000.32 The introduction of the programme identified several 
parameters which determine the effectiveness of the mutual recognition 
exercise.33 In the following years this programme was implemented by 
several Framework Decisions on a European Arrest Warrant; the execution 
of orders freezing property and evidence; financial penalties; execution of 
confiscation orders; a European Evidence Warrant; the transfer of sentenced 
persons; probation and parole orders; pre-trial supervision orders; 
recognition of convictions; the exchange of criminal records; and in absentia 
trials.34 The development of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters was further encouraged by the Hague 
Programme of 2004 which listed 10 priorities for the next 5 years concerning 
 
31 Tampere Conclusions (n 4) para 37. 
32 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ C 12/10, 15 January 2001. 
33 Ibid, 11 and 12.  
34 See respectively, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1; Council 
Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the EU of orders freezing 
property or evidence [2003] OJ L 196/45; Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 
2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties [2005] OJ L 
76/16; Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions 
in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings [2008] OJ L 
220/32; Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal 
matters [2008] OJ L 350/72; Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ L 327/27; Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA 
of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and 
probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions 
[2008] OJ L 337/102; Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the 
application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition 
to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention [2009] OJ L 294/20; 
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of 
the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States [2009] OJ L 
93/23. 
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the area of freedom, security and justice.35 The Programme was supported 
by its related Action Plan which focused on the implementation of the 
Programme and giving the Hague Programme a practical aspect in an 
effective way.36 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,37 the institutional 
framework of JHA changed again considerably. The policy areas of JHA 
were reunited38 and the abolition of the pillar structure was a fact. The Lisbon 
Treaty communitarised the former intergovernmental areas of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As for decision-making rules, the 
Lisbon Treaty extended the qualified majority voting in the Council and co-
decision with the European Parliament in the ordinary legislative procedure 
to almost all JHA matters. The Treaty of Lisbon included transitional 
provisions regarding acts adopted in the field of police cooperation and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters which were adopted prior the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Commission’s power to start an 
infraction procedure under Article 258 TFEU if a Member State has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under the Treaties in this field were not applicable for the 
first five years after the date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.39  
The Court of Justice obtained jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in 
the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
The Lisbon Treaty repealed former Article 35 TEU under which the Court’s 
jurisdiction was subject to a declaration by which each Member State 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and specified the national 
courts that were entitled to request a preliminary ruling. The Treaty of Lisbon 
thus removed the restrictions to the Court’s jurisdiction, but the transitional 
period of five years referred to above, which ended on 1 December 2014, 
 
35 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Hague 
Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The partnership for European renewal in the field 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 184 final.  
36 Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening 
freedom, security and justice [2005] OJ C 198/1. 
37 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2008] OJ C 115/1. 
38 See Title V of Part Three TFEU.  
39 See Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions [2008] OJ C 115/322, Article 10.  
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was also applicable to the Court’s jurisdiction.40 Moreover, the Treaty of 
Lisbon also included a specific reference to the urgent preliminary ruling 
procedure which applies to the area of freedom, security and justice and 
came into effect on March 2008.41 The new paragraph in Article 267 TFEU 
requires the Court of Justice to act with a minimum of delay ‘if such a 
question is raised in a case pending before the court or tribunal of a Member 
State with regard to a person in custody’.  
The development of the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice got an even more prominent position in the Treaty of Lisbon. It now 
appears in the opening parts of the TEU, were the most important Union’s 
objectives are stated.42 Moreover, as is clear from the preceding discussion 
the principle of mutual recognition, especially in light of the AFSJ objective,  
was high on the agenda in relation to official and supporting documents 
coming from the Union institutions, but the Lisbon Treaty incorporated the 
principle of mutual recognition for the first time in the Treaties.43 The principle 
especially obtained a dominant position in the provisions on judicial 
cooperation and criminal matters. Article 82(1) TFEU states that ‘judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of 
mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. The Treaty 
also included a legal basis to adopt minimum rules ‘necessary to facilitate 
mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension’.44   
The developments discussed above in the institutional and legislative 
framework demonstrate the fast changes in the field of EU criminal law. In 
less than two decades the EU moved from creating some formal 
intergovernmental system with limited powers for the institutions in JHA 
 
40 Ibid. 
41 Information for the Press No 12/08, A New Procedure in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
The Urgent Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 3 March 2008. See also the Council’s request in Council 
Decision of 20 December 2007 amending the protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice and 
amendments to the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice adopted by the Court on 15 January 
2008, OJ 2008 L 24/42, 39.  
42 See, Article 3(2) TEU. 
43 See, Articles 67(3) TFEU, 70 TFEU, 81 TFEU and 82 TFEU. 
44 See Article 82(2) TFEU.  
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matters under the Maastricht Treaty to a more supranational system under 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In order to move forward with the integration project in 
such sensitive policy areas where Member States’ sovereignty is highly 
valued, differentiated integration45 and the introduction of the principle of 
mutual recognition were a necessary compromise. Since the 1999 Tampere 
Conclusions, which endorsed the principle of mutual recognition as the so-
called ‘cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters’, the EU has 
been quite ambitious in terms of the development and implementation of the 
principle in this field. This resulted in several secondary legislative 
instruments and the introduction of the principle in the Lisbon Treaty itself 
only 10 years after the Tampere Conclusions. Thus, the principle of mutual 
recognition has obtained a prominent role in the judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and has become a ‘constitutional’ principle that underpins 
the development of an AFSJ.46  
 
1.3 Cross-Policy Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition: The 
Internal Market and EU Criminal Law/AFSJ 
 
If substantive harmonisation of national rules and standards seems 
unrealistic and not achievable, the concept of mutual recognition provides a 
way forward in the integration project of the EU. The principle, on the one 
hand, embraces the diversity of national legal systems, but on the other hand 
is based on the equivalence of national standards, norms and judicial acts.47 
 
45 See for more detail on specific opt-outs in this field by Member States, Peers (n 8) chapter 2. See 
also J. Shaw, ‘Flexibility in a “Reorganized” and “Simplified Treaty”’, (2003) 40 Common Market Law 
Review, 279; R. Adler-Nissen, ‘The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National 
Integration Strategies’, (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 663; R. Adler-Nissen, ‘Behind 
the scenes of differentiated integration: circumventing national opt-outs in Justice and Home 
Affairs’, (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 62; R. Adler-Nissen, ‘Opting Out of an Ever Closer 
Union: The Integration Doxa and the Management of Sovereignty’, (2011) 34 West European Politics 
1092; A. Hinarejos, J. R. Spencer and S. Peers, ‘Opting out of EU Criminal law: What is actually 
involved?’, CELS Working Paper, September 2012, available at: 
https://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/oct/eu-cels-uk-opt-out-crim-law.pdf, last accessed 8 June 
2017. 
46 E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘Constitutional Principles in the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in D. 
Acosta and C. Murphy (eds), EU Security and Justice Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 36.  
47 D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 764; 
E. Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution 
and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 489, 508. 
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It is therefore an alternative to positive integration and governs cooperation 
among Member States.48 Instead of requiring the vertical transfer of 
sovereignty which is a necessity by EU harmonisation, the principle of mutual 
recognition is an example of the transfer of sovereignty on a horizontal basis 
(Member States recognise and give effect to the rules and acts of the 
judiciary of other Member States).49 This concept, therefore demonstrates 
more respect for a Member State’s autonomy,50 but also creates extra-
territoriality as Member States can enforce their national rules and judicial 
decisions beyond its territorial legal borders.51  
Generally seen as a useful principle to promote economic integration 
in the internal market ‘the idea was born that judicial cooperation [in criminal 
matters] might also benefit from the concept of mutual recognition’.52 The 
suitability of the cross-policy application of the principle of mutual recognition, 
which was already questioned at the early stages of the adoption of the 
principle as the key pillar in judicial cooperation,53 is important to look at in 
more detail in order to obtain a more holistic understanding of the challenges 
the principle caused in the AFSJ and particularly in EU criminal matters. 
Firstly, the background and developments of the two distinct policy areas in 
the EU before the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition are very 
dissimilar. The developments in the economic integration project were far 
more advanced before mutual recognition became a key pillar in the internal 
market compared to the AFSJ. Secondly, a closer look at the functioning and 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the context of the internal 
market and the AFSJ illustrates important differences and demonstrates that 
 
48 K.A. Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’, in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single 
European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 2002) 225.  
49 S. Schmidt, ‘Mutual Recognition as a new Mode of Governance’ (2007) 14 Journal of European 
Public Policy 667, 672.  
50 K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through Mutual Recognition’ (2007) 14 
Journal of European Public Policy 682. 
51 Ibid; K. Nicolaidis and G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without 
Global Government’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 263; V. Mitsilegas, ‘Mutual 
Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and 
T. Konstadinides (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar Publishing) 149. 
52 Commission’s Communication (n 30) 2. 
53 See generally, Peers (n 22); Mitsilegas (n 23); S. Lavenex, ‘Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly 
of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 762. 
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the principle is not a homogeneous concept.54 As a result of the 
dissimilarities in the AFSJ compared to the internal market, trust in the 
adherence of the Union’s foundational values by other Member States is 
essential for the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters. This is undermined if Member States no longer fully share the EU’s 
normative and constitutional identity based on Article 2 TEU and therefore 
requires a strong commitment to the values.  
 
1.3.1 Different stages of integration and introduced at different levels   
 
As is commonly known, the roots of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
EU lie in the free movement of goods area. It was introduced in the internal 
market in 1978 by the famous Cassis de Dijon judgment.55 In Cassis the 
Court of Justice was asked whether the German authorities were allowed to 
refuse the importation of a French fruit liqueur on the grounds that the liqueur 
did not meet the German minimum alcohol percentage requirements. The 
Court held that the German rule was an obstacle to trade and prohibited 
under what is now Article 34 TFEU as there is ‘no valid reason why, provided 
that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member 
States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other Member 
State’.56 Although the Court in Cassis de Dijon did not embrace the exact 
wording of the principle, it is generally recognised that this renowned 
statement encapsulated the principle of mutual recognition.57 The application 
 
54 M. Möstl, ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
405, 408. See for a more detailed comparative study of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
internal market and the AFSJ, W. van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual Recognition in European  Law 
(Intersentia 2015). 
55 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649. 
56 Ibid, para 14.  
57 See, for example: P. Graig and G. De Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University 
Press 2015) 676; L. Woods and P. Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 
390; J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (Pearson 2016) 583; C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of 
the EU. The Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press 2016) 112. The Commission in the 
communication concerning the consequences of the judgment also acknowledged the introduction 
of the principle of mutual recognition in the free movement of goods area and elaborated on the 
importance of this principle. See Communication from the Commission concerning the 
consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 
(‘Cassis de Dijon’), OJ C 256/2, 3 October 1980, 2-3. Interestingly, it was not until many years later in 
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of the principle of mutual recognition by the Court in the free movement of 
goods area was equally applied to the other free movement categories 
shortly afterwards.58 Moreover, not long after the Cassis de Dijon judgment 
the Commission in 1985 in the White Paper on the completion of the internal 
market launched a new legislative strategy, which truly embraced the 
principle of mutual recognition in combination with minimum harmonisation.59 
The Commission acknowledged the shortcomings of the internal market’s 
harmonisation approach in achieving a genuine common market by 1992.60 It 
stated that ‘in principle, therefore, given the Council’s recognition of the 
essential equivalence of the objectives of national legislation, mutual 
recognition could be an effective strategy for bringing about a common 
market in a trading sense’,61 because ‘a strategy based totally on 
harmonisation would be over-regulatory, would take a long time to 
implement, would be inflexible and could stifle innovation’.62 As a result it 
adopted a policy where further initiatives to accomplish the internal market 
would only be harmonised if it is essential and could not be left to mutual 
recognition of national regulations and standards.63 
 The principle of mutual recognition was thus first introduced in the 
internal market sphere in 1978 by Cassis and adopted as a key concept in 
the following years. It is, however, important to acknowledge that the level of 
economic integration had already made several significant steps prior to the 
principle of mutual recognition finding its way into the internal market. Firstly, 
the six founder Member States had completed the customs union on 1 July 
1968, which abolished customs duties at internal borders between the 
Member States; adopted common customs duties on imports from outside 
the EU; common rules of origin for products from outside the EU; and a 
 
Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519 that the Court of Justice actually employed the 
term ‘principle of mutual recognition’ in the area of the free movement of goods.  
58 See for a detailed discussion of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the free 
movement area, C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law (Oxford University Press 
2013) Part I, Chapter 1, 11.  
59 White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Completing the Internal Market, COM 
(1985) 310 final.  
60 Ibid, para 61. 
61 Ibid, para 63.  
62 Ibid, para 64.  
63 Ibid, 19.  
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common definition of customs value.64 The Court of Justice had also already 
rendered some important judgments in relation to customs duties and 
charges having equivalent effect in which it adopted a broad definition of the 
latter, focused on the effect of the charge rather than its purpose and has 
been reluctant to accept exceptions to the rule thereby leaving little scope for 
Member States to circumvent the prohibition on customs duties.65 The 
decisions indicated the Court’s approach in that the Treaty provisions on 
customs duties were to be taken seriously which is unsurprising as the 
abolition of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect go to the 
very heart of the creation of an internal market.  
Secondly, prior to the introduction on the principle of mutual 
recognition the Court had already established the principle of direct effect in 
Van Gend en Loos,66 one of the most ground-breaking judgments of the 
Court of Justice which is also one of the few cases concerning customs 
duties. The Court recognised that EU Law was also contended to confer 
rights on individuals which if certain conditions were satisfied, could be 
directly enforced in national courts. As a result, it provided individuals with a 
remedy to enforce EU provisions that were directly effective and challenge 
inconsistent national actions. The consequences of this judgment for the EU, 
but at the time more specifically for the internal market are significant. It led 
to other provisions concerning the internal market also being held as directly 
effective,67 allowed the Court to employ direct effect to compensate for 
insufficient action on the part of the Union’s legislative institutions and to 
prompt the proper implementation of the internal market Treaty provisions by 
the Member States.68 Finally, an EU tax framework abolishing tax 
discrimination which is closely related to the customs union was also already 
 
64 The current relevant provisions can be found in Articles 28-32 TFEU.  
65 See Case 10/65 Deutschmann v. Germany [1965] ECR 469; Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] 
ECR 193; Cases 2 and 3/69 Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. SA Ch. Brachfeld & Sons [1969] 
ECR 211; Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 423; Case 18/71 Eunomia v Italy [1971] ECR 811; 
Case 29/72 Marimex SpA v. Italian Finance Administration [1972] ECR 1309; Case 39/73 Rewe-
Zentralfinanz v Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer Westfalen-Lippe [1973] ECR 1039. 
66 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
67 See for example, Case 13/68 SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade [1986] ECR 453; Case 
41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631; Case 
43/75 Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne [1976] ECR 455. 
68 Graig and De Burca (n 57) 276. 
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established prior to Cassis.69 The main provision in this field which currently 
can be found in Article 110 TFEU was already held to be directly effective in 
the 1960s.70 
It is thus evident that some significant steps in the internal market 
integration project were already made before the principle of mutual 
recognition was introduced as a tool in 1978 to further the level of integration. 
Moreover, in the internal market the national underlying laws were much 
more comparable as harmonisation had already occurred which made the 
principle of mutual recognition a success in this field.71 Whereas, only baby-
steps had been made in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
prior to the objective of creating an AFSJ in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
recognition in 1998 at the Cardiff European Council of mutual recognition as 
a concept to enhance cooperation in this field after which the Tampere 
Conclusions in 1999 formally adopted the principle as the way-forward for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.72 This was thus a relatively new 
policy area, with less legislation, jurisprudence from the Court of Justice and 
overall less supporting and guiding mechanisms to consider for Member 
States and their national courts when implementing and applying the 
principle of mutual recognition.  
Another important difference is that in the internal market domain the 
principle was introduced by the Court of Justice. In Cassis the Court 
responded to the national courts who were faced with an increase of cases 
being brought before them due to the broad definition adopted in the 
Dassonville judgment of ‘measures having equivalent effect’.73 It addressed, 
on the one hand, the traders’ interests who needed to comply with the home 
and host Member States’ rules and requirements on their goods and who 
complained about these dual burden measures. On the other hand, it also 
 
69 The current relevant provisions can be found in Articles 110-113 TFEU.  
70 Case 57/65 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarlouis [1966] ECR 205. 
71 Peers (n 22) 9; C. Murphy, ‘The European Evidence Warrant: Mutual Recognition and Mutual 
(Dis)trust’ in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime Within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: A European Public Order (Cambridge University Press 2011) 226. Harmonisation to support 
the mutual recognition framework in criminal matters is discussed in chapter 2.  
72 See section 1.2 for a more detailed discussion on the developments of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters.  
73 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5.  
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took into account the Member States’ concerns in protecting their 
fundamental interests. The traders’ interests were accounted for by the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition and the Member States’ 
concerns through the so-called ‘mandatory requirements’ as grounds to limit 
the principle of mutual recognition and restrict the free movement of goods if 
the measure is proportionate.74 In comparison, whilst the Court of Justice, 
stemming from the requests of the national courts, introduced the principle of 
mutual recognition in the internal market, in the AFSJ the principle of mutual 
recognition came from the top of the legislative powers in the EU, namely the 
European Council itself. This is an important difference, especially for 
national courts who need to apply the principle of mutual recognition and 
might be less supportive and convinced by the introduction of this concept in 
the AFSJ, particularly in the sensitive area of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.75 
 
1.3.2 The differences in the functioning and application of the principle of 
mutual recognition  
 
Whilst the overall rationale for adopting the principle of mutual recognition in 
the internal market and the AFSJ was similar in terms of coordinating the 
policy areas and moving forward with the EU’s integration project without the 
need to harmonise national laws to a great extent, the functioning and 
purpose of mutual recognition differs considerably in both policy areas. 
Although the application of the principle of mutual recognition in both spheres 
requires the difficult task of balancing the respect for individuals’ rights and 
freedoms and the legitimate objectives of public interests,76 one supports 
individual freedom and the other does the exact opposite by limiting the 
rights and freedoms of the individual.77 In the context of the internal market, 
mutual recognition requires Member States to recognise standards and 
 
74 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649, para 8 and 14(4). 
75 This is discussed in more detail in chapter 2 and 3. 
76 See Möstl (n 54) 407 and Lenaerts (n 24) 3.  
77 Möstl (n 54) 409. 
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requirements in terms of goods, services and persons of other Member 
States whilst these might be different or lower compared to their own 
standards and requirements. Individuals no longer have the burden of having 
to comply with two different regulatory regimes but can rely on home state 
rules in the host state. It therefore supports and serves the individual’s 
freedom and limits the Member States’ regulatory autonomy.78  
On the other hand, in the more recent context of the AFSJ, mutual 
recognition requires Member States to recognise and act on judicial 
decisions of other Member States. It promotes the freedom of judicial 
decisions and serves the State as it extents its judicial powers beyond its 
territory.79 This is also apparent in the discussion paper by the Finnish 
Presidency in 2006, where it was held that ‘as a result of the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition, judicial decisions can be enforced much 
more quickly and with greater certainty. The amount of discretion is reduced, 
as is the scope of grounds for refusal’.80 However, the effects on the 
individual are not to be taken lightly as they are exposed to what are usually 
disadvantageous rules coming from a foreign country which interfere with 
their rights and freedom.81 Hence, the principle of mutual recognition limits 
individual freedom. It follows that the beneficiaries of the principle of mutual 
recognition in both policy areas are different, in the internal market the 
individual benefits from the concept whereas in the AFSJ these are State 
representatives. Moreover, as rightly stated by Lavenex, mutual recognition 
in the internal market is used as a tool of liberalisation, but the principle in the 
AFSJ leans more towards an instrument of governmentalisation.82   
It is also important to emphasise that what Member States mutually 
recognise as a consequence of the principle is fundamentally different in both 
areas. In the internal market Member States recognise standards and 
requirements in terms of product safety, products being economically 
 
78 Ibid, 407.  
79 See Lavenex (n 23) 764-765.  
80 Finnish Presidency, Informal JHA ministerial meeting Tampere, 20-22 September 2006, available 
at: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/sep/eu-jha-informal-borders.pdf, last accessed 9 
October 2018.  
81 Möstl (n 54) 409. 
82 Lavenex (n 23) 765. 
  
 
42 
friendly, qualifications etc. as equal compared to their own standards. The 
only exception to this is if a Member State has an objective and legitimate 
public interest that they want to protect and the measure is proportionate to 
the aim. Moreover, the standards of other Member States are legal texts 
which, if necessary, can be accessed by other Member States and courts. By 
contrast, in the AFSJ, Member States give effect to an act of the other 
Member States’ judiciary. In doing so, Member States not only recognise a 
law as being equivalent, but also the interpretation of all relevant provisions 
by another Member States’ judiciary.83 The justification for this process is that 
the executing Member State can trust that the judicial decision of the other 
Member State is legal and legitimate based on the common values listed in 
Article 2 TEU and more specifically in criminal matters, the shared standards 
of fundamental rights and procedural safeguards. Therefore, although in both 
policy fields the principle of mutual recognition was introduced to make 
integration more effective, in the AFSJ the justification for the legitimate 
application of mutual recognition is based on the adherence to the EU’s 
foundational values by its Member States. Consequentely, in the field of EU 
criminal matters, fundamental rights and rule of law breaches weaken the 
first tier of the mutual recognition framework which is based on compliance 
with the common values. This in turn will have a negative effect on the 
second tier of the framework as it undermines trust among Member States in 
each other’s criminal justice systems and could challenge the legitimacy and 
justification of the application of the principle of mutual recognition.  
Indeed, considering that the principle of mutual recognition in EU 
criminal matters was introduced to enhance judicial cooperation among 
Member States, the effectiveness of the principle in this field would be 
significantly reduced if minor and infrequent fundamental rights breaches by 
Member States prevent the application of the principle. Therefore, to enforce 
the application of mutual recognition in these circumatances could be 
justified to protect its effectiveness. However, this becomes increasingly 
problematic and unjustified if the non-complicance by Member States with 
the values is serious, systematic and persistent. In those circumstances, the 
 
83 Ibid. 
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mutual reconition framework is significantly and justifiably weakened and the 
effectiveness of judicial cooperation in criminal matters can no longer prevail.  
 
1.4 Conclusion  
 
The EU is a significant actor in addressing cross-border crime and although it 
is logical that it was one of the last policies included in the EU’s integration 
agenda due to its sensitive nature and the original focus of the European 
project, cross-border crime has become more problematic over the years. 
For example, advanced technology but also the development of the four 
freedoms in the internal market such as the free movement of persons and 
capital have all contributed to an increase in cross-border crime. This justifies 
the need to make real progress in this field and develop it rapidly.  
The idea of introducing the principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ 
based on this concept being rather successful in the internal market as a tool 
to improve the level of integration without the need for a significant amount of 
harmonisation is understandable at first. However, the functioning and 
application of the principle of mutual recognition is fundamentally different in 
both areas. The freedom and rights of the individuals concerned are much 
more problematic in the AFSJ as the principle serves the state rather than 
the individual. Moreover, the application of the principle in this area by 
Member States goes beyond the pure recognition of another Member States’ 
law, including the fundamental rights standards as equivalent. It recognises 
the interpretation of the relevant provisions and the need to enforce another 
Member States’ judicial decision.84 As a result, the level of trust that Member 
States need to have in each other’s judiciary system is much higher. The 
latter requires, a strong commitment by all the Member States to the EU’s 
normative identity based on the common values listed in Article 2 TEU. 
Consequently, serious and persistent non-compliance with fundamental 
rights and the rule of law by Member States undermines trust and the 
legitimate application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters. Whilst the effectiveness and enhacement of judicial cooperation 
 
84 Ibid, 765-766. 
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underlie the introduction of the principle in this field, mutual recognition and 
presumed trust cannot be justifiably forced upon Member States if violations 
of the foundational values are no longer infrequent and minor.    
Therefore, although mutual trust is a prerequisite for the successful 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, trust in 
upholding and safeguarding the values when there is clear evidence of the 
contrary cannot be presumed and forced upon Member States. Moreover, as 
fundamental rights are at stake the preconditions and limitations of the 
automaticity of mutual recognition and presumed trust play a far more 
important role in this field.85 Indeed, as the chapters that follow will illustrate, 
the trust presumption is problematic and jeopardises the legitimate 
application of the principle of mutual recognition. It is therefore not surprising 
that the application of mutual recognition in the AFSJ and specifically in 
criminal matters was challenged early on and caused a significant amount of 
controversy. Whilst mutual recongtion was introduced to boost the 
effectiveness of judicial coopration in criminal matters, this aim should not 
prevail if Member States seriously violate the foundational values.  
 
 
 
85 Mitsilegas (n 51) 148.  
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2.  Mutual Trust: A Prerequisite for the Principle of Mutual 
Recognition 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapter highlighted the differences between the internal 
market and the AFSJ in relation to the principle of mutual recognition. It 
argued that as a result of these differences a higher level of trust among 
Member States is required for the application of mutual recognition, 
especially in criminal matters. Building on chapter one, this chapter focuses 
on the principle of mutual trust. Mutual trust is a prerequisite for the principle 
of mutual recognition and the second tier of the mutual recognition 
framework. It rests on the first tier which assumes that all Member States 
respect the EU’s foundational values listed in Article 2 TEU and share the 
EU’s normative and constitutional identity. This allows for Member States to 
have trust in each other’s criminal justice systems and therefore can 
recognise and act on judicial decisions coming from other Member States. 
However, mutual trust among Member States cannot be presumed, it needs 
to be sufficiently supported by evidence that Member States in practice 
actually comply with these values. In particular, respect for fundamental 
rights is essential for the justification of the application of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters, because violations of this important value 
challenge the legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework.   
 This chapter discusses the importance of a sufficiently high level of 
genuine and earned trust among Member States for the application of mutual 
recognition. It is argued that trust cannot be presumed and forced upon 
Member States as this undermines the legitimacy of the mutual recognition 
framework. It therefore criticises the strict trust presumption that the Court 
initially adopted in its case law (section 2.2). It then examines the 
developments in the Court’s case law regarding mutual trust in the different 
AFSJ policy fields. It demonstrates that the Court adopted a more nuanced 
approach towards the presumption of trust, but in relation to the EAW where 
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fundamental rights are key, the case law is problematic and still questions 
the legitimacy of the application of mutual recognition (section 2.3). The 
chapter then discusses the secondary law measures adopted by the EU 
regarding the individual’s procedural rights. It argues that the harmonisation 
of national law contributes to the strengthening of trust among Member 
States and therefore supports the application of mutual recognition 
instruments in criminal matters, such as the EAW. However, the 
proportionality issues in relation to the EAW, combined with violations of the 
foundational values by Member States and the case law regarding the EAW 
challenges the successful application of this mutual recognition instrument 
(section 2.4).  
 
2.2 The relationship between mutual recognition and mutual trust  
 
The Tampere Conclusions which launched the principle of mutual recognition 
as a governance tool in the AFSJ did not explicitly link the principle to a 
requirement of trust between Member States. Shortly after, the Commission 
acknowledged that trust was an important element for mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions in criminal matters.1 The Programme to implement mutual 
recognition firmly established the presumption of trust and stated that:  
 
Implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters presupposes that Member States have trust in each others’ criminal 
justice systems. That trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared 
commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.2  
 
Since then, the EU institutions have embraced the use of the term mutual 
trust in the criminal justice area in legislation, policy documents and case 
law, but the principle of mutual trust is not defined in the Treaties and its 
 
1 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Mutual 
Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final, 4, where the Commission 
stated that ‘mutual trust is an important element, not only trust in the adequacy of one’s partners 
rules, but also trust that these rules are correctly applied’. 
2 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ C 12/10, 15 January 2001, 10 (emphasis added). 
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scope is ambiguous. However, mutual trust is a core aspect of EU criminal 
matters as a sufficiently high level of trust is necessary among Member 
States for the extraterritoriality of judicial decisions to be accepted.3 The 
presumption of trust is justified on the basis of the EU’s common values 
shared by Member States and in light of EU criminal matters, especially 
compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of law.4 The assumption of 
compliance with fundamental rights was initially founded on the ECHR of 
which all Member States are parties to. With the entering into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty the EU’s internal situation regarding fundamental rights 
changed by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as primary 
law.5  
Within the mutual recognition framework, the second tier, which 
entails the principle of mutual trust, is thus based on compliance with the 
values and therefore requires every Member State to share the EU’s 
normative identity. The compliance presumption requires trust in abstracto 
and trust in concreto. Trust in abstracto acknowledges that standards 
between Member States might be different but renders them equivalent. 
This, of course, only holds as long as Member States are committed to the 
values.6 Trust in concreto requires these standards and rules that are 
equivalent also to be interpreted and applied correctly in practice, which has 
proven to be difficult.7 A lack of sufficient, genuine and unambiguous trust in 
relation to both trust requirements questions the legitimacy of mutual 
recognition, because the two tiers on which it is built are undermined.8  
 Indeed, it has been widely acknowledged that the successful 
application of mutual recognition relies on the prerequisite of trust. The Court 
of Justice has also referred to the principle of mutual trust in its case law on 
 
3 See also, chapter 1. 
4 The rule of law is discussed in chapter 4.  
5 Article 6 TEU.  
6 See chapter 4 for a discussion on the dismantlement of the values through, inter alia, legislative 
amendments.  
7 J. Ouwekerk, ‘Mutual Trust in the Area of Criminal Law’, in Meijers Committee, The Princple of 
Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration and Criminal Law (Forum 2011) 38, 47. 
8 G. Vermeulen, ‘Flaws and Contradictions in the Mutual Trust and Recognition Discourse: Casting a 
Shadow on the Legitimacy of EU Criminal Policy Making and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters?, in N. Persak (ed.), Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and Justice (Ashgate 
Publishing 2014) 153. 
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mutual recognition in the AFSJ and became a strong defender of the trust 
presumption in order to protect the effectiveness of judicial cooperation.9 In 
Gözütok and Brügge, its first judgment concerning mutual recognition under 
the third pillar the Court was asked whether ne bis in idem listed in Article 54 
CISA,10 included settlements out of court and therefore prohibited criminal 
proceedings based on the same facts in another Member State.11 The Court 
ruled in the affirmative and as a justification for the effet utile of Article 54 
CISA and the broader framework of creating an AFSJ12 adopted a broad 
notion of mutual trust:  
 
there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law 
in force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be different if 
its own national law were applied.13 
 
The Court confirmed this prerequisite of trust in each other’s criminal justice 
systems in its later ne bis in idem judgments.14 Not long after Gözütok and 
Brügge, the Court’s presumption of mutual trust found its way in different 
situations where the limits of mutual recognition were questioned. In 
Advocaten voor de Wereld, the first preliminary judgement concerning the 
EAW, the Court was asked to rule on the validity of the mutual recognition 
instrument.15 Similar to the ne bis in idem line of case law, the Court 
embraced a functional and theleological approach and focused on the 
effectiveness of the Framework Decision which is based on mutual 
recognition16 and justified ‘in the light of the high degree of trust and solidarity 
 
9 See generally, T. Ostropolski, ‘The CJEU as a Defender of Mutual Trust’ (2015) 6 New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 166. 
10 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 [2000] OJ L 239/19. 
11 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2003:87. 
12 Ibid, para 36 and 37. 
13 Ibid, para 33. 
14 See for example, Case C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333, para 30; Case C-467/04 Gasparini 
and others [2006] ECR I-9199, para 30; Case C-150/05 Van Straaten [2006] ECR I-9327, para 43; Case 
C-297/07 Bourquain [2008] ECR I-9425, para 37.  
15 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, EU:C:2007:261. See for a more detailed discussion 
chapter 3, section 3.3. 
16 Ibid, para 28. 
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between Member States’.17 It is, however, important to point out that unlike 
the ne bis in idem case law which enhances the protection of fundamental 
rights and focusses on legal certainty in order to ensure free movement, the 
Court’s use of the presumption of trust in the EAW limits the fundamental 
rights protection of the individual.18 As a result, trust in abstracto and trust in 
concreto based on a firm commitment to the foundational values is essential 
and relying on a strong presumption of trust without sufficient grounds to 
justify this becomes problematic. The trust presumption is especially 
undermined and unjustified if there is strong and persistent evidence that 
indicates that Member States are not safeguarding the values. This fractures 
the first tier and foundation of the mutual recognition framework and 
challenges the legitimate application of the principle. In those circumstances 
the effectiveness of the FDEAW should not prevail, because this would not 
only go directly against the values upon which the EU is founded it also 
undermines the justification for mutual recognition and mutual trust which the 
EU itself has provided. Thus, whilst the Court has the challenging task of 
protecting the effectiveness of the EAW and fundamental rights, the latter 
should certainly prevail if it concerns serious violations of the values. Yet, in 
later judgments the Court reiterated the strong focus on the effectiveness of 
mutual recognition in the FDEAW and high level of presumed trust which in 
turn therefore does not allow for restrictions and limitations of the application 
of mutual recognition beyond the grounds listed in the legislative 
instrument.19  
Up until 2011, in the judgment of N.S. and Others,20 the Court of 
Justice adopted a very strict approach in relation to the principle of mutual 
trust and did not allow the presumption of trust to be challenged by Member 
 
17 Ibid, para 57. 
18 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From 
Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of 
European Law 319, 322. 
19 See for example, C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov [2007] ECR I-08993, para 42 and 51; Case 
C-123/08 Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:616, para 56; Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello, EU:C:210:683, 
para 37; Case C-192/12 PPU Melvin West, EU:C:2012:404, para 54-56; Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile 
Radu, EU:C:2013:39, para 33-36; Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, 
para 36-38; Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. v Premier ministre, EU:C:2013:358, para 34-35. 
20 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S and M.E. and Others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, EU:C:2011:865.  
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States.21 This period in the literature is referred to as “blind trust” and was 
upheld for a significant time in which the Court overstretched the principle of 
trust and treated trust as a duty in order to protect the effectiveness of trust-
based law.22 This is problematic and criticised on the ground that the 
foundation of trust is not that strong23 and ‘that mutual recognition does not 
necessarily imply mutual trust’.24 It is incorrect to assume compliance with 
rules without Member States becoming trustworthy and gaining trust based 
on actual evidence.25 Mutual recognition as a concept is objective and can be 
treated as a normative principle. Member States under EU law can be 
required to recognise and act on judicial decisions of another Member State. 
Trust on the other hand, is a subjective concept and cannot be normative 
and enforced upon Member States. It is a social concept26 which cannot be 
treated as a legal obligation but needs to be earned.27 Thus, whilst the 
enforcement of mutual recognition instruments is understandbale in order to 
protect the effectivenss of trust-based law and enhance judicial cooperation, 
enforcing trust without sufficient evidence to justify this, especially if 
fundamental rights are at stake, is not in line with the mutual recognition 
framework.  
  
2.3 The Court of Justice and the presumption of trust versus human 
rights   
 
 
21 See for a more detailed discussion section 2.4.1  
22 E. Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of 
Evolution and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 
489, 492.  
23 See generally, S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, ‘Europe’s Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in 
the European Arrest Warrant System’ (2013) 55 CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, 
available at https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/europes-most-wanted-recalibrating-trust-
european-arrest-warrant-system/, last accessed 10 December 2018. 
24 T. Konstadinides, ‘The Europeanisation of Extradition: How Many Light Years Away to Mutual 
Confidence?’ in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds.), Crime Within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: A European Public Order (Cambridge University Press 2011) 194.  
25 Xanthopoulou (n 22) 500-501. 
26 A. Williams, ‘Mutual Trust as a Term of Art in EU Criminal Law: Revealing its Hybrid Character’ 9 
European Journal of Legal Studies (2016) 211, 234 -241. 
27 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights in 
Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 457, 457.  
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The principle of mutual trust is thus essential for the functioning of the 
principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ. The Court of Justice is supposed 
to act as guarantor of fundamental rights and conduct a constitutional check 
regarding the Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights.28 
However, as discussed above, the Court initially focused on the effectiveness 
of mutual recognition in order to promote automaticity in inter-state 
cooperation in the borderless AFSJ.29 In doing so, it adopted a very strict 
approach of the presumption of trust and did not allow for limitations and 
exceptions on human rights grounds. It justified its presumption of trust on 
the required compliance of all EU Member States with fundamental rights. 
However, the case law indicates that the level of trust among Member States 
is limited and cannot always be presumed.30 Moreover, it also demonstrates 
that there are valid reasons to question the compliance with fundamental 
rights. Having been confronted with strong concerns regarding the 
fundamental rights implications and the violations of those rights, the Court 
eventually nuanced its approach towards mutual trust and reconsidered the 
concept but did so at different periods for the AFSJ policy fields governed by 
mutual recognition and adopted high thresholds during this process.  
The first time that the Court of Justice accepted that the presumption 
of trust is not unlimited was in the context of the Dublin Regulation31 
concerning asylum law in the case of N.S and Others.32 The Court followed 
the ECtHR ruling M.S.S v Belgium and Greece in which the Strasbourg Court 
 
28 K. Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ The 
Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever Lecture All Souls College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, 
available at: 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_f
reedom_judge_lenaerts.pdf, last accessed 20 March 2017, 4. For a more detailed discussion of 
proportionality and the EAW, E. Xanthopoulou, ‘The Quest for Proportionality for the European 
Arrest Warrant: Fundamental Rights Protection in a Mutual Recognition Environment’ (2015) 6 New 
Journal of Criminal Law 32. 
29 Mitsilegas (n 18) 319. 
30 E. Guild, ‘Crime and the EU’s Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 218, 230. 
31 Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin Regulation III) establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] OJ L 
180/31. Previously and applicable to N.S, the Dublin II Regulation, Regulation 343/2003 [2003] OJ L 
50/1. 
32 N.S and M.E. and Others (n 20).  
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held that both Belgium and Greece were in breach of the ECHR.33 Belgium 
as the sending Member State was held to be in breach, because they knew 
or ought to have known about the systematic flaws in Greece’s asylum 
procedure and by knowingly exposing the applicant to conditions of detention 
and living conditions that amounted to degrading and inhuman treatment.34 
The Court also relied on the evidence gathered by the Strasbourg Court 
coming from public sources which clearly indicated serious fundamental 
rights breaches in Greece.35 The Court held that the presumption that asylum 
seekers will be treated in a way that complies with fundamental rights must 
be regarded as rebuttable.36 It came to this conclusion on the basis of that:  
 
the conclusive presumption that the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights will be 
observed in the Member State primarily responsible for his application is 
incompatible with the duty of the Member States to interpret and apply [the Dublin] 
Regulation in a manner consistent with fundamental rights.37  
 
… to require a conclusive presumption of compliance with fundamental rights, it 
could itself be regarded as undermining the safeguards which are intended to 
ensure compliance with fundamental rights by the European Union and its Member 
States.38 
 
The Court drastically changed the interstate cooperation in the AFSJ by its 
rejection of an infinite presumption of trust that Member States will respect 
and comply with fundamental rights.39 However, this has been accompanied 
by the establishment of a high threshold of incompatibility with fundamental 
rights and a need for substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic 
flaws resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment.40 Thus, in light of the 
 
33 ECtHR, M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (21 January 2001) Application no 30696/09. See for a 
commentary V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S v Belgium and Greece’ (2012) 14 
European Journal of Migration and Law 1.  
34 N.S and M.E and Others (n 20) para 88-89. 
35 Ibid, para 90. 
36 Ibid, para 104. 
37 Ibid, para 99. 
38 Ibid, para 100. 
39 M. den Heijer, Case Comment on Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S and M.E. (2012) 49 
Common Market Law Review 1735. 
40 N.S and M.E. and Others (n 20). para 85. 
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effectiveness of the principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ, it is 
unsurprising that the Court confirmed the assumption that all Member States 
respect fundamental rights and as a result adopted a high threshold to rebut 
the mutual trust presumption.41 Nevertheless, this is a ground-breaking 
judgment and according to Mitsilegas ‘constitutes a turning point in the 
evolution of inter-state cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. The rejection by the Court of the conclusive presumption of 
fundamental rights compliance by EU Member States signifies the end of 
automaticity in inter-state cooperation not only as regards the Dublin 
Regulation, but also as regards cooperative systems in the fields of criminal 
and civil law’.42 Peers agrees with this statement and held that ‘logically the 
judgment should apply by analogy to other areas of justice and Home Affair 
law, like the European Arrest Warrant’.43 
Unfortunately, in relation to the EAW, the Court of Justice was 
reluctant to apply the same reasoning that there are under strict conditions 
limits to the presumption of trust if fundamental rights are at stake. In Radu, 
the national court asked the Court of Justice for the first time in such a direct 
manner whether human rights breaches could prevent mutual recognition 
and as result refuse surrender.44 The Court focused on the effectiveness of 
the system to surrender based on mutual recognition and how this supports 
the objective of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice which is 
based on the high degree of confidence that exist between Member States.45 
By reaffirming the presumption of (blind) trust the Court held that respect for 
fundamental rights did not require the executing Member State to refuse 
surrender in the event of fundamental rights breaches as this would 
inevitably lead to the failure of the very system of surrender.46 The same 
teleological approach was followed in Melloni in which mutual trust was again 
 
41 Ibid, para 78 and 80. For another reminder of the trust obligation after the N.S and M.E case see, 
Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, EU:C:2013:813. 
42 Mitsilegas (n 18) 358. 
43 S. Peers, ‘The Court of Justice: The NS and Me Opinions – The Death of “Mutual Trust”?’ 
Statewatch Analysis available at: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-148-dublin-mutual-
trust.pdf, last accessed 24 April 2016, 1. 
44 Radu (n 19).  
45 Ibid, para 33 and 34. 
46 Ibid, 39 and 40. 
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the basis for upholding the efficiency of the EAW rather than the protection of 
fundamental rights.47 This approach of focusing on the effectiveness of 
judicial cooperation by assuming a high level of compliance with fundamental 
rights and the strict refusal grounds listed in the EAW and thereby prioritising 
this over the protection of fundamental rights has been heavily criticised.48  
It undermines the legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework, because 
the first tier upon which the entire framework rests that requires compliance 
with the values, including the safeguarding of fundamental rights does not 
sufficiently support the application of mutual recognition. Moreover, 
considering that the Union’s peoples are at the heart of the EU project and 
the rationale behind the objective to create an AFSJ, prioritising judicial 
cooperation when fundamental rights are at stake challenges the Union’s 
objectives.  
However, the Court of Justice also highlighted the importance of the 
protection of the principle of mutual trust beyond its case law concerning EU 
criminal matters, in its Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR.49 The Court stated that the principle of mutual trust is of fundamental 
importance in EU law and that Member States may be required to presume 
compliance with fundamental rights and are not allowed to check actual 
compliance with these rights.50 The Court did refer to ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ which would allow to deviate from the principle of mutual 
recognition but did not elaborate on this much further. Instead it turned the 
presumption of trust between Member States in an EU law obligation.51 This 
has been criticised as being far removed from actual and genuine trust and 
as such undermines the validity of the presumption of trust.52  
 
47 Melloni (n 19); see also Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan, 
EU:C:2015:474. 
48 See for example, M. Ventrella, ‘European Integration or Democracy Disintegration in Measures 
Concerning Police and Judicial Cooperation? (2013) 4(3) New Journal of European Criminal Law 290; 
Mitsilegas (n 27). On the topic of fundamental rights violations as a ground for refusal, see also M. 
Bose, ‘Human Rights Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on the European Arrest Warrant’ 
in S. Ruggeri (ed.), Human Rights in European Criminal Law (Springer 2015) 135.  
49 Opinion to 2/13 of the Court (Accession ECHR), EU:C:2014:2454. 
50 Ibid, para 191 and 192. 
51 Ibid, para 194.  
52 Williams (n 26) 226. 
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Moreover, the ECtHR in Tarakhel went already a step further than the 
Luxembourg Court’s N.S asylum judgment and adopted an approach of a 
detailed individual assessment in a specific case.53 It ruled that rather than 
requiring evidence of a systemic deficiency in relation to the compliance with 
fundamental rights it always requires an assessment of the individual’s rights 
in the specific case before the Court. The Strasbourg court held that the 
situation in Italy could not be compared to Greece at the time of M.S.S v 
Belgium and Greece judgment, but although general systemic deficiencies 
were not found the Convention was still breached with regard to the specific 
individual’s rights.54  
As far as the FD EAW is concerned, the Court of Justice only adopted 
the possibility to derogate from the obligation to trust under strict conditions 
in 2016 in its Aranyosi judgment.55 The question whether the executing 
authority was allowed to refuse to execute a EAW on the basis of 
fundamental rights breaches reappeared. The Court held that if the executing 
Member State is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment they are bound to assess the existence of that risk 
based on objective, reliable, specific and updated information regarding the 
detention conditions of the issuing Member State.56 However, the Court 
introduced a high threshold as a finding of inhuman or degrading treatment 
itself is not sufficient to refuse to execute a EAW.57 The executing Member 
State must prove that the specific individual concerned will be exposed to 
that risk58 and still only then is allowed to postpone the execution of that 
warrant and is not allowed to abandon it.59 Therefore, although the Court 
opened up the possibility to rebut the presumption of blind trust, it also added 
an extra layer to this exception compared to the N.S. judgment and in doing 
so remained closely loyal to the idea of blind trust.60  
 
53 ECtHR, Tarakhel v Switzerland (4 November 2014) Application no. 29217/12.  
54Ibid, para 114 and 115.  
55 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198. 
56 Ibid, para 88 and 89. 
57 Ibid, para 91. 
58 Ibid, para 92-94. 
59 Ibid, para 98.  
60 Xanthopoulou (n 23) 495. 
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In the more recent EAW case LM,61 the Court had another opportunity 
to elaborate on the two-stage test in Aranyosi and possible limitations to the 
principle of trust. The case concerned the rule of law crisis in Poland and the 
systemic deficiencies in their judicial system.62 The Court was asked whether 
the execution of a EAW could be refused on the basis of a real risk of breach 
of the fundamental right to a fair trial63 as the independence of the judiciary 
was no longer guaranteed and whether it is necessary to follow the test in 
Aranyosi in order to assess the exposure of the individual to this risk if he is 
surrendered to Poland. Thus, whilst Aranyosi concerned the possibility of a 
limitation of mutual trust and mutual recognition based on a real risk of the 
absolute right of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, LM extends the possibility to apply a 
similar limitation to a real risk of another fundamental right’s breach which is 
non-absolute.  
Moreover, this case highlights the serious issues within the EU 
concerning the rule of law, one of the common values listed in Article 2 TEU 
and upon which the principle of mutual recognition and in turn the principle of 
mutual trust is based. It is important to appreciate the highly political 
sensitivity of the case and the difficult task the Court had as it needed to find 
a balance between protecting the fundamental rights and defend the 
constitutional values of Article 2 TEU, but at the same time take into account 
the possible impact of its judgment before the Council had made a decision 
concerning Article 7 TEU.64 The Opinion of AG Tanchev65 in which the case 
at issue was merely addressed by focusing on the fundamental right to a fair 
trial has been criticised for not focusing more on the EU’s common values.66 
The Court of Justice, however, addressed the case through the lens of the 
 
61 Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:586. 
62 Discussed in chapter 4.  
63 Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR. 
64 Discussed in Chapter 5.  
65 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, delivered on 28 June 2018, in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister 
for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:517.  
66 See for example, A. Łazowski, ‘Aranyosi and Căldăraru – Through the Eyes of National Judges’, in V. 
Mitsilegas, A. di Martino and L. Mancano (eds.) The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. 
Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2019) 437, 451 
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rule of law as one of the core values upon which the Union is built,67 and 
links judicial independence as part of the rule of law and the essence of the 
right to a fair trial.68  
The Court found that a real risk of a violation of the right to a fair trial 
due to systemic or generalised deficiencies which affect the independence of 
the judiciary in the issuing Member State, can in principle justify the refusal of 
the execution of a EAW.69 However, the executing judicial authority is 
required to assess whether there is a real risk that the individual concerned 
will suffer a breach of that fundamental right.70 The Court thus applied the 
Aranyosi precedent in requiring the two-stage test. The outcome of the ruling 
is welcome from the perspective of broadening the scope of fundamental 
rights breaches which could prevent mutual recognition and limit the 
presumption of trust. However, from a fundamental rights perspective it is 
problematic to ask for an individual and specific assessment of the person 
concerned if the nature of the problem regards the entire independence of 
the judiciary. Moreover, requiring a dialogue between the executing Member 
State and the issuing Member State regarding the judicial independence of 
the latter seems unrealistic and ill founded.71 Having said that, if the second 
layer of the Aranyosi test would not have been a requirement, the Court 
would have seriously harmed Poland’s participation in the Union altogether. 
This would not have only led to questioning Poland’s ability to deal with any 
case involving EU law but also the protection of EU citizens’ rights. These 
are matters possibly better dealt with in an infringement procedure or within 
the framework of Article 7 TEU rather than a specific fundamental rights case 
concerning a EAW.72 
In terms of the EAW it is clear that the Court has recognised that 
under exceptional circumstances and if strict requirements are fulfilled, the 
mutual recognition measure cannot prevail the fundamental rights protection 
 
67 LM (n 61) para 35. 
68 Ibid, para 48, 51, 63 and 65. 
69 Ibid, para 59. 
70 Ibid, para 60. 
71 Ibid, para 76 and 77.  
72 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis of the EAW and the relevant jurisprudence and Chapter 
5 on the issues surrounding the enforcement of the core values of the EU.  
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and therefore ultimately limits the presumption of compliance. In the area of 
asylum law the Court of Justice has already made the next step in terms of 
fundamental rights protection and moved away from the requirement of 
systemic deficiencies in N.S. An individual’s specific circumstances in a 
particular case are now considered by the Court of Justice. Inhuman or 
degrading treatment are no longer seen as the only option to challenge the 
transfer,73 but instead the Court has acknowledged other possible human 
rights breaches such as the right to an effective remedy as a possible ground 
to limit the presumption of trust on behalf of fundamental rights protection in 
a specific case.74  
In C.K and Others, which concerned the interpretation of Article 3(2) of 
the Dublin III Regulation, the Court was asked whether in the absence of 
systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure the requirements of Article 4 
of the Charter prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment could still be 
satisfied.75 The Court by referring to the corresponding prohibition in Article 3 
ECHR and case law of the ECtHR, held that ‘the suffering which flows from 
naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental, may be covered by 
Article 3 ECHR if it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether 
flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which 
the authorities can be held responsible’.76 Therefore, even in the absence of 
serious systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and irrespective of the quality 
of the reception and care of asylum seekers, a transfer of an asylum seeker 
in itself, whose state of health is particularly serious, may result in a real risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter. This is specifically the case, if an asylum seeker suffers from a 
serious mental or physical illness and the transfer would result in a real and 
proven risk of a significant and permanent deterioration in his state of 
health.77 The Court further held that the authorities of a Member State are 
 
73 This narrow view was for example adopted in Shamso Abdullahi (n 41).  
74 See for example, Case C-63/15 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid and Justitie, 
EU:C:2016:409; Case C-155/15 George Karim v Migrationsverket, EU:C:2016:410; Case C-490/16 A.S. 
v Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2017:585; Case C-646/16 Jafari, EU:C:2017:586. 
75 Case C-578/16 PPU C.K. and Others v Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2017:127. 
76 Ibid, para 68. 
77 Ibid, para 73 and 74. 
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under an obligation to assess and eliminate any serious risk concerning the 
impact of the transfer on the state of health of the person concerned78 and if 
necessary, postpone the transfer due to the condition of the asylum seeker.79 
This is an important step for the protection of fundamental rights as it 
indicates room for an individual assessment in a specific case rather than 
focusing on the effectiveness of the asylum procedure based on mutual trust. 
Moving away from the systemic deficiencies requirement in N.S would also 
be more in line with the case-by-case analysis of the ECtHR. However, the 
Court’s jurisprudence concerning the FDEAW demonstrates that although 
individual circumstances are taken into account as a second step during the 
assessment of whether the mutual recognition of a EAW can be limited due 
to fundamental rights breaches, the first requirement is still the establishment 
of systemic deficiencies. Moreover, if the systemic deficiencies are so 
serious that they are affecting the independence of a Member State’s 
judiciary and thereby the very notion of a democratic state upholding the rule 
of law which clearly undermines the right to a fair trial, the second step of the 
Aranyosi test is still required and controversially it needs to be proven that 
the individual in question is at a real risk. This approach undermines the 
legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework, because the foundation of 
the framework which consists of the requirement that Member States share 
the EU’s normative identity and are committed to the values is fractured and 
therefore does not support the application of mutual recognition. In addition, 
the EU’s normative influence to address the non-compliance of Member 
States with its foundational values is not efficient enough to restore the first 
tier of the mutual recognition framework and therefore further questions the 
Court’s test adopted in relation to the EAW.80  
 
2.4 Strengthening mutual trust and the legitimacy of mutual recognition  
 
The Court’s case law demonstrates that the mutual recognition framework 
and the prerequisite of mutual trust upon which the objective of creating an 
 
78 Ibid, Para 75 and 76. 
79 Ibid, para 87. 
80 See chapter 5.  
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area of freedom, security and justice is build is problematic. One of the 
underlying reasons for this is that when the principle of mutual recognition 
was adopted as the way forward in the integration process of the AFSJ the 
levels of harmonisation compared to the internal market were significantly 
lower.81 This contributed to the difficulties of trust among Member States 
which in turn challenges the legitimacy of the principle of mutual recognition 
which is based on this presumed level of trust. Therefore, although mutual 
recognition might be less compromising for the state’s authority it needs to 
be accompanied by sufficient legal approximation and harmonisation in order 
to be a successful concept in the AFSJ.82 The legitimacy of trust is seriously 
weakened if it is forced upon Member States as a static obligation and 
enforced by the Court of Justice whilst fundamental rights are violated. 
Strengthening the shared values among Member States through 
harmonisation is essential for the principle of trust and achievement of an 
AFSJ.83  
 Protecting fundamental rights in this area is especially important 
because the application of the principle of mutual recognition enhances the 
state’s power and limits the individual’s rights.84 It is therefore of the essence 
that there is a sufficient balance between, on the one hand, the aim of 
creating an AFSJ and protecting the effectiveness of judicial cooperation 
through the principle of mutual recognition and, on the other hand, the 
Union’s fundamental rights framework.85 Any limitations on fundamental 
 
81 See for more detail chapter 1, section 1.3.1. 
82 See J. Vogel, ‘Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary? A Comment’ in A. Klip and H. van 
der Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Science 2002) 60; S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European 
Union: Has the Council got it Wrong?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5, 29-34; A. 
Weyembergh, ‘The Functions of Approximation of Penal Legislation Within the European Union 
(2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 149, 164. 
83 G. Vermeulen, ‘Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?’ in A. Klip and H. van 
der Wilt (eds.), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Science 2002) 71-73.  
84 M. Möstl, ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
405, 409. See for a more detailed discussion on the functioning of the principle of mutual recognition 
Chapter 1, section 1.3.2. 
85 See for a more detailed and critical discussion on the balance between an AFSJ and fundamental 
rights E. Guild, S. Carrera and T. Balzacq, ‘The Changing Dynamics of Security in an Enlarged 
European Union’, in D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R. Walker (eds.), Delivering Liberty, Europe’s 21st 
Century Challenge (Ashgate Publishing 2010) 31-48. 
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rights must be in agreement with the ECHR and the Charter and must 
according to Article 52(1) of the Charter be ‘provided for by law’. Unlike in the 
context of the internal market where the principle of mutual recognition is 
enforced by national courts through the direct effect of the relevant legal 
provisions the successful operation of the ‘principle in the AFSJ rest on the 
legislative acts adopted at EU level’.86 These acts should ensure that the 
application of mutual recognition respects fundamental rights and that an 
appropriate level of harmonisation is achieved in order to support mutual 
recognition.  
Respect for individual rights and the need for procedural safeguards 
were already on the Union’s radar in the first official documents from the 
institutions concerning the AFSJ and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.87 The Commission, in its 1998 Communication which sets out its 
vision for an AFSJ, stated that is should examine whether the greater 
efficiency of judicial cooperation in criminal matters can be reconciled with 
respect for individual rights. According to the Commission, especially the 
development of common minimum standards relevant to the rights of 
defence were a key priority to ensure that individuals rights were respected.88 
Moreover, the famous paragraph in the Tampere Conclusions which 
embraced mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation held 
that this combined with the necessary approximation of legislation would not 
only facilitate enhanced cooperation between the relevant Member States’ 
authorities but would also facilitate the ‘judicial protection of individual 
rights’.89 This was reiterated by the Commission in its Communication on 
mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal matters in which it referred to 
the Council’s opinion and held that it should ‘therefore be ensured that the 
 
86 Lenaerts (n 28) 4.  
87 See also S. Lavenex and W. Wagner, ‘Which European Public Order? Sources of Imbalance in the 
European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, (2007) 16 European Security 225-243; V. Mitsilegas, 
‘Trust-building measures in the European judicial area in criminal matters: Issues of competence, 
legitimacy and interinstitutional balance’ in S. Carrera and T. Balzacq (eds.), Security Versus 
Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future (Ashgate Publishing 2006) 279-290. 
88 Communication from the Commission, Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM 
(1998) 459 final, 9. 
89 European Council in Tampere, Presidency Conclusions (15-16 October 1999), para 33 (emphasis 
added). 
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treatment of suspects and the rights of the defence, would not only not suffer 
from the implementation of the principle, but that the safeguards would even 
be improved through the process’.90  
 The Council’s Programme of measures to implement the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters also provided that the 
adoption of mutual recognition as the way forward in the Union’s integration 
project and the development of an AFSJ, is not only ‘designed to strengthen 
cooperation between Member States but also to enhance the protection of 
individual rights’.91 It also acknowledged that the effectives of mutual 
recognition in this area was dependent on a number of parameters which 
included the ‘mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of […] of suspects’ and 
‘the definition of minimum common standards necessary to facilitate 
application of the principle of mutual recognition’.92 
 The documents from the Commission and Council not only confirm the 
importance of fundamental rights in the mutual recognition framework but 
also indicate that the enhancement of individual rights protection is one of its 
aims. At the same time, they also demonstrate that respect for individual 
rights in this context was already a matter of concern early on, particularly in 
criminal matters and it was recognised that more harmonisation was 
necessary to guarantee respect for individual rights of suspects and 
defendants. This is interesting as it questions from the very start of the 
introduction of mutual recognition the level of trust that Member States can 
have in each other’s judicial systems upon which the requirement is based to 
recognise as equivalent and give effect to foreign judicial decisions.  
 
2.4.1 Harmonisation of criminal procedural rights 
 
The Commission’s Green Paper on procedural safeguards for suspects and 
defendants in criminal proceedings also clearly stated the need to strengthen 
trust in practice. The problems with trust were directly linked to the absence 
 
90 Commission’s Communication (n 1) 16.  
91 Programme of measures (n 2) 10.  
92 Programme of measures (n 2) 11 and 12. 
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of a standard set of procedural rights throughout the European Union.93 This 
led to the Commission’s proposal in 2004 for a Framework Decision on 
procedural rights in criminal proceedings.94 Unfortunately, when it came to 
the actual adoption of concrete secondary legislation with the aim to enhance 
mutual trust, Member States could after long-lasting negotiations which 
ended in 2007 not agree on the measure to harmonise national standards.95 
The importance of enhancing mutual trust and building confidence for the 
successful application of mutual recognition in the AFSJ was also highlighted 
by the Hague Programme96 and its related Action Plan.97 The subsequent 
Stockholm Programme went a step further and stated that ‘ensuring trust and 
finding new ways to increase reliance on, and mutual understanding 
between, the different legal systems in the Member States will thus be one of 
the main challenges for the future’.98 The issue of safeguarding procedural 
rights by adopting minimum standards at EU level returned and was seen as 
an essential step to make real progress with mutual trust.99  
After several years of discussions on procedural rights without any 
concrete results, progress was finally made in 2009 when the Council 
adopted the Roadmap on Criminal Procedural Rights.100 The Roadmap’s aim 
is to ‘strengthen procedural guarantees and the respect of the rule of law in 
criminal proceedings’101 within the EU. It thus focuses on supporting the first 
tier of the mutual recognition framework based on compliance with the 
 
93 Green Paper from the Commission, ‘Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union’, COM (2003) 75 final, 9. 
94 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union, COM (2004) 328 final.  
95 See for a more detailed discussion of these negotiations M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings Throughout the 
European Union’ in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (Ashgate Publishing 2008) 171. 
96  European Council, The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the 
European Union [2005] OJ C 53/01, section 3.2. 
97 Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening 
freedom, security and justice [2005] OJ C 198/1, section 4.1. 
98 European Council ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens’ [2010] OJ C 115/01, section 1.2.1. 
99 Communication from the Commission, ‘Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s citizens. Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme’, COM (2010) 171 final, 
section 8.  
100 Resolution of the Council on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1. 
101 Ibid, recital 10. 
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common values, but it also acknowledged the complexity of these issues and 
therefore employed a ‘step-by-step approach’.102 In doing so, it listed the 
basis for future action and provided 5 measures on procedural rights that 
were to be given priority and the Commission was invited to propose EU 
legislation regarding these measures.103 With the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty the EU’s legislative powers in the field of EU criminal law 
changed. The Treaty specifically mentions that mutual recognition in this field 
requires a degree of harmonisation104 and the EU received competence 
among some other areas to specifically adopt minimum rules on the rights of 
individuals in criminal proceedings.105 This led to the adoption of several 
Directives concerning the right to interpretation and translation;106 the right to 
information;107 the right of access to a lawyer;108 the presumption of 
innocence and the right to be present at trial;109 procedural safeguards for 
children;110 and the right to legal aid.111 These Directives have been further 
accompanied by a Commission’s Communication112 and 2 recommendations 
on safeguards for vulnerable people and legal aid.113 
It is, however, important to point out that under Article 82(2) TFEU the 
EU only has competence to adopt minimum rules if this facilitates mutual 
 
102 Ibid, recital 11. 
103 Ibid, point 2 and 3. For a more detailed discussion on the Roadmap, see J. Blackstock, ‘Procedural 
Safeguards in the European Union: A Road Well Travelled?’ (2012) 2(1) European Criminal Law 
Review 20. 
104 Article 82(1) TFEU.  
105 Article 82(2)(b) TFEU. 
106 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] 
OJ L 280/1. 
107 Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1. 
108 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European 
Arrest Warrant Proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of 
liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of 
liberty [2013] OJ L 294/1. 
109 Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence 
and the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1.  
110 Directive (EU) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 132/1. 
111 Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings 
and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings [2016] OJ L 297/1. 
112 Commission’s Communication, ‘Making progress on the European Union Agenda on Procedural 
Safeguards for Suspects or Accused Persons – Strengthening the Foundation of the European Area of 
Criminal Justice’ COM (2013) 820 final.  
113 Commission Recommendation on procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons suspected or 
accused in criminal proceedings [2013] OJ C 378/8 and Commission Recommendation on the right to 
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recognition in criminal matters.114 The Roadmap’s measures focusing on 
improving the individual’s procedural rights throughout the EU is thus not the 
end goal but the means for the purpose of facilitating mutual recognition.115 
The legal basis for activating Article 82(2) is presumably met because the 
adoption of EU minimum rules in addition to the already existing standards of 
the ECHR should enhance trust, which is the aim of the Roadmap, and which 
in turn is necessary for the EU’s criminal justice mutual recognition 
framework.116 The same approach is also evident from the post-Lisbon 
Directives on procedural rights where the rationale of adopting these 
legislative measures has also been linked to the enhancement of mutual 
trust.117  
Nevertheless, the EU’s competence to adopt legislation in this field 
has been questioned on several grounds.118 First of all, convincing evidence 
of how the proposed procedural rights in the Roadmap will enhance trust and 
thereby facilitate mutual recognition is missing.119 Secondly, the justification 
for EU harmonisation under the Treaties is usually based on the cross-border 
requirement, because transnational problems that Member States cannot 
regulate adequately require Union action.120 The EU’s competence to 
legislate in the AFSJ is also under several provisions specifically linked to 
this cross-border dimension, including Article 82(2) TFEU.121 However, the 
secondary legislation harmonising the national procedural criminal laws by 
adopting minimum EU human rights standards does not only affect cross-
border proceedings but is also applicable to purely domestic cases.122 These 
 
114 Mitsilegas (n 18) 365-366. 
115 Williams (n 26) 220. 
116 Roadmap (n 100) recital 8. 
117 See for example, (n 106) recital 4; (n 108) recital 6 and (n 111) recital 2. See also Mitsilegas (27) 
475-476. 
118 For a critical discussion on harmonisation and the competence of the EU prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty see, A. Weyembergh, ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, The Constitutional Treaty and The 
Hague Programme’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 1567. 
119 Williams (n 26) 221 and Mitsilegas (n 18) 476.  
120 E.T. Swaine, ‘Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice’ (2000) 
41(1) Harvard Internal Law Journal, 53; G. De Búrca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after 
Amsterdam’ (1999) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 7/1999, 25; G. Bermann, ‘Taking 
Subsidiarity Seriously’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 332, 370. 
121 See also for example Article 81(1) TFEU, 81(2)(b) TFEU, 81(3) TFEU, 83(1) TFEU and 88(1) TFEU. 
122 See for a critical discussion on the cross-border requirement J. Oberg, ‘Subsidiarity and EU 
Procedural Criminal Law (2015) 5(1) European Criminal Law Review 19, section II A; W. de Bondt and 
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grounds raise issues with the principle of subsidiarity under Article 5(3) TEU, 
because the EU’s competence is not exclusive in this field and conditional 
under Article 82(2) TFEU on the basis that EU action ‘facilitates mutual 
recognition’ in criminal matters having a ‘cross-border dimension’.123 In 
addition, it is also problematic for the process of judicial review under Article 
263 TFEU which allows the Court to review the legality of these legislative 
acts based on grounds ‘of lack of competence’ and ‘infringement of the 
Treaties’, because the concept of trust as discussed above is subjective 
rather than objective.124 This makes it difficult for the Court to assess the 
legality of these legislative acts based on Article 82(2) TFEU, as ‘according 
to settled case-law of the Court, the choice of legal basis for a European 
Union measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial 
review, these include the aim and the content of the measure’.125  
Instead of focusing on the enhancement of trust in order to facilitate 
mutual recognition Mitsilegas suggests a sensible alternative approach which 
should provide more objective factors to assess the legality of a measure and 
would link mutual recognition in criminal matters more clearly to the need to 
respect fundamental rights.126 He suggests that the adoption of procedural 
rights measures for suspects and defendants in criminal measures should be 
justified on the basis that it is necessary to address the ‘effects’ that the 
operation of mutual recognition has on the individual. This would move the 
emphasis of the necessity of measures to facilitate mutual recognition under 
Article 82(2) TFEU from the State and its relevant authorities to have trust in 
each other’s criminal justice systems to the perspective of the individual.127 
 
G. Vermeulen, ‘The Procedural Rights Debate: A Bridge too Far or Still Not Far Enough?’ (2010) 4 
EUcrim 163, 164.  For a different view concerning the cross-border requirement, see S. Peers, EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 670-671. 
123 Oberg (n 122) 19; Williams (n 26) 221. 
124 See also, V. Mitsilegas, ‘Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon, in 
V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. Konstadinides (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 148, 164. 
125 Case C-43/12 Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:298, para 29; see also for example 
Case C-411/06 Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2009:518 para 45; Case C-130/10 
Parliament v Council, EU:C:2012:472 para 42; Case C-540/13 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:224, 
para 30; Joined Cases C-317/13 and C-679/13 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:223, para 40. 
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Regardless of the competence issues and how the Directives on 
procedural rights are framed to meet the legal basis of facilitating mutual 
recognition, the EU secondary law measures harmonising national law on the 
rights of the individual have improved the human rights standards in the area 
of criminal justice. It signals a move in the mutual recognition framework from 
focusing mainly, if not solely, on the interest of the state to a system where 
the rights of suspects and defendants affected by the mutual recognition 
measures have gained a more prominent role.128 The Directives on 
procedural rights in the area of criminal justice have improved the 
fundamental rights protection in the EU Member States. Some of the rights 
listed in the Directives have direct effect and as result can be relied upon and 
enforced in national courts if Member States have not implemented the 
Directives adequately.129 The implementation of the Directives by the 
Member States must also comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Moreover, the Charter is not only applicable to the specific national 
legislation implementing the procedural rights Directives but also to the 
national criminal proceedings more broadly if there is a connection to the EU 
defence rights. The Court of Justice has adopted a broad interpretation of 
Article 51 of the Charter concerning the applicability of the Charter when 
implementing Union law and held that this goes beyond the specific national 
legislation implementing the EU criminal law measure.130 In addition, under 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is also entitled to monitor compliance with 
the procedural rights Directives and start an infringement procedure if the 
Directives have not been implemented adequately.  
Thus, whilst the adoption of these trust-building measures was a 
difficult process when the principle of mutual recognition was introduced as 
the cornerstone for judicial cooperation in criminal matters the changes since 
2009 are positive. The harmonisation of national laws and adoption of 
minimum rules contribute to a stronger foundation of the mutual recognition 
 
128 Mitsilegas (n 27) 477. 
129 For example, the right to a translator and/or interpreter or the right to access to a lawyer. 
130 See Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, section re the 
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framework and therefore enhance trust among Member States and 
strengthen the legitimacy of the application of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters.  
 
2.4.2 Fundamental rights concerns beyond harmonisation  
 
The proportionality problem is another fundamental rights related issue in the 
application of mutual recognition in criminal proceedings which has been 
addressed by legislators to some extent. The extensive scope of the FDEAW 
as a fast-track judicial cooperation mechanism, the partial abolition of the 
dual criminality requirement and the limited grounds for refusal led to a high 
number of EAW’s being issued by some Member States for minor crimes.131 
Examples include the issuing of an arrest warrant by Romania for the theft of 
10 chickens,132 counterfeiting of 100 euros and exceeding an overdraft limit 
which was dealt with as a theft although the debt was already paid off several 
years ago.133 The Council also raised concerns regarding the lack of 
proportionality checks in some Member States such as Poland134 and 
Romania.135 It has been recognised that Poland issued significant numbers 
of EAWs, because their law enforcement authorities were required to 
prosecute any crime regardless of the gravity, consequences and 
seriousness and the EAW is a tool that made that possible.136  
 
131 See, inter alia, Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Overuse of the European 
Arrest Warrant – A Threat to Human Rights’ Press Release 15 March 2011; Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of the 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States COM (2011) 175 final, 7; S. Haggenmüller, ‘The Principle of 
Proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant’ (2013) 3 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 95, 98-99. 
132 High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 28 October 2009, Sandru v Government of Romania 
[2009] EWHC 2879 (Admin). 
133 See the case of Patrick Connor and Mikolai Kowalski respectively in Fair Trials International, ‘The 
European Arrest Warrant Seven Years On – The Case for Reform’ (2011) 15 available at: 
https://www.fairtrials.org/documents/FTI_Report_EAW_May_2011.pdf, last accessed 9 March 2017. 
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Procedures Between Member States” Report on Poland, document 14240/07, 8 November 2007. 
135 Council of the European Union, Evaluation Report on the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations 
“The Practical Application of the European Arrest Warrant and the Corresponding Surrender 
Procedures Between Member States” Report on Romania, document 8267/2/09, 20 May 2009. 
136 European Commission Meeting of Experts, Implementation of the Council Framework decision of 
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The disproportionate use (or misuse) of EAWs can result in 
fundamental rights breaches for the requested individual,137 in particular it 
could limit their right to a fair trial and right to liberty in a disproportionate 
manner.138 It has also been acknowledged that the proportionality issues 
undermine the mutual confidence in the application of the EAW.139 The 
disproportionate use of EAWs and the lack of consistency among Member 
States in the application of a proportionality test undermine the good 
functioning of this instrument in the fight against serious cross-border crime. 
Indeed, the lack of a uniform proportionality check is a significant challenge 
to mutual trust.140 The need for a proportionality check in the operation of 
mutual recognition has been broadly accepted in the academic literature,141 
strongly argued for by human rights organisations142 and acknowledged in 
official documents coming from the EU institutions.143 The Council reacted to 
the seriousness of the proportionality problem and the call for a unified 
approach by deciding to amend the EAW Handbook.144 The revised version 
of the Handbook invites the issuing Member State to consider proportionality 
before deciding to issue a warrant and provides guidance on the factors to 
take into account to conduct this assessment. The issuing authority is asked 
to consider ‘the seriousness of the offence, the possibility of the suspect 
 
also the Report from the UK Home Office, A Review of the United Kingdom’s Extradition 
Arrangements, 30 September 2011, section 5.120, 162. 
137 A. Weyembergh, I. Armada and C. Brière, European Added Value Assessment - The EU Arrest 
Warrant, Critical Assessment of the existing European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (2014) 
European Added Value Unit, 34. 
138 Xanthopoulou (n 28) 48.  
139 Commission’s Report (n 131) 7. 
140 Carrera, Guild and Hernanz (n 23) 19-12; Weyembergh, Armada and Brière (n 137) 33. 
141 See for example, Xanthopoulou (n 28); M. Fichera and E. Herlinn-Karnell, ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation Test and Balancing in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice: A Proportionate 
Answer for a Europe of Rights?’ (2013) 19(4) European Public Law 759; Haggenmüller (131);  
Mitsilegas (n 18)  323-330; J. Vogel and J.R Spencer, ‘Proportionality and the European Arrest 
Warrant’ (2010) Criminal Law Review 474. 
142 Fair Trials International (n 133); Fair Trials International, ‘The European Arrest Warrant Eights 
Years On – Time to Amend the Framework Decision?’ (2012) available at: 
http://www.fairtrials.net/publications/article/the-european-arrest-warranteight-years-on, last 
accessed 14 February 2018; JUSTICE, ‘European Arrest Warrants: Ensuring an Effective Defence’ 
(2012) available at: https://justice.org.uk/european-arrest-warrant/, last accessed 15 February 2018.  
143 European Parliament Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommendations to the Commission 
on the review of the European Arrest Warrant (2013/2109(INL)), P7_TA_(2014)0174. 
144 Council of the European Union, Follow-up to the recommendation in the final report on the 
fourth round of mutual evaluations, Council Conclusions, 28 May 2010, document 8436/2/10, 3. 
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being detained, and the likely penalty imposed if the person sought is found 
guilty of the alleged offence. Other factors also include ensuring the effective 
protection of the public and considering the interests of the victims of the 
offence’.145 Although, the Commission stated that this was the appropriate 
way to address the proportionality problems the concerns remained146 due to 
the non-legally binding nature of the Handbook and the absence of 
proportionality as a ground to refuse execution of the EAW.147  
In 2014, the European Parliament on the legislative basis of Article 
255 TFEU, submitted recommendations to the Commission to review the 
EAW.148 It reiterated the weaknesses inter alia, concerning the 
disproportionate use of the EAW and the absence of an explicit ground for 
refusal if the execution would breach fundamental rights of the individual 
concerned149 which undermines the mutual trust that Member States have in 
each other’s criminal justice system.150 It requested the Commission to 
propose legislation for inter alia: ‘a proportionality check when issuing a 
mutual recognition decision’; a standardised consultation procedure between 
the issuing and executing authorities to exchange information on for example 
the assessment of proportionality; and ‘a mandatory refusal ground where 
there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the measure 
would be incompatible with the executing Member State's obligation in 
accordance with Article 6 of the TEU and the Charter, notably Article 52(1) 
thereof with its reference to the principle of proportionality’.151 In its response 
to the European Parliament’s request, the Commission stated that it did not 
share the view that the core of the EAW legislation needs to be re-visited.152 
It referred to the guidelines on applying a proportionality test by the issuing 
 
145 Council of the European Union, Revised version of the European Handbook on how to issue a 
European Arrest Warrant, 17 December 2010, document 17195/1/10, 14. 
146 Commission’s Report (n 131) 8; Council of the European Union, Follow-up to the Evaluations 
Reports on the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations: Practical Application of the European Arrest 
Warrant and the Relevant Surrender Procedures between Member States, 18 November 2011, 
document 15815/1/11, 13. 
147 Carrera, Guild and Hernanz (n 23) 16-18.  
148 European Parliament Resolution (n 143).  
149 Ibid, part F. 
150 Ibid, para 6. 
151 Ibid, para 7(b), (c) and (d) respectively. 
152 Follow up to the European Parliament resolution with recommendation to the Commission on the 
review of the European arrest warrant adopted by the Commission on 28 May 2014, SP(2014)447, 1. 
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authorities in the EAW Handbook as a successful and good practice which 
illustrates that legislative action is not always the best approach. As to a 
specific refusal ground on the basis of fundamental rights, the Commission 
did not think this was necessary as it could potentially undermine the 
principle of mutual recognition and held that the primacy of fundamental 
rights is already underlined in Article 1(3) FD EAW.153  
The Commission’s reluctance to include a refusal ground based on 
fundamental rights violations demonstrates that the efficiency of the EAW as 
an instrument for judicial cooperation is prioritised. This puts the executing 
Member State in a difficult position as the issuing Member State is supposed 
to conduct a proportionality check and the executing Member State is 
supposed to trust that this is conducted appropriately.154 Therefore, in the 
absence of a proper proportionality check the executing Member States 
cannot refuse surrender. This undermines trust in the EAW as a mutual 
recognition instrument155 and also the legitimacy of the mutual recognition 
framework. Moreover, the Commission’s reference to Article 1(3) EAW 
concerning the primacy of fundamental rights is unsatisfying. Whilst the 
Article states that the FDEAW ‘shall not have the effect of modifying the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles’, 
this does not sufficiently protect the fundamental rights of the individual for 
whom an arrest warrant has been issued. In fact, the non-compliance by 
Member States with the foundational values, especially fundamental rights 
and the rule of law is a serious problem.156 This in combination with the strict 
test adopted by the Court of Justice of when the executing Member State can 
refuse to surrender the individual based on fundamental rights breaches 
further questions the legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework. Judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters can simply not prevail the safeguarding of an 
individual’s fundamental rights if there are substantial grounds to believe that 
the execution of a EAW would breach these rights. Therefore, the inclusion 
 
153 Ibid, 3. 
154 See, Commission Notice — Handbook on how to issue and execute a European arrest warrant 
(2017) OJ C 335/1, 14. 
155 See also chapter 3 regarding the lack of trust in the FDEAW itself.   
156 See chapter 3 and 4.  
  
 
72 
of a mandatory refusal ground on this basis would not only enhance trust in 
the FDEAW itself, but would also address the legitimacy issues of the mutual 
recognition framework in relation to the non-adherence of Member States.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The principle of mutual recognition rests on the principle of mutual trust. The 
latter principle, is justified by the EU institutions on the basis that all Member 
States adhere to the common values of the EU such as fundamental rights 
protection and the rule of law which are key values for the application of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters. However, mutual trust cannot be 
presumed. It needs to be earned through actual evidence indicating that 
Member States are committed to the foundational values and fully share the 
EU’s normative identity. Non-compliance with the values, especially 
fundamental rights violations significantly challenges and limits the mutual 
trust that Member States have in each other’s criminal justice system. A lack 
of trust among Member States based on the non-adherence of the 
foundational values undermines the first two tiers of the mutual recognition 
framework and in turn challenges the legitimacy of the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. 
Initially, the Court was a strong defender of the presumption of trust 
and exceptions to the application of mutual recognition based on 
fundamental rights breaches were not allowed. Although, this is 
understandable in light of the objective to create an AFSJ and the 
effectiveness of the mutual recognition instruments, it is problematic from a 
fundamental rights perspective and undermines the legitimacy of mutual 
recognition. The more recent case law demonstrates that the Court moved 
from a strict presumption of blind trust towards exceptional circumstances 
which can rebut the presumption of compliance with the foundational values. 
However, the Court only accepted this if strict requirements were fulfilled and 
especially the high thresholds adopted in the case law on the EAW, where 
compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of law is essential due to the 
nature and functioning of this instrument, cannot always be justified and still 
question the legitimacy of mutual recognition.   
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   The harmonisation measures which were eventually adopted and 
focus on the individual’s procedural rights in criminal proceedings could 
enhance mutual trust among Member States and support the mutual 
recognition framework. Yet, specifically in relation to the EAW, the case law 
indicates a lack of trust which is justified because of fundamental rights and 
rule of law violations by Member States. Moreover, this mutual recognition 
instrument is also surrounded by proportionality issues. This in combination 
with the non-adherence of the foundational values by the Member States 
undermines the legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework and 
challenges the strict test adopted by the Court in its EAW case law 
concerning the limits of mutual trust and when an executing Member State is 
allowed to refuse the surrender of an individual.  
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3. The European Arrest Warrant and the Difficult Relationship 
between Fundamental Rights, Mutual Trust and Mutual 
Recognition 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter builds on chapter two and explores further the problems with the 
mutual recognition framework in EU criminal matters by focusing on the 
FDEAW.1 The EAW plays an important role in the judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, but the mutual recognition instrument has also caused a lot 
of debate. At the heart of the controversies lies the difficult relationship 
between fundamental rights, mutual trust and mutual recognition. Due to the 
nature and functioning of the EAW, it is essential that Member States are 
committed to the foundational values upon which the mutual recognition is 
based. In particular, respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law is vital 
due to the lack of a specific fundamental rights refusal ground in the FDEAW.  
It therefore becomes problematic if Member States violate the values and no 
longer share the EU’s normative identity. Although this significantly 
undermines trust in the FDEAW, the Court has been reluctant to accept 
limitations to the mutual trust presumption.  
 The chapter starts with a discussion on the changes introduced to the 
extradition procedures among Member States by the FDEAW. It is argued 
that the amendments introduced by the legislative framework of the EAW 
require a higher level of trust by Member States in each other’s criminal 
justice systems (section 3.2). This is followed by an analysis of the 
transposition of the FDEAW into national legislation. It will demonstrate that 
the EAW caused concerns among Member States from the moment the 
Framework Decision was adopted. This indicates a lack of trust in the mutual 
recognition instrument itself. The manner in which the EAW has been 
 
1 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
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implemented into national law by several Member States confirms this as the 
substance has been modified and additional refusal grounds have been 
introduced. However, it is further argued that the lack of trust in this mutual 
recognition instrument is justified because of the fundamental rights 
violations by Member States which undermines the successful application of 
mutual recognition (section 3.3). The chapter continues with an analysis of 
the key cases concerning the EAW and criticises the Court’s approach prior 
to Aranyosi2 in which it did not allow for a refusal ground based on 
fundamental rights breaches. While the more recent case law is a step in the 
right direction, the test that the Court adopted for the refusal to surrender to 
be allowed on fundamental rights grounds is also problematic. Especially, in 
the current values crises the test cannot be justified from a fundamental 
rights perspective and undermines the legitimacy of the mutual recognition 
framework (section 3.4).  
 
3.2 The European Arrest Warrant: Key changes in the legislative 
framework of extradition between Member States  
 
The FDEAW changed the extradition procedure among Member States 
considerably and due to the amendments introduced by this mutual 
recognition instrument a much higher level of trust is required among 
Member States in each other’s criminal justice system. This in turn, requires 
a strong commitment to the first tier of the mutual recognition framework by 
Member States. Indeed, the successful application of the EAW depends on 
the adherence by the Member States to the foundational values, because 
only then can the application of this mutual recognition tool be justified. 
Especially, the limited grounds of refusal and strict time-framework under the 
EAW, require that Member States truly share the EU’s normative and 
constitutional identity and respect fundamental rights and the rule of law.  
The FDEAW was adopted in June 2002 and Member Sates needed to 
comply with the provisions by 31 December 2003.3 It is the first concrete 
 
2 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198 
3 Article 34 of the FDEAW.  
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measure implementing the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal law.4 
Prior to the FD EAW, extradition among Member States was regulated by a 
number of Conventions. The main international framework for extradition was 
the European Convention on extradition of 1957.5 There were extensive 
exceptions to grant extradition under the 1957 Council of Europe 
Convention.6 Most importantly, a contracting party had the right to refuse 
extradition of its own nationals.7 In addition, Article 26(1) allowed a 
contracting party ‘to make a reservation in respect of any provision or 
provisions of the Convention’.8 In order to reduce the use of these exceptions 
four additional Protocols9 were adopted to accompany the 1957 Convention 
and in 1977 the European Convention on the suppression of terrorism was 
adopted.10         
 Extradition was unsatisfactory under this regime, because a significant 
number of Member States had not ratified one of the first two Protocols of the 
1957 Convention and many Member States had made reservations of the 
provisions of the Convention.11 The Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement;12 the Convention on simplified extradition procedure between 
Member States of the European Union13 and the Convention relating to 
extradition between Member States of the European Union14 were intended 
to restrict the use of exceptions and reservations. Although, these 
Conventions improved the extradition system among Member States to some 
extent it still allowed for several exceptions and reservations and the overall 
procedure was slow and time consuming. As a result of the formal extradition 
 
4 See, recital 6 FDEAW.   
5 European Convention on extradition of 13 December 1957, ETS No. 024.  
6 See Ibid, Articles 2, 3, 4 and 14.   
7 Ibid, Article 6.   
8 Ibid, Article 26(1).   
9 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 086; Second Additional 
Protocol, ETS No. 098; Third Additional Protocol, CETS No. 209; Fourth Additional Protocol, CETS No. 
212.  
10 The European Convention on the suppression of terrorism of 27 January 1977, ETS No. 090. 
11 See S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, (Oxford University Press 2016) 37. 
12 The Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 
239/19. 
13 The Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure between Member States of 
the European Union, OJ C 78/1. 
14 The Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between Member States of the 
European Union, OJ C 313/11. 
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procedure being inadequate, the Tampere European Council Conclusions 
referred to the need for a more efficient and simpler procedure.15 Although, in 
the programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition 
of decisions in criminal matters, arrest warrants were initially not of the 
highest priority,16 the 9/11 events prioritised the adoption of the European 
Arrest Warrant.17         
 The FDEAW replaced the previous legislative framework of extradition 
discussed above18 and introduced a higher level of automaticity in inter-state 
cooperation in criminal matters through the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition.19 Under the Framework Decision the extradition 
procedure is simplified and traditional safeguards are limited.20 As a result, it 
is essential that Member States respect the values in Article 2 TEU, because 
non-compliance not only undermines trust among Member States but also 
the legitimacy of the application of this instrument. The FDEAW introduced a 
standard form that the issuing judicial authority needs to fill in21 and once the 
executing judicial authority has received the EAW it ‘shall be dealt with and 
executed as a matter of urgency’22 within a strict time-framework.23 The 
automaticity of the extradition procedure was further encouraged by 
removing the exception not to extradite their own citizens, which was 
common to most civil-law European countries and an important exception 
 
15 European Council in Tampere, Presidency Conclusions (15-16 October 1999) para 35. 
16 See programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters, OJ C 12/10, 15 January 2001, p. 15. 
17 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant (2004) 10 European Law Journal 200, 202. 
18 Article 31 FDEAW.  
19 L. Mancano, ‘The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual Recognition in Criminal 
Matters’, (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 215, 218. See for a detailed 
analysis of the European Arrest Warrant, N. Keijzer and E. van Sliedrecht (eds.) The European Arrest 
Warrant in Practice (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009).  
20 A. Efrat, ‘Assessing mutual trust among EU members: evidence from the European Arrest Warrant’ 
(2019) 26 Journal of European Public Policy 656, 661.  
21 See Article 8 FDEAW.  
22 Article 17(1) FDEAW.  
23 See Articles 11, 13-17 and 23 FDEAW. If a requested person consents to his surrender the 
execution of the warrant should be within 10 days after the consent has been given. If a requested 
person does not consent to his surrender a decision must be made on the execution of the EAW 
within a period of 60 days after the arrest of the requested person. The surrender of the person 
requested needs to take place as soon as possible, usually no later than 10 days after the final 
decision on the execution of the EAW.  
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under the 1957 Convention.24 Moreover, one of the key provisions of this 
mutual recognition instrument abolished the principle of double criminality for 
32 offences if they are punishable by a sentence of at least 3 years.25 It also 
adopted a limited number of grounds for non-execution of the arrest 
warrant.26 The basic rule is that ‘Member States shall execute any European 
arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in 
accordance with the provisions of [the] Framework Decision’.27 The Court of 
Justice interpreted this as that ‘Member States are in principle obliged to give 
effect to a European arrest warrant’.28 However, this can only be justified if 
the first two tiers of the mutual recognition framework sufficiently support the 
extradition procedure. Another factor that has contributed to simplify 
extradition among Member States, is that the Framework Decision 
introduced a surrender procedure with minimum executive involvement, 
unlike the more traditional model in which the final decision on surrender 
rested in the hands of the political authorities, the procedure under the EAW 
is entirely judicial.29 This also highlights the importance that Member States 
need to have genuine trust in each other’s criminal justice systems.  
   
The FDEAW thus creates a fast-track extradition procedure between 
the Member States which is based on mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions. The latter, as discussed, relies on the presumption of trust that 
Member States ought to have in each other’s criminal justice system due to 
their shared commitment to fundamental rights and the rule of law.30 The 
 
24 Convention on extradition (n 5) Article 26.  
25 Article 2(2) FDEAW. 
26 See Article 3 FDEAW for the mandatory non-execution grounds and Article 4 and 4(a) for the 
optional non-execution grounds. For more detail on how to issue and execute a warrant, see the 
Commission Notice – Handbook on how to issue and execute a European Arrest Warrant (2017) OJ C 
335/1. 
27 Article 1(2) FDEAW.  
28 See C- 237/15 PPU Lanigan, EU:C:2015;474, para 36. See also, C-192/12 PPU West, EU:C:2012:404, 
para 55; C-399/11 Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para 38; Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v Premier Minister, 
EU:C:2013:358, para 36.  
29  Efrat (n 20) 662. 
30 Ibid, 659. See also V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and 
Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 4 New Journal of European Criminal 
Law 457. 
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EAW also refers to that Member States need to trust the decisions of the 
issuing authority in recital 10, which states that:  
 
‘the mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high level of 
confidence between Member States. Its implementation may be suspended only 
in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of 
the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union, 
determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) of the said Treaty with the 
consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof’. 
 
To reiterate, Article 6 TEU under the Lisbon Treaty, states that the Charter 
has the same value as the Treaties and that fundamental rights under the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of Union’s law. Therefore, 
recital 10 indicates, one the one hand, the importance of compliance with 
fundamental rights for the EAW, but on the other hand, that mutual trust in 
the EAW rests on the presumption that Member States act in compliance 
with fundamental rights across the European Union. The Court of Justice has 
also referred to the presumption that the Member States’ national legal 
systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of 
fundamental rights31 and has used this as a platform to defend the trust 
presumption.32 However, as discussed in chapter two, trust cannot be 
presumed and in practice is not always sufficiently supported.33 Equivalence 
in terms of the quality of judicial decisions and vital safeguards in criminal 
justice cannot be assumed, because national criminal justice systems vary 
between Member States and different levels of protection are offered to 
individuals in this field. Moreover, although with the entering into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty the Charter of Fundamental rights has the same legal value as 
the EU Treaties and all Member States are members of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, this does not guarantee respect for human 
 
31 Jeremy F (n 28) para 50.  
32 See generally, T. Ostropolski, ‘CJEU as a defender of mutual trust’ (2015) 6 New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 166.   
33 G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and L. Surano, Study, Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters in the European Union (Final Report), Institute for European Studies, Jean Monnet 
Centre for Excellence, Université Libre de Bruxelles, ECLAN (2008), 20. 
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rights. As correctly pointed out by Alegre and Leaf, ‘respect for human rights, 
however, is not simply apparent on a matter of declaratory intent, the 
protections must be real, not simply apparent on paper’.34  
Moreover, the reference to the Article 7 TEU procedure in recital 10 is 
also problematic, because of the political nature of this mechanism and the 
ineffectiveness of this procedure.35 In the current political climate of the EU 
where several Member States are no longer committed to the foundational 
values, it is safe to say that Article 7(2) TEU will never be activated. 
Moreover, practice demonstrates that it takes a long time before Article 7(1) 
is triggered even if there is substantial evidence of serious and persistent 
breaches of the foundational values by Member States.36 Under these 
circumstances, it would not be justified to refer to the trust presumption and 
enforce extradition under the EAW.  
 Thus, compliance with fundamental rights and assurance that, for 
example, the extradited person receives a human treatment and a fair trial 
across all Member States are of particularly concern in extradition 
procedures,37 especially under the more simplified and speedy surrender 
procedure of the EAW.38 This is not only due to the nature and functioning of 
this mutual recognition instrument, but also because the refusal grounds 
under the EAW do not include an express provision to refuse surrender 
based on human rights grounds.39 The FDEAW refers to fundamental rights 
in its preamble40 and Article 1(3), but violations of fundamental rights is not 
listed as a mandatory or optional refusal ground in the EAW. Therefore, trust 
that is earned and based on real evidence rather than forced upon Member 
States is especially important under the EAW, because if the issuing Member 
State does not comply with fundamental rights, the executing Member State 
 
34 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study – the European Arrest Warrant (2004) 10(2) European Law Journal 200, 216.  
35 See chapter 5.  
36 This refers to the situation in Hungary and Poland which is discussed in chapter 4 and 5.   
37 J. Dungard and C. Van den Wyngaert, ‘reconciling extradition with human rights’ (1998) 92 
American Journal of International Law 187, 191.  
38 Efrat (n 20) 658.  
39 Ibid, 661.   
40 See, preamble recitals 10, 12 and 13 FDEAW.  
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becomes to a certain extent complicit in the human rights violations.41 The 
ECtHR also confirmed that even if the human rights violations occur outside 
of the executing Member States’ jurisdiction, if there are substantial grounds 
to believe that the individual being extradited will suffer human rights 
breaches, the executing Member State still has a responsibility for any 
foreseeable consequence of extradition.42 Taking into account the significant 
changes of the extradition legislative framework introduced by the EAW, the 
lack of earned trust among Member States in each other’s’ criminal justice 
system and the Member States’ personal responsibility to ensure compliance 
with fundamental rights, it is not surprising that the implementation of the 
EAW into national legislation did not go smoothly.  
 
3.3 The EAW and its transposition into national legislation  
 
The tension between the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
extradition procedures and the protection of fundamental rights were a 
discussion of debate from the moment the FDEAW was adopted.43 Some 
academics argue that due to the lack of equivalent standards, practices and 
harmonisation measures, the principle of mutual recognition has gone too far 
and the presumption of trust based on the adherence of fundamental rights 
by Member States is limited.44 Moreover, as a result of this limited trust 
among Member States, some scholars have argued that Article 1(3) FDEAW 
which states that the ‘Framework Decision shall not have the effect of 
modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union’, 
should be interpreted as a ground to refuse the execution of an arrest 
 
41 Dungard and Van den Wyngaert (n 37) 191; Efrat (n 20) 657.  
 
42 ECtHR, Soering v The United Kingdom (7 July 1989) Application no. 14038/88, para 91. 
43 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, European Arrest Warrant, A Solution Ahead of its Time?, 2003 London: 
Justice.  
44 See W. Van Ballegooij and P. Bard, ‘Mutual Recognition and Individual Rights. Did the Court get it 
Right?’, (2016) 7 New Journal of European Criminal Law 439; S. Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and 
criminal law in the European Union: Has the Council got it wrong?’, (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 5; E. Guild (Ed), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen: Wolf 
2006; V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
From Automatic Inter State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 
Yearbook of European Law 319. 
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warrant based on fundamental rights violations.45 The controversies 
surrounding the EAW are also visible in the national legislation implementing 
the EAW and judgments of the national courts. These clearly reflect a lack of 
trust in other Member States’ criminal justice systems and adherence to 
fundamental rights which has led to constitutional rulings against the national 
implementing acts and differences in the implementing legislation of the 
FDEAW across Member States.   
 
3.3.1 Constitutional Courts challenging the EAW         
 
A significant number of constitutional courts were challenged with questions 
regarding the compliance of national acts implementing the FDEAW with 
fundamental rights and constitutional principles.46 Member States such as 
Slovenia and Portugal amended their constitution to comply with their 
obligations under the EAW, whereas in other Member States complaints 
concerning constitutional law and the national implementing act were 
rejected.47 However, in 3 Member States the Constitutional Court ruled 
against the national implementing act. First, on 27 April 2005 the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal held that the EAW which abolished the exception not 
to extradite nationals of the executing Member State, breached Article 55(1) 
of the Polish Constitution under which this is forbidden.48 Secondly, similar to 
the situation in Poland, the Cypriot Constitutional Court ruled against the 
national implementing act on 7 November 2005, because there was no legal 
 
45 See for example, A. Tinsley, ‘The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When does the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights Require Non-Execution of a European Arrest Warrant?’ (2012) 2 European 
Criminal Law Review 338, 340-342; Ostropolski (n 32) 174.  
46 See for a more detailed analyses of the cases, E. Guild (ed), Constitutional Challenges to the 
European Arrest Warrant (Wolf Legal Publishers 2009).  
47 N. Long, A Study on the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant and Joint Investigation 
Teams at EU and National Level, requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2009), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/410671/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2009)410671_EN.pdf, last accessed 18 July 2019, 16.  
48 The official website of the Constitutional Tribunal provides a summary of the judgment in English, 
available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng. See for a more detailed analysis of the ruling, A. 
Lazowski, ‘Poland. Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish Citizens Under the European 
Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005. Case Note’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 
569. The ruling led to an amendment of Article 55 of the Constitution which entered into force on 
the 26 December 2006, see Ibid, 18.  
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basis in its Constitution justifying extradition of a Cypriot national.49 
 Finally, the German Constitutional Court also objected to their national 
implementing act on the 18th July 2005. It held that the implementing act did 
not provide sufficient protection to German nationals as required under its 
Constitution. The Bundesverfassungsgericht held that “the European Arrest 
Warrant Act infringes fundamental rights and is unconstitutional. The Act is 
void.”50 The Bundesverfassungsgericht also specifically stated that the mere 
fact that Member States are supposed to comply with fundamental rights 
does not justify an assumption that every Member State provides similar 
safeguards and therefore a corresponding examination in individual cases by 
the executing Member State is not superfluous.51 The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht continued by saying:   
 
“In this respect, putting into effect a strict principle of mutual recognition, and the 
extensive statement of mutual confidence among the states that is connected with it, 
cannot restrict the constitutional guarantee of the fundamental rights.”52    
 
Therefore, in Germany the constitutional challenges clearly involved 
fundamental rights issues and more specifically the different standards of 
human rights across the Member States and raises the more fundamental 
constitutional questions.53 The Constitutional Court directly questioned the 
presumption of trust and equivalence. This demonstrates a lack of trust in 
other Member States’ criminal justice systems as well as in the EAW as a 
mutual recognition instrument itself. It sends a clear message that judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters should not prevail the fundamental rights 
safeguards provided for in national constitutions. As a result, it questions the 
entire framework upon which the principle of mutual recognition and its 
 
49 Supreme Court (CY) decision of 7 November 2005, Ap. No 294/2005.  An English summary of the 
Supreme Court Decision is also available in Council document No 14285/05 of 11 November 2005, 
see in particular page 2. See also, Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of 
the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States COM (2007) 407 final, 5-6. 
50 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 18 July 2005 – 2 BvR 2236/04, para 61. Germany adopted a 
new implementation Act on 20 July 2006.  
51 Ibid, para 118.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Editorial, ‘Mutual Trust’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 1. 
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successful application is based.       
 The Belgium Supreme Court was the only constitutional court that 
referred its EAW case to the Court of Justice and submitted a preliminary 
reference in July 2005.54 This was significant, because the Court of Justice is 
the only court that has the legal competence to rule on the validity and 
interpretation of the mutual recognition instrument itself.55 It was therefore an 
opportunity for the Luxembourg Court to address the issues that the national 
constitutional courts had dealt with previously. In doing so, it had an 
opportunity to restore the confidence in the FDEAW which is indispensable 
for the successful judicial cooperation in criminal matters based on mutual 
recognition.56 The Belgian Supreme Court submitted 2 questions to the Court 
of justice under the preliminary reference procedure.    
 The first question, challenged the legal basis and asked whether the 
Framework Decision was the correct legal instrument. Advocaten voor de 
Wereld claimed that the subject matter of the EAW ought to have been 
implemented by way of a Convention and not by way of a Framework 
Decision, because according to Article 34(2)(b) EU, they may only be 
adopted ‘for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States.57 It was also argued that, since the EAW shall replace 
conventions on extradition, only a measure of the same kind, i.e. a 
convention, can validly derogate from a convention in force.58 The Court of 
Justice, in line with the Advocate-General Colomer’s Opinion,59 rejected 
these arguments. The Court held that the implementation of mutual 
recognition of arrest warrants requires the approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States.60 It further stated that the Council acted 
within its discretion as to the choice of the proper legal instrument when it 
 
54 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld (AvdW), EU:C:2007:261. 
55 Article 267 TFEU. 
56 F. Geyer, ‘European Arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European Communities. Judgment of 3 
May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad’ (2008) 4 
European Constitutional Law Review 149, 150-151.  
57 AvdW (n 54) para 11 and 25. 
58 Ibid, para 26. 
59 Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer, delivered on 12 September 2006, in Case C-303/05 
Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, EU:C:2006:552, para 38-68. 
60 AvdW (n 54) para 29. 
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selected a Framework Decision to regulate the EAW.61 The Court also based 
its decision on the principle of effectiveness,62 since a Convention would 
undermine the effectiveness and Framework Decisions were introduced to 
overcome the ratification problems of Conventions.63 It is important to recall, 
that the challenges put forward regarding the validity of the instrument are 
inherently linked to the third-pillar regime and that with the entering into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty and the abolishment of the pillar structure the usual legal 
instruments of the previous first pillar are now available to regulate judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.64       
 The second question, however, deals with the substance of the EAW 
and is directly linked to the Union’s obligation to respect fundamental rights. 
Advocaten voor de Wereld argued that Article 2(2) of the EAW breached 
fundamental human rights, and more specifically the principle of equality, 
non-discrimination and the legality in criminal matters, because of the partial 
abolition of the double criminality requirements. Considering the importance 
on the judgment it was remarkable that the judgment itself is rather brief and 
the Court of Justice only dedicated 18 paragraphs to the substantive human 
rights question.65 The Court confirmed that the principle of the legality of 
criminal offences and penalties and the principle of equality and non-
discrimination formed part of the general principles of law common to the 
Member States which was also reaffirmed by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.66 Concerning the argument that the principle of legality in criminal 
matters is breached, because Article 2(2) of the FDEAW listing 32 offences 
of which the double criminality rule is abandoned lacks clear legal definitions 
of these offences and as a result is not precise, clear and predictable, the 
Court held that this principle was not infringed. The Court stated that the 
FDEAW does not seek to harmonise the criminal offences in Article 2(2), but 
the definition of those offences are matters determined by the law of the 
issuing Member State which must respect fundamental rights and 
 
61 Ibid, para 32. 
62 Ibid, para 42.  
63 Opinion AG Colomer (n 59) para 65 and 66.  
64 Geyer (n 56) 157. 
65 AvdW (n 54) para 44-61. See also Geyer (n 56) 153.   
66 Ibid, AvdW para 45 and 46.   
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fundamental legal principles.67 In doing so, the court assigned responsibility 
to comply with the principle of legality to the Member States and thereby 
opened up the possibility of an issuing Member State asking for the 
surrender of an individual whilst the principle of legality is breached. For 
example, one of the offences listed under Article 2(2) for which the double 
criminality requirement has been abolished concerns ‘murder, grievous 
bodily injury’. Euthanasia and abortion might fall under this offence in certain 
Member States and in other Member States this might actually be legal if 
certain conditions are met.68 It has therefore been argued that the 32 
offences should have been harmonised first before the double criminality 
check was abolished.69 Moreover, by making the compliance with the 
principle of legality the responsibility of the issuing Member State the 
executing Member State is obliged to trust that this fundamental principle is 
not breached. However, this of course becomes problematic if there is a lack 
of trust or clear indications that this principle is violated, especially because 
there is no mandatory refusal ground in the FDEAW based on fundamental 
rights violations.  
Regarding the argument that the principles of equality and non-
discrimination were breached concerning offences not specifically listed in 
Article 2(2) and therefore surrender could be made subject to the double 
criminality rule and this could lead to unjust difference in treatment between 
individuals depending on the national legal rules in the executing Member 
State, the Court ruled that these principles were not breached. The 
distinction between the 32 offences listed in Article 2(2) for which the double 
criminality rule was abolished if certain requirements were met and other 
offences than those listed in that provision was objectively justified.70 The 
Court, however, never addressed the question whether there is an actual risk 
of differentiated treatment.71 Instead, it swiftly continued by stating that the 
 
67 Ibid, para 52 and 53. 
68 C. Janssens, ‘Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad’ (2007) 
14 Columbia Journal of European Law 169, 176-177.  
69 H. van der Wilt, ‘Harmonisatie van Strafrecht in Europa: Gewogen en te Licht Bevonden’ (2002) 
Nederlands Juristenblad 747, 752.  
70 AvdW (n 54) para 58. 
71 Geyer (n 56) 160-161.  
  
 
87 
Council’s choice of specifically those 32 categories were grounded, ‘on the 
basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in light of the high degree of 
trust and solidarity between the Member States, that, whether by reason of 
their inherent nature or by reason of the punishment incurred of a maximum 
of at least three years, the categories of offences in question feature among 
those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting public order 
and public safety justifies dispensing with the verification of double 
criminality’.72 This is somewhat unconvincing, because the seriousness of the 
offence cannot always objectively justify unequal treatment and the high 
degree of trust that the Court refers to is not always present.73 As will be 
discussed in more detail below, the lack of trust is also evident from the 
national legislation of Member States that implemented the FDEAW, since 
several Member States have maintained the double criminality check beyond 
the requirements under the EAW. Overall, the Court’s support for the 
FDEAW and the principle of mutual recognition is unsurprising as the 
consequences would have been severe for the further development of the 
AFSJ if it had reached a different conclusion.74 However, considering the 
public attention of the FDEAW as a mutual recognition instrument, both in 
terms of the academic activity and the various constitutional courts’ rulings, 
the Court of Justice missed an opportunity to restore confidence in this 
instrument. It avoided some significant and complicated questions which 
deserved a more detailed examination.  
 
3.3.2 The implementation of the EAW indicates a lack of trust  
 
It is important to note that, apart from the 3 Constitutional Courts’ rulings 
against the national implementation acts which led to amendments of the 
Constitutions of those Member States, and the Court of Justice having 
confirmed, although somewhat unconvincing, the compatibility of the FDEAW 
 
72 AvdW (n 54) para 57.  
73 See for a more detailed analysis and a more positive view of the Court’s judgment, C. Janssens, 
‘Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad’ 14 Columbia Journal 
of European Law (2007) 169.  
74 H.F. Sørensen, ‘Advocaten voor de Wereld: The Salvation of Mutual Trust’, in V. Mitsilegas, A. Di 
Martino and L. Mancano, The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Leading Cases in a 
Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2019) 333, 341 and 345.  
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with fundamental rights, the transposition by Member States of the FDEAW 
in national law exceeds the actual substance of the Framework Decision 
itself and therefore fails to comply with the FDEAW.75 Protection of 
fundamental rights was a key concern among Member States which led to 
defects in the transposition of the mutual recognition instrument into national 
law. The absence of strong references to human rights in the EAW and in 
particular the non-existence of a mandatory ground for refusal based on 
human rights has been criticised by many Member States.76 Implementation 
legislation from several Member States includes a mandatory refusal ground 
based on fundamental rights violations as well as other additional grounds to 
refuse surrender beyond the ones listed in the FDEAW.77 This demonstrates 
a lack of trust in the compliance presumption concerning the values of the 
EU and the mutual recognition framework upon which the EAW is based. 
 Italy is one example of a Member State that has introduced additional 
grounds for refusal in their implementing legislation.78 Moreover, it 
specifically states that it does not recognise the EAW “if the sentence for the 
execution of which surrender is requested contains provisions contrary to the 
fundamental principles of the Italian legal system”.79 Greece and Finland are  
2 examples of Member States who have implemented recital 12 of the 
FDEAW80 into a mandatory refusal ground for execution whilst the list of 
 
75 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation 
since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States COM (2011) 175 final, 9. See for a detailed 
discussion on the implementation of the FDEAW per Member State, Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and 
Surano (n 33) 10 and the national reports therein; G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen, L. Surano and A. 
Weyembergh (eds.), The Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters (Éditions de l’Université 
de Bruxelles 2009); M. Fichera, The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European 
Union: Law, Policy and Practice (Intersentia 2011). 
76 Long (n 47) 19.  
77 Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States COM (2007) 407 final, 8-9.  
78 This has also been noticed by the Commission, see Implementing Report 2007 (n 75), 8. For a more 
detailed evaluation of the situation in Italy, see Council of the European Union Evaluation Report on 
the fourth round of mutual evaluation “The practical application of the European Arrest Warrant and 
corresponding surrender procedure between Member States” – report on Italy, 18 March 2009, 
5832/2/09 REV 2 (5832/1/09 REV 1 Restreint UE 23 February 2009). For the full list of refusal 
grounds see 83-86. 
79 Ibid Council, 86. 
80 Recital 12 of the FDEAW states: ‘This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and 
observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the 
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refusal grounds in Articles 3 and 4 of the EAW is exhaustive and recital 12 is 
not part of this exhaustive lists.81 Poland, Ireland and Belgian have also 
introduced checks on whether fundamental rights have been respected into 
their national implementing legislation.82      
 In the United Kingdom the EAW was heavily criticised by members of 
the Parliament.83 Similar to other Member States, a key issue where the 
different standards of justice among Member States and the various levels of 
respect for human rights.84 Especially article 3 ECHR violations regarding the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
was a matter of concern.85 These concerns about human rights violations are 
also visible in the United Kingdom’s Extradition Act 2003 which implemented 
the FDEAW into national law and allows refusal on the basis of human rights 
violations.86 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Chapter VI thereof. Nothing in 
this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for whom a 
European arrest warrant has been issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of 
objective elements, that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, 
language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person's position may be prejudiced 
for any of these reasons’. 
81 Council of the European Union Evaluation Report on the fourth round of mutual evaluation “The 
practical application of the European Arrest Warrant and corresponding surrender procedure 
between Member States” – report on Greece. 3 December 2008, 13416/2/08 REV2 (13416/1/08 
REV1 Restreint UE 28 September 2007), 38; Council of the European Union Evaluation Report on the 
fourth round of mutual evaluation “The practical application of the European Arrest Warrant and 
corresponding surrender procedure between Member States” – report on Finland. 16 November 
2007, 11787/2/07 REV2(11787/1/07 REV1 Restreint UE 28 September 2007) 24 and 36. 
82 Report Commission (n 75) and Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and Surano (n 33) 10.  
83 Efrat (n 20) 664. 
84 See for a detailed report on the problems with human rights and extradition in the UK, House of 
Lords and House of Commons. Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Human Rights Implications of 
UK Extradition Policy: Written Evidence (2011), available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/JCHR_EXT_Written_Evidence_11.pdf, last accessed 19 April 2019.  
85 See for example, House of Lords, Committee on Extradition Law, Oral and Written Evidence (2015) 
and in particular the Chief Magistrate’s Office – Written Evidence 241-248 and the answers to 
questions 9 and 10 in particular, available at: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/extradition-law/SELECT%20COMMITTEE%20ON%20EXTRADITION%20LAW.pdf, last 
accessed 23 June 2018.  
86 Article 21 of the Extradition Act 2003. See for a more detailed discussion on the implementation, 
N. Padfield, ‘The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in England and Wales’ (2007) 3 
European Constitutional Law Review 253. 
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Moreover, the United Kingdom has refused surrender on the basis of 
fundamental rights violations. For example, in Lithuania v Liam Campbell,87 a 
judgment concerning the application under the Extradition Act 2003, the 
national court held that extradition would lead to a breach of Article 3 ECHR 
concerning inhuman and degrading treatment and thus to a breach of section 
21 of the Extradition Act 2003. It reached this conclusion by relying on the 
Soering88 judgment of the ECtHR in which it was held that a Member State 
could be in breach of the Convention, in particular Article 3 ECHR, if they 
extradited an individual to a State in which the person in question would face 
a breach of a Convention right. It thereby extended the scope of a state’s 
responsibility for violations of the Convention and led to the executing 
Member State barring extradition if surrender would result in a flagrant 
breach of the rights protected under the Convention. In Liam Campbell, the 
Court based its decision not to extradite on the ECtHR decision Savenkovas 
v Lithuania in which the Strasbourg Court had concluded that the poor 
detention conditions in Lithuania amounted to degrading treatment in breach 
of Article 3 of the Convention.89 Surrender has also been refused to Italy due 
to poor prison conditions which constituted a breach of Article 3 ECHR.90 
More recently, with reference to the judgment of the ECtHR in Varga and 
Others v Hungary91 demonstrating persistent, serious and widespread 
problems within the Hungary prison system and consistent violations of 
Article 3 ECHR, in GS & Ors the Court of Appeal assessed whether 
Hungarian assurances in relation to detention conditions and more 
specifically the space available to individual prisoners were being enforced 
and could be relied upon.92  
 
87 The High Court of Justice in Norther Ireland, Queen’s Bench Division, 22 February 2013, Lithuania v 
Liam Campbell [2013] NIQB 19. 
88 Soering (n 42).  
89 ECtHR, Savenkovas v Lithuania (18 November 2008) Application no. 871/02, para 82. 
90  England and Wales High Court, Administrative Court, 11 March 2014, Badre v Italy [2014] EWHC 
614 (Admin). In its decision the High Court relied on the ECtHR judgment which found Italy in breach 
of Article 3 ECHR, ECtHR, Torreggiani and Others v Italy (8 January 2013) Application no. 43517/09. 
91 ECtHR, Varga and Others v Hungary (10 March 2015) Application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 
73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13. 
92 Court of Appeal, Administrative Court, 21 January 2016, GS & Ors v Central District of Pest Hungary 
& Ors [2016] EWHC 64 (Admin). 
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Violations among Member States of the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 ECHR and 
article 4 of the Charter, due to poor prison conditions are a serious problem 
in the Union and directly affect the smooth functioning of the EAW.93 Among 
other countries, prison conditions in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Italy, Romania, 
Hungary and Greece are all questioned, and in several cases the United 
Kingdom does refuse extradition or requires assurances from the issuing 
Member State.94 In doing so, the national courts take into account recent 
examinations and evaluations of the ECtHR which is based on statistical data 
and other evidence and in which the Strasbourg court held that prison 
conditions breach Article 3 of the Convention. These judgments therefore 
clearly demonstrate serious and consistent violations of human rights by 
Member States. Moreover, they confirm that Member States cannot trust the 
criminal justice systems of their Union partners and their respect for 
fundamental human rights. This justifies and supports the lack of trust among 
Member States, because the first tier of the mutual recognition framework is 
fractured and does not support the second tier consisting of mutual trust. It 
therefore challenges the entire mutual recognition framework upon which the 
application of the EAW is built. Enforcing arrest warrants when there is 
substantial evidence that fundamental rights are not upheld would undermine 
the legitimacy of this mutual recognition instrument.  
 Apart from refusal grounds based on human rights, some Member 
States’ national implementing legislation have included: other additional 
mandatory refusal grounds as well; reintroduced double criminality checks; 
appointed an executive body as the competent judicial authority; included 
additional conditions beyond the EAW form, and have not fully implemented 
the strict time-framework of the EAW.95 The defects in the implementation of 
the EAW thus demonstrate a lack of trust in the mutual recognition 
instrument and confidence in each other’s criminal justice system.  
 
93 See also Article 19(2) of the Charter which states that no one may be handed over to a State 
where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.  
94 House of Lords (n 85)  
95 Commission’s Report (n 77) 8-9 and Long (n 47) 20-21.  
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However, this is not surprising as the same year that the EAW was 
adopted, the 2002 report of the EU Network of Independent Experts in 
Fundamental Rights on the situation of human rights in the Union indicated 
serious problems with the respect of fundamental rights in several Member 
States.96 Moreover, the same year, the report from the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment also 
indicated serious problems with the pre-trial detention conditions, general 
prison conditions and the overcrowding of prisons and treatment of suspects 
and convicted persons in the EU.97  
The Commission initially criticised the defects in the national 
implementation acts and the additional refusal grounds introduced by 
Member States in its implementation report on the EAW.98 However, with 
reference to the judgments of the ECtHR concerning the deficiencies in some 
prisons within the EU,99 its more recent report shows a different view. The 
Commission specifically stated that:  
 
it is clear that the Council Framework Decision on the EAW (which provides in 
Article 1(3) that Member States must respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles, including Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights) does not mandate surrender where an executing judicial 
authority is satisfied, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, that 
such surrender would result in a breach of a requested person’s fundamental 
rights arising from unacceptable detention conditions.100  
 
This view was reiterated in the Commission’s Green Paper focusing on 
detention101 which was a response to the Council’s request who correctly 
 
96 EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Report on the situation of 
fundamental rights in the European Union and its member states 2002. See in particular, Chapter I of 
the report concerning Dignity, 44-62 and Chapter VI concerning Justice, 243-262.  
97 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe, CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1. 
98 Commission’s Report (n 77) 8. 
99 See inter alia, ECtHR, Peers v Greece (19 April 2001) Application no. 28524/95; ECtHR, 
Sulejmanovic v Italy (16 July 2009) Application no. 22635/03; ECtHR, Orchowski v Poland (22 January 
2010) Application no. 17885/04. 
100 Commission’s Report (n 75) 7.  
101 European Commission, Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green Paper 
on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention COM (2011) 327 final, 4. 
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held that the concerns of the detention standards in the Union “prejudice 
judicial cooperation between Member States and do not represent the values 
for which the European Union stands.”102 The European Parliament, in its 
2017 resolution on prison systems and conditions, clearly outlines the 
seriousness of the prison situation in Europe.103 Reports by the Council of 
Europe also show that overcrowding in prisons is a recurrent problem in the 
Union.104 The 2019 ECtHR Factsheet concerning detention conditions and 
treatment of prisoners which contains a rather long list of Member States 
who have been held to breach Article 3 ECHR also confirm the seriousness 
of the situation in the EU.105 The detention standards in some Member States 
falling short of international law standards106 and compliance with EU human 
rights is at the root of the lack of trust between Member States.107  This 
seriously undermines mutual recognition in criminal matters, but is justified 
since judicial cooperation should not prevail the protection of human rights.  
 
3.4 The EAW and Fundamental Rights according to the Court of Justice 
 
Unsurprising, the Court of Justice was also challenged rather quickly with the 
human rights concerns in the application of the FDEAW and referred to the 
exhaustive list of grounds for non-execution in the Framework Decision on 
several occasions.108 The Court adopted a strict trust presumption and 
 
102 Resolution of the Council on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1, 1. 
103 European Parliament Resolution of 5 October 2017 on prison systems and conditions 
(2015/2062(INI)). 
104 Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics, SPACE I – Prison Populations Survey 2015, published on 
14 March 2017, PC-CP (2016) 6. See also, Council of Europe European Committee on Crime 
Problems, White Paper on Prison Overcrowding of 30 June 2016, PC-CP (2015) 6 rev 7. 
105 European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet – Detention conditions and treatment of prisoners, 
July 2019.  
106 See for example, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation to Member 
States concerning foreign prisoners, on 10 October 2012, CM/Rec (2012) 12; Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers, Recommendation concerning prison overcrowding and prison population 
inflation on 30 September 1999, CM/Rec (99) 22. 
107 European Parliament Legislative Train Area of Justice and Fundamental Rights, Common 
Standards for Prison and for Detention Conditions, 20 June 2019, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-
common-standards-for-prisons-and-for-detention-conditions, last accessed 24 July 2019.  
108 See inter alia, Case C-388/08 PPU Artur Leymann and Aleksi Pustovaroc, EU:C:2008:669, para 51 
and Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:661, para 57. 
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focused on the effectiveness and aim of the extradition procedure by 
ensuring that mutual recognition was applied.109 When the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights became legally binding with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 the question of whether fundamental rights 
should be taken into account regarding the execution of an arrest warrant 
and whether this can be refused on grounds of fundamental rights 
infringements became even more prominent. 
Radu110 was the first key case that directly questioned the 
compatibility of the Charter with the FDEAW, by asking whether an executing 
Member State may refuse to execute an European arrest warrant on 
fundamental rights grounds. It therefore addressed the complicated 
relationship between all 3 tiers of the mutual recognition framework, namely 
fundamental rights, mutual trust and mutual recognition. Yet, the Court 
largely avoided this key issue by rephrasing the question in the preliminary 
ruling. As a result, the judgment has largely been considered as ‘a missed 
opportunity’, especially since AG Sharpston’s Opinion raised high hopes.111   
The preliminary reference asked whether the execution of an arrest 
warrant could be refused if it would infringe, the requested person’s rights to 
liberty and security and a fair trial under Articles 5 and 6 of ECHR and 
Articles 6, 48 and 52 of the Charter.112 AG Sharpston in a rather detailed and 
strong analytical opinion started by referring to the objectives of the 
Framework Decision and the Court’s approach of concluding that the non-
execution grounds are an exhaustive list.113 More interestingly, the AG then 
stated: 114 
 
 
109 See inter alia, AvdW (n 54) para 28; Ibid, Leymann para 42; Jeremy F (n 28) para 35.  
110 Case C-396/11 Radu, EU:C:2013:39 
111 R. Raffaelli, ‘Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 29 January 2013, Radu’ in V. 
Mitsilegas, A. Di Martino and L. Mancano, The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Leading 
Cases in a Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2019) 363, 364.  
112 Radu (n 110) para 20.   
113 Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, delivered on 18 October 2012, in Case C-396/11 Radu, 
EU:C:2012:648, para 66-68.  
114 Ibid, para 69 and 70. 
  
 
95 
“However, I do not believe that a narrow approach – which would exclude 
human rights considerations altogether – is supported either by the wording 
of the Framework Decision or by the case-law.” 
 
“Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision makes it clear that the decision does 
not affect the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU (now, after amendment, Article 6 
TEU). It follows, in my view, that the duty to respect those rights and 
principles permeates the Framework Decision. It is implicit that those rights 
may be taken into account in founding a decision not to execute a warrant. 
To interpret Article 1(3) otherwise would risk its having no meaning – 
otherwise, possibly, than as an elegant platitude.” 
 
The AG continued by considering which factors must be taken into account in 
reaching a decision whether or not to refuse an order for surrender on the 
basis of human rights grounds and considered the case law and test coming 
from the ECtHR.115 She concluded that the execution of an arrest warrant 
could be refused on human rights grounds116 if ‘the deficiency or deficiencies 
in the trial process should be such as fundamentally to destroy its 
fairness’.117 AG Sharpston, therefore accepted that there are limits to the 
presumption that Member States comply with fundamental rights upon which 
the principle of mutual trust is based. As such, under exceptional 
circumstances, fundamental rights violations prevent the mutual recognition 
of an arrest warrant. This reasoning is welcome, because it is in line with the 
case law of the ECtHR and the Commission’s view in its 2011 
implementation report of the EAW.118 Moreover, it considers the importance 
of this mutual recognition instrument for the AFSJ but also acknowledges 
that in principle Member States should respect the Union’s values, in practice 
this does not always happen. It therefore recognises that the effectiveness of 
mutual recognition instruments cannot always prevail the protection of 
fundamental rights.  
 
115 Ibid, para 73-78.  
116 Ibid, para 97.  
117 Ibid, para 83. 
118 Commission’s Report (n 75) 7.  
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Unfortunately, the Court of Justice did not follow AG Sharpston’s 
Opinion nor did it fully address the questions referred by Romania 
concerning the possibility of the refusal of mutual recognition on human 
rights grounds. The Court focused on the objectives of the FDEAW as a 
system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition.119 It 
referred to the purpose of the FDEAW as a more effective system to 
enhance judicial cooperation in criminal matters and which therefore 
contributes to the objective set for the EU to become an AFSJ ‘by basing 
itself on the high degree of confidence which should exist between the 
Member States’.120 By referring to the principle of mutual trust among 
Member States, the Court reaffirmed the exhaustive grounds for non-
execution of an EAW.121 Moreover, the Court of Justice stated that an 
obligation to refuse surrender on the basis that the individual in question was 
not heard by the issuing Member State before the EAW was issued would 
lead to the failure of the Framework’s Decision system of surrender122 and ‘in 
any event, the European legislature has ensured that the right to be heard 
will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to 
compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system’.123 On 
the basis of this reasoning the Court rejected the possibility of human rights 
breaches as a ground to refuse the execution of an arrest warrant.  
The unexpectedly short judgment of the Court and the narrow 
approach adopted is somewhat unconvincing and dissatisfying. The Court 
did not directly address the problems surrounding the role of fundamental 
rights within the EAW.124 Moreover, the judgment largely contradicted the 
Advocate General’s Opinion that strongly considered the effectiveness of the 
FDEAW, but acknowledged that serious fundamental rights breaches 
undermine the legitimate application of this instrument. Thus, in light of the 
AFSJ objective it is understandable that the Court wants to protect the 
effectiveness of EU criminal law instruments. However, this should not 
 
119 Radu (n 110) para 33.  
120 Ibid, para 34.  
121 Ibid, para 39.  
122 Ibid, para 40. 
123 Ibid, para 41.  
124 Raffaelli (n 111) 370.  
  
 
97 
exceed the judicial protection of human rights which are a primary part of the 
EU’s legal framework and their safeguarding is extremely important in 
extradition procedures. It is unconvincing to refuse surrender based on 
human rights violations by simply referring to the presumption of trust that 
should exist between Member States, when the preliminary reference itself 
involves a breach of human rights.  
The Court, by avoiding the question of the role of fundamental rights 
within the EAW in Radu and instead decided to answer a more limited 
question where the focus was on the effectiveness of the mutual recognition 
instrument, laid ground for the Melloni125 judgment which followed relatively 
easily from Radu.126 Indeed, by reiterating the strict mutual trust presumption 
the Court adopted a similar approach where the effectiveness of the EAW 
was at the heart of the judgment which led to the primacy of the EAW as a 
secondary piece of legislation over fundamental rights concerns. The Melloni 
case concerned a conviction in absentia of an Italian national who was 
residing in Spain. Although the FDEAW allows for the refusal to execute a 
EAW if an individual has been convicted in absentia, the optional non-
execution grounds on judgments in absentia were amended by a Framework 
Decision in 2009. The amendments provided that a Member State cannot 
refuse to execute an arrest warrant if the person concerned was sufficiently 
aware of the trial; was defended by a councillor which the person concerned 
had instructed; had waived his or her right to a retrial or has a right to a full 
retrial.127 These exceptions were applicable to Mr. Melloni. Yet, under the 
Spanish Constitution the right to be present at a trial is part of the right to a 
fair trial.  
The first question referred to the Court asked whether Article 4a(1) of 
the FDEAW precludes the executing Member State to review the execution 
of an arrest warrant if a person was convicted in absentia and the conditions 
 
125 Melloni (n 28).   
126 Raffaelli (n 111) 370-371.  
127 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 
2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural 
rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions 
rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, L 81/24, OJ 27 March 2009, Article 4a 
(1). 
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listed in that Article are not applicable. The Court reiterated the aim of the FD 
EAW and that Member States are in principle obliged to act upon a European 
arrest warrant.128 On the basis of this, the Court continued by adopting a 
literal interpretation of Article 4a(1) and held that the provision restricts the 
opportunities for refusing to execute a warrant.129 The literal interpretation 
was also confirmed by the mutual recognition objectives pursued by the EU 
legislature to improve mutual recognition of judicial decisions between 
Member States through the harmonisation of the grounds for non-recognition 
of decisions rendered following an in absentia trial.130 The second question 
referred to the Court of Justice concerned the compatibility of the limited 
exceptions under Article 4a(1) with the right to an effective judicial remedy 
and the right to a fair trial under Article 47 and 48(2) of the Charter.131 By 
referring to case law of the ECtHR, the Court stated that the right to a fair trial 
is not absolute but that this right can be waived expressly or tacitly.132 
Furthermore, the Court specified that the objective of Framework Decision 
2009/299 concerning in absentia trials was to ‘enhance the procedural rights 
of persons subject to criminal proceedings whilst improving mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions between Member States’133 and held that 
Article 4a(1) is compatible with the requirements under Articles 47 and 48(2) 
of the Charter.134  
The final and most significant question referred to the Court 
concerned the possibility of Member States providing a greater level of 
human rights protection in their national constitutional law under Article 53 of 
the Charter than provided for under FDEAW. The Court rejected such an 
interpretation of Article 53 of the Charteras this ‘would undermine the 
principle of the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would allow a Member 
State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the 
Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s 
 
128 Melloni (n 28) para 36-38.  
129 Ibid, para 41. 
130 Ibid, 43. 
131 Ibid, para 26.  
132 Ibid, para 49-50. 
133 Ibid, para 51.  
134 Ibid, para 54.  
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constitution’.135 The Court confirmed the possibility for national courts to 
provide higher levels of protection of fundamental rights, but this cannot 
compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter and the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. Article 4a(1) of the Framework 
Decision does not allow refusal to execute an arrest warrant if one of the 
situations referred to in the Article applies.136 The court then referred to the 
aim of the provision, which is to remedy the difficulties, associated with 
mutual recognition regarding in absentia trials and reflects the consensus 
reached by all Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law 
to the procedural rights enjoyed by a person convicted in absentia who are 
the subject of a European arrest warrant. On this basis, the Court stated:  
 
Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter 
to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the 
conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, a possibility not 
provided for under Framework Decision 2009/299, in order to avoid an adverse 
effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the 
constitution of the executing Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of 
the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework 
decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition which 
that decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy 
of that framework decision.137 
 
In the Melloni judgment the Court clearly did not recognise higher 
national standards of fundamental rights protection on the basis of the 
Charter, a primary source of EU law, but gave preference to the mutual 
recognition of provisions listed in the FDEAW, a secondary legislation 
instrument. By prioritising the effectiveness of mutual recognition based on 
the presumption of mutual trust between Member States the Court has 
interpreted fundamental rights in a restrictive manner.138 As rightly noted by 
two scholars, this sits uneasily with the Court’s notion that the Framework 
 
135 Ibid, para 58. 
136 Ibid para 60-61. 
137 Ibid, para 63 (emphasis added). 
138 Mitsilegas (n 30) 469.  
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Decision regarding in absentia trials also aims to protect the individual’s 
procedural rights.139 Moreover, the Court’s proclamation of the primacy and 
autonomy of EU law in relation to the standards protected in national 
constitutions in the sensitive area of EU criminal law undermines the Member 
States’ trust in the FDEAW as a mutual recognition instrument itself. The 
Court’s stance when it comes to the application of mutual recognition is to 
the detriment of a meaningful fundamental rights scrutiny.140 This has 
profound implications and is not line with the Strasbourg Court’s approach 
which had already embraced an individual assessment of fundamental rights 
violations.141 Therefore, in light of the national courts and the Strasbourg 
Court, the Court’s reasoning undermines the credibility of the FDEAW.142  
The judgments of the Court in Radu and Melloni both referred to the 
obligation for the executing Member State of the EAW to recognise the level 
of human rights protection of the issuing Member State as equivalent to its 
own level of fundamental rights protection. Therefore, mutual trust was 
presumed unconditional. However, in the more recent joined cases of 
Aranjosi and Căldăraru143 the Court departed from this unconditional trust 
presumption and recognised that mutual trust between Member States is not 
unlimited. In this case the executing Member State was challenged with the 
issue whether or not to execute the arrest warrants issued by Romania and 
Hungary with the possibility of inhumane detention conditions and strong 
indications that the issuing Member States infringe Article 4 of the Charter. 
For this reason, the Higher Regional Court of Bremen decided to stay the 
proceedings and asked the Court of Justice whether in light of serious 
fundamental right concerns, Article 1(3) of the FDEAW should be interpreted 
as meaning that a request for surrender for the purposes of prosecution is  
 
139 V. Mitsilegas and L. Mancano, ‘Melloni: Primacy versus Rights?’ in V. Mitsilegas, A. Di Martino and 
L. Mancano, The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis 
(Hart Publishing, 2019) 393, 397. 
140 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Resetting the Parameters of Mutual Trust: From Aranyosi to LM’ in V. Mitsilegas, A. 
Di Martino and L. Mancano, The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Leading Cases in a 
Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2019) 422, 424.  
141 See, ECtHR, Tarakhel v Switserland (4 November 2014) Application no. 29217/12. See also chapter 
2.  
142 Mitsilegas (n 140) 424.  
143 Aranyosi (n 2).  
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inadmissible or should the executing Member State decide on the 
admissibility and whether in relation to the provision of assurances by the 
issuing Member State the executing Member State should lay down specific 
minimum requirements applicable to the detention conditions.144   
AG Bot in its Opinion started with a traditional analysis of Article 1(3) 
FDEAW and concluded that the provision does not constitute a ground for 
non-execution of the EAW,145 but merely refers to the principle of mutual 
confidence between the Member States.146 The AG was of the opinion that 
another interpretation of Article 1(3) FDEAW would be contrary to the 
structure of the system, as it would go against the exhaustive grounds for 
non-execution listed in Article 3 and 4a. Apart from the exceptional 
circumstances referred to in recital 10 and 13, other grounds for non-
execution are not acceptable.147  Having referred to the general obligation to 
execute an arrest warrant, AG Bot then concluded that there is no such 
obligation to execute an arrest warrant if this would lead to disproportionate 
results.148 The systemic deficiency in the detention conditions in the issuing 
Member States, is such an exceptional circumstance that it is ‘necessary to 
weigh up the rights of the surrendered person against the requirements of 
the protection of rights and freedoms of others’,149 in order to assess whether 
the detention conditions are proportionate. Therefore, rather than accepting a 
ground to refuse surrender based on fundamental rights violations the AG, 
rather disappointingly, relied on the principle of proportionality as a basis for 
the executing Member State to refuse surrender.150 This approach sits at 
odds with the mutual recognition framework that is based on the first tier 
which requires inter alia compliance with fundamental rights by Member 
States. If there are clear indications that fundamental rights are breached the 
second tier consisting of mutual trust is not supported and therefore should 
prevent the mutual recognition of judicial decisions. Therefore, the 
 
144 Ibid, para 46.  
145 Opinion Advocate General Bot, delivered on 3 March 2016, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 
PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:140, para 69.  
146 Ibid, para 72-78. 
147 Ibid, 79-93.  
148 Ibid, para 130-132. 
149 Ibid, para 135. 
150 Ibid, para 160. 
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fundamental rights problems should lead to the non-execution of this mutual 
recognition instrument, because there is clear evidence that the issuing 
Member States’ criminal justice system is not line with the EU’s normative 
identity and therefore limits trust.  
The Court did not follow AG Bot’s opinion and gave Article 1(3) 
FDEAW a significant role in the protection of fundamental rights. The Court 
first recalled the importance of the principle of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust for the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system of 
extradition that contributes to the objective of an area of freedom security 
and justice within the EU.151 However, it then recognised that limitations of 
the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust between Member States 
can be made in exceptional circumstances as the Court had already 
acknowledge in Opinion 2/13. It proceeded by stating that Article 1(3) FD 
EAW holds that the Framework Decision does not affect the obligation to 
respect fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter.152 Article 4 of the 
Charter, which corresponds with Article 3 ECHR, concerning the inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is binding and an absolute right and one 
of the fundamental values of the Union and its Member States.153 On this 
basis the Court set out a two-stage test which could lead to the 
postponement of the execution of the arrest warrant and eventually to the 
termination of the procedure. First, if an executing Member State is in the 
possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment then 
they need to assess the existence of this risk.154 However, finding a real risk 
of inhuman treatment cannot in itself lead to the refusal to execute an arrest 
warrant. The second step of the test requires the executing Member State to 
examine whether the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk.155  
The Court thus recognised, for the very first time in relation to the 
FDEAW, that mutual trust and therefore mutual recognition is not 
unconditional, especially when fundamental rights are infringed by Member 
 
151 Aranyosi (n 2) para 75-79. 
152 Aranyosi (n 2) para 82-83. 
153 Aranyosi (n 2) para 84-87. 
154 Aranyosi (n 2) para 88. 
155 Aranyosi (n 2) para 92. 
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States.156 The possibility of a refusal ground based on fundamental rights is a 
positive step which supports the mutual recognition framework. However, the 
case also raised some questions and did not eliminate all the trust issues in 
relation to the FDEAW. First, it was not clear from the Court’s judgment at 
the time whether other fundamental rights violations could also prevent the 
execution of an arrest warrant.157 Secondly, the high thresholds adopted that 
could justify the non-execution of an arrest warrant are somewhat 
problematic. For example, the requirement that the national courts must 
examine the risk that the individual will be exposed to inhuman treatment by 
relying on objective, reliable, specific and updated information,158 assumes 
that this information is available. Based on this information which needs to 
indicate a real risk of fundamental rights violations can mutual trust be 
limited. This indicates that it cannot be easily relied upon if there are no 
generalised fundamental rights problems in the criminal justice system of the 
issuing Member State. Thus, if under specific circumstances an individual’s 
fundamental rights might be breached, but it involves a single violation, the 
executing Member State is required to act upon the request from the issuing 
Member State.159 This still challenges the legitimacy of the mutual 
recognition framework.  
Moreover, it has been rightly noted that the requirement for the 
national courts to base their assessment on ‘objective, reliable and, specific 
and properly updated’ data is somewhat vague.160 While the Court provides 
some indications as to the type of sources that can be used as evidence it 
does not ‘specify what is to be accepted by a national court as evidence in 
surrender proceedings and what not’.161 The requirement that the data needs 
 
156 K. Bovend’Eerdt, ‘The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A New Limit to the Mutual Trust 
Presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (2016) 32 Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 112, 118. 
157 Mitsilegas (n 140) 429.  
158 Aranyosi (n 2) para 89-90.  
159G. Anagnostaras, ‘Mutual confidence is not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection and the 
execution of the European arrest warrant: Aranyosi and Căldăraru’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law 
Review 1675, 1693-1694.  
160 A. Łazowski, ‘Aranyosi and Căldăraru – Through the Eyes of National Judges’, in V. Mitsilegas, A. di 
Martino and L. Mancano (eds.) The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law. Leading Cases in a 
Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2019) 437, 441.  
161 Ballegooij and Bárd (n 44) 461. 
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to be specific is also problematic. It is not clear what satisfies this 
requirement to pass the test that allows for the non-execution of the EAW.162 
Thus, although the judgment is welcome from the perspective that it 
recognised limits to the mutual trust among Member States in each other’s 
criminal justice systems, the test adopted by the Court still raises problems 
with the justification of mutual recognition due to the high thresholds and is 
rather challenging for the national courts who need to apply it.  
The LM judgment163 answered the question regarding the scope of 
fundamental rights violations which allow for the refusal to surrender an 
individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued and extended the 
possibility to non-absolute fundamental rights. In light of the rule of law crisis 
and in particular the serious and widespread attacks on the judiciary whose 
independence as a result is heavily undermined, the Irish High Court asked 
the Court of Justice whether the Aranjosi test is applicable. More precisely, it 
asked whether the second step of the test that requires an assessment as to 
the exposure of the individual in question to the risk of an unfair trial is still 
required.164 While the Court accepted the possibility to refuse surrender 
based on the fundamental right violation of the right to a fair trial, it required 
both steps of the Aranyosi test and thus confirmed the need to examine the 
exposure of the individual to the risk of an unfair trial. This is problematic, 
because as rightly held by the Irish Court ‘it is difficult to see how individual 
guarantees can be given by the issuing judicial authority as to a fair trial 
when it is the system of justice itself that is no longer operating under the rule 
of law’.165 Therefore, the assessment required by the Court in a situation 
where the rule of law is seriously dismantled is unrealistic and cannot be 
justified in light of the mutual recognition framework and from a fundamental 
rights perspective. It has therefore been rightly argued that issues concerning 
the independence of the judiciary need to be examined as a rule of law 
problem, rather than a violation of the right to a fair trial. This would imply the 
 
162 Łazowski (n 160) 442.  
163 Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:586.  
164 Ibid, para 25-26.  
165 Minster of Justice and Equality v Artur Celmer [2018] IEHC 119 (3 December 2018) para 142. 
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postponement of judicial cooperation by the executing Member State when 
rule of law issues appear.166  
The suggestion proposed seems fitting in light of the rule of law crisis 
and questionable independence of the judiciary in several Member States167 
which severely fractures the foundation of the mutual recognition framework. 
Indeed, the rule of law violations that the EU is currently confronted with 
demonstrates that the compliance presumption of the Article 2 TEU values is 
limited and in turn the level of trust among Member States in each other’s 
criminal justice systems is justifiably challenged. As a result, notwithstanding 
the broader considerations of its judgment that the Court needed to take into 
account, from the perspective of the mutual recognition’s framework the 
Court’s requirement of the two-stage test when rule of law issues are at stake 
undermines the legitimacy of the framework. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The normative approach adopted in the mutual recognition framework, 
which treats mutual trust as a mechanism to enhance the judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters among Member States based on the foundational values 
is especially problematic for the EAW. The latter introduced a fast-track 
extradition procedure with limited grounds for Member States to refuse 
surrender. Especially, the absence of a refusal ground on the basis of 
fundamental rights violations caused a significant amount of concern from 
the moment the Framework Decision was adopted. Due to the lack of 
sufficient fundamental rights guarantees in the mutual recognition instrument 
a remarkably high number of Member States adopted extra safeguards in 
their national legislation implementing the FDEAW, including a ground to 
refuse surrender based on fundamental rights violations. This shows that the 
trust that the Member States had in each other’s criminal justice system and 
therefore in the EAW was limited. However, the case law of the ECtHR, as 
well as documents from the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the 
 
166 P. Bárd and W. van Ballegooij, ‘Judicial Independence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust? The 
CJEU in Minister for Justice and Equality v LM’ (2018) 9 New Journal of European Criminal Law 353, 
357.  
167 See chapter 4, 5 and 6.  
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Council of Europe clearly demonstrate that not all Member States adhere to 
the fundamental rights value. This undermines the mutual recognition 
framework as the foundation consists of the Member States commitment to 
the values listed in Article 2 TEU. As such, the second tier comprising of 
mutual trust is not sufficiently supported and the lack of trust among Member 
States is therefore justified. Executing an arrest warrant when fundamental 
rights are at stake undermines the legitimacy of the application of mutual 
recognition.  
However, the Court of Justice by focusing on the effectiveness of the 
EAW as a mutual recognition instrument to enhance judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and contribute to the development of an AFSJ, has been a 
strong defender of the mutual trust presumption. Initially, the Court adopted 
an unconditional trust requirement and did not allow Member States to refuse 
surrender of an individual based on fundamental rights grounds. In its more 
recent case law, however, the Court has accepted that the trust presumption 
is not unlimited. Yet, it adopted a very strict test that national courts need to 
apply, including an examination of the exposure of the individual to the 
fundamental rights violation as a second step. While the guidance provided 
by the Court to national judges lacks precision and detail, the more difficult 
issues arise when a EAW is issued by a Member State with rule of law 
problems and the independence of the judiciary is no longer guaranteed. 
Under those circumstances the Court still requires that the national court 
fulfils the second step of the test and thus obtains information and enters into 
a dialogue with the judiciary that allegedly is no longer independent to assess 
whether the individual might be exposed to an unfair trial. This is problematic 
as the information obtained from the issuing authority cannot necessarily be 
trusted. This approach therefore undermines the legitimacy of the mutual 
recognition framework and is in light of the rule of law violations in several 
Member States where the independence of the judiciary is weakened 
unjustifiable.  
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4. The Rule of Law in the European Union: 
Serious Fractures in the Mutual Recognition Framework’s 
Foundation 
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the EAW as a tool to enhance EU 
integration in criminal matters through the principle of mutual recognition is 
perceived as a threat to the established human rights protected in national 
constitutions and the standards adopted within Member States. This is clear 
from the constitutional courts’ reactions on the mutual recognition instrument 
and the implementation of the Framework Decision in the national legal 
orders. A sufficient degree of trust is necessary for the effective functioning of 
trust-based mutual recognition instruments. Human rights breaches by 
Member States contribute to a lack of trust and undermine the entire 
operation of the mutual recognition framework. 
This chapter extends the problems regarding the functioning of the 
principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal matters by focusing on the rule 
of law. The latter is a fundamental foundational value of the EU and a 
genuine and shared commitment to the adherence of the rule of law is 
required for the successful operation of the mutual recognition framework. 
However, this essential value for the EU legal order is currently profoundly 
undermined by some Member States due to the rise of illiberal regimes. This 
justifiably challenges trust among Member States in each other’s criminal 
justice system and questions the legitimacy of the mutual recognition 
framework.   
First, the chapter discusses the importance of the rule of law as a 
foundational value of the EU and for the principle of mutual recognition to 
enhance judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It argues that respect for the 
rule of law is essential for the EU’s normative and constitutional identity and 
a strong commitment by the Member States to this value is necessary to 
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support the mutual recognition framework (section 4.2). It continues by 
focusing on the rule of law crisis in the EU and discusses the deliberate 
dismantlement of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary where the judiciary is 
gravely undermined. The non-adherence to the rule of law value of these 
Member States demonstrates problems with the EU’s normative and 
constitutional identity upon which mutual trust is based. This seriously 
weakens the mutual recognition framework’s foundation (section 4.3). 
 
4.2 The rule of law as one of the founding values of the Union  
  
The principle of mutual trust and mutual recognition in the EU are a result of 
the progression of the European integration project which is surrounded by 
the development of stronger EU constitutional dimensions.1 Indeed, the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States has evolved significantly 
since the start of the European project.2 In the 1960s doctrines such as direct 
effect and supremacy led to the EU being described as a “constitutional 
framework for a federal-type structure”.3 In 1962, the first president of the 
European Commission, Walter Hallstein, held that:  
 
The European Economic Community [now European Union] is a community of 
law …. because it serves to realize the idea of law. The founding Treaty, which 
may not be terminated forms a kind of a Constitution for the Community.4  
 
Hallstein’s famous expression “community of law” clearly refers to the notion 
of the rule of law.5 The Court of Justice did not formally adhere to this until 
 
1 M. Bonelli, ‘From a Community of Law to a Union of Values. Hungary, Poland, and European 
Constitutionalism’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review, 793. See for a detailed analysis 
specifically focusing on EU Criminal Law and how effectiveness has driven the constitutional 
development in this field, E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law 
(Hart Publishing 2012).  
2 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal, 2403, 2406. 
3 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 The American 
Journal of International Law, 1.  
4 W. Hallstein, Europäische Reden (1979), 343-344, translation from: T. von Danwitz, ‘The Rule of 
Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ’ (2014) 37(5) Fordham International Law Journal, 1311, 
1312-1313.  
5 R. Manko, The EU as a community of law. Overview of the role of law in the Union, European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Briefing March 2017, available at: 
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1986, in its ground-breaking judgment Les Verts, in which it held that the EU 
is a “Community based on the rule of law” and in which it referred to the 
Treaty as the “basic constitutional charter.”6 However, based on the common 
traditions of the Member States, the Court of Justice as early as the 1950s 
proclaimed various general principles of EU Law which were key building 
blocks for a community of law and form an integral part of the rule of law as a 
constitutional principle of the EU.7 Over time, many of these general 
principles are codified in primary law, in particular the TEU and Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Article 47 of the Charter, for example, provides for the 
right of an effective remedy and fair trial. Adherence to both these rights is 
especially important for mutual recognition and mutual trust which are the 
driving forces of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Thus, the EU 
integration process which has been characterised as “integration through 
law”8 has changed and developed the EU’s constitutional architecture 
considerably. In this process the rule of law has a significant place and has 
become an indispensable value for the successful operation of the mutual 
recognition framework in EU criminal law.  
 
4.2.1 The EU’s rule of law legal mandate and its importance in the mutual 
recognition framework  
 
Indeed, whilst EU integration expanded, the rule of law obtained a more 
prominent place in EU primary law and became a foundational principle and 
the cornerstone upon which EU integration is based.9 It entered the 
European Union domain in its Treaties in 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599364/EPRS_BRI(2017)599364_EN.pd
flast accessed 2 August 2019, 2. 
6 Case C-294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23. 
7 See Danwitz (n 4) 1314, in which substantive principles such as legality, legal certainty and 
proportionality as well as procedural guarantees are discussed by analysing the Court’s case law.    
8 As referred to in one of the first academic studies focusing on European legal integration, M. 
Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J. Weiler (eds.) Integration through Law: Europe and the American 
Federal Experience. Volume 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions (Walter de Gruyter, 1986). See for a 
more recent project on this topic, D. Augenstein (ed), ‘Integration Through Law’ Revisited: The 
Making of the European Polity (Routledge 2016).  
9 Les Verts v Parliament (n 6), para 23; A. von Bogandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the 
Rule of Law: What is it, What Has been Done, What can be done (2014) 51 Common Market Law 
Review, 59; Danwitz (n 4) 1312. 
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was adopted.10 Although, mainly symbolic at first, Treaty amendments 
included multiple references to the rule of law and provided a solid 
constitutional basis for the concept as a primary principle within the Union’s 
constitutional framework. Currently, it is most profoundly referred to in Article 
2 TEU which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and states that the rule of 
law, as well as, other key legal principles such as democracy and respect for 
human rights, are values upon which the Union is founded and which are 
proclaimed to be ‘common to the Member States’.11 These foundational 
values are therefore the basis of the EU’s politico-legal system.12 The Union 
legitimises these foundational values by assuming their shared commitment 
in national constitutions of the Member States. AG Maduro, for example, held 
that “by anchoring the constitutional foundations of the European Union in 
the constitutional principles common to the Member States. Through this 
provision the Member States are reassured that the law of the European 
Union will not threaten the fundamental values of their constitutions.”13  
 Article 2 TEU thus presumes that the current Member States adhere 
to these values which according to Article 21 TEU have inspired the Union’s 
‘creation, development and enlargement’. Member States are expected to 
maintain respect for these common values as a ‘clear risk of a serious 
breach of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU’ can allow the Council to 
activate Article 7 TEU and lead to EU sanctions.14 The Union’s international 
action is also guided by the rule of law and other values listed in Article 215 
and safeguarding these values plays a crucial role in the cooperation in all 
fields of international relations.16 Moreover, under Article 49 TEU, respect for 
 
10 See the Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty which stated that Member States confirm “their 
attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law” and Article J(1) which in light of the common foreign and security 
policy refers to the objective “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (emphasis added).  
11 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the rule of law was introduced as a principle by the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam in Article 6(1) TEU. 
12 L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review, 359, 362. 
13 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on 21 May 2008, in Case C-127/07 Société 
Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine v. Premier Minister, EU:C:2008:292, paragraph 16.  
14 Article 7 TEU is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
15 Article 21(1) TEU. 
16 Article 21(2) TEU.  
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the values listed in Article 2 TEU is required by any prospective Member 
States who seeks to join the EU.17 
Apart from respecting the common values, including the rule of law, on 
a continued basis, these values should also be actively promoted. Under 
Article 3(1) TEU promoting these values is one of the aims of the Union. In 
light of the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, Member 
States are therefore under an obligation not to act in way that could 
jeopardise the achievement of this objective and assist in facilitating its 
attainment.18 The EU institutions are also bound to promote the foundational 
values of the Union19 and ‘shall practise mutual sincere cooperation’ to assist 
each other to achieve its aims.20 
The above-mentioned references to primary law demonstrate a firm 
constitutional basis for the EU values and the rule of law more specifically.21 
The presumption that Member States respect the rule of law and sustain this 
respect is crucial for the functioning of the EU legal order as a community of 
law based on mutual trust which according to the Commission is the very 
foundation of the Union itself.22 The Court of Justice also made this evident:  
essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured network of 
principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its 
Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, 
as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a ‘process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. 
This legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State 
shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a 
set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That 
premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member 
 
17 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
18 Editorial comments, ‘Safeguarding EU values in the Member States – Is something finally 
happening?’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review, 619, 621.  
19 Article 13(1) TEU. 
20 Article 13(2) TEU. 
21 Pech (n 12) 361; C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU. Legal Mandate and Means’ in C. 
Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 63. 
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new EU 
framework to strengthen the Rule of Law COM (2014) 158 final, 2. 
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States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU 
that implements them will be respected.23 
Thus, a strong commitment by all the Member States to the common values 
and more specifically, the rule of law is required to uphold the EU’s normative 
and constitutional identity upon which the first tier of the mutual recognition 
framework is based. A genuine commitment to the Article 2 TEU values 
allows for mutual trust among Member States and justifies the trust 
presumption and second tier of the mutual recognition framework. Trust 
among Member States that the rule of law is respected is vital for the final tier 
of the framework, the mutual recognition of national legal acts. Hence, it is of 
the utmost importance for the operation of the EU legal order that the 
presumption of sharing and maintaining respect for the values in Article 2 
TEU stays intact. As long as the presumption holds, mutual trust between 
Member States is justified. The rule of law is therefore essential for the 
effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters which is based on mutual 
recognition.24 The latter generally requires that Member States recognise 
each other’s criminal justice systems as equivalent as their own. On this 
basis they must accept court decisions of other Member States and execute 
a EAW issued in another Member State.25 This illustrates that the rule of law 
plays a particular fundamental role in the further development of the EU into 
an area of freedom security and justice without internal frontiers.26 
 Disregard for the rule of law not only challenges the effective 
functioning of trust-based mutual recognition instruments is also undermines 
the entire operation and foundation of the Union.27 Indeed, a lack of 
commitment to the rule of law by Member States challenges the legitimacy of 
 
23 See Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) EU:C:2014:2454, paragraphs 167-168. 
24 European Commission Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with the Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland. Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law COM 
(2017) 835 final, 2017/0360 (NLE), 38 and 41.  
25 C. Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring in the Rule of Law. Normative Arguments, Institutional 
Proposals and the Procedural Limitations’ in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 16.  
26 Commission’s Communication (n 22) 2.  
27 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on Article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is 
based, COM(2003) 606 final, 5.  
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the entire decision-making in the EU, since Member States who deviate from 
the rule of law are still involved in the decision-making in the EU institutions. 
Therefore, when EU laws are adopted and apply to the whole of the EU 
continent, Member States who violate the rule of law, indirectly govern the 
lives of all citizens of Europe.28 Respect for the rule of law throughout the 
entire continent of the Union is thus fundamental.  
 
4.2.2 A broad understanding of the rule of law in the EU 
 
The rule of law formula has become a common political ideal and a dominant 
concept, in political and legal discourse, along with democracy and human 
rights.29 The rule of law is indeed widely supported, especially in Western 
societies.30 It has been referred to by the Commission as “the backbone of 
any modern constitutional democracy”31 and the rule of law has obtained a 
primary place in the EU’s constitutional framework. However, the rule of law 
is also one of the most elusive concepts32 and it has been argued that the 
general acceptance of the rule of law as a good thing is “possible only 
because of dissensus as to its meaning”33 which makes it an “essentially 
contested concept”.34 
 The literature on the rule of law is voluminous. The concept has been 
examined from many different perspectives and various approaches have 
 
28 For more detail on the all-affected principle, see J-W Müller, ‘Should the EU Protect Democracy 
and the Rule of Law inside Member States?’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 141, 144-145; C. Closa, 
D. Kochenov and J.H.H Weiler, “Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’ EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25, available at: 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/30117/RSCAS_2014_25_FINAL.pdf?sequence=3 
 [last accessed: 21 August 2019] 5-6; Closa (n 25) 18-19.  
29 B. Z. Tamanaha, ‘The history and elements of the rule of law’ (2012) Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies, 232; Pech (n 12) 360. 
30 B. Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 2004) 1-
2; Pech (n 12) 360.  
31 Commission’s Communication (n 22) 2. For a comprehensive study of the rule of law as an ideal of 
constitutionalism, see T.R.S Allen, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
32 Bogandy and Ioannidis (n 9) 62; Tamanaha (n 29) 232; R. Stein, ‘Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?’ 
(2009) 18(2) Minnesota Journal of International Law, 293, 296. 
33 S. Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
331, 332. 
34 J. Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and 
Philosophy, 137.  
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been adopted in the analysis of the rule of law.35 Generally, a distinction is 
made between a “thin” and “thick” understanding, the so-called formal and 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law.36 Formal conceptions focus on 
specific procedural and formal requirements that a legislative framework 
must have in order to satisfy the rule of law. It requires that legal rules are 
prospective (no retrospective laws); promulgated (available to the public); 
they must be general and apply to everyone in a similar situation; sufficiently 
clear, and consistent (legal rules cannot be contradictory). Furthermore, 
government officials must operate within the framework of exciting laws and 
legal proceedings should be fair and open and an independent judiciary 
should apply the law and has the power of judicial review.37 Provided that 
these requirements are met, formal conceptions are not concerned with the 
content of the law and whether the law is itself good and substantially just. 
Those who support substantive conceptions of the rule of law go a step 
further. They agree that the rule of law insist on the formal and procedural 
requirements discussed above, but certain substantive rights are derived 
from the rule of law and consequently the rule of law requires that the law is 
good and substantially just. Protection of fundamental rights are therefore 
also a rule of law requirement.38   
 Whilst it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the different 
theories, perceptions and approaches to the rule of law in depth, it is helpful 
to explain the understanding adopted that underlies the assessment. In order 
to examine mutual trust based on the presumption that all the Member States 
adhere to the foundational values listed in Article 2 TEU and the concept 
upon which mutual recognition is based, it is important to adopt a broad 
notion of the rule of law, including both formal and substantive components. 
 
35 See, for example, Tamanaha (n 30); J. Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, (2008) 43 
Georgia Law Review, 1; Allan (n 31); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 210 
et seq; T.A.O. Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1. 
36 P. P Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework’ (1997) 
Public Law 467.  
37 Tamanaha (n 29) 232-247; A. Zanghellini, ‘The Foundation of the Rule of Law’ (2016) 28 Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities, 213-214; J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law 
Quarterly Review, 195. 
38 A. L. Young, ‘The Rule of Law in the United Kingdom: Formal or Substantive?’ (2012) 6 Vienna 
Journal on International Constitutional Law, 259, 260-261; Ibid, Zanghellini 214.  
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This is equally so, for the assessment of the EU enforcement tools if Member 
States do not comply with the Union values and more specifically the rule of 
law.39  
Pech correctly states that ‘the Union’s ‘Constitution’, viewed as whole, 
strongly suggests that all the Union’s foundational principles are 
interdependent and must be construed in light of each other’.40 This broad 
understanding of the rule of law is also supported by the Commission, who 
specifically refers to the constitutional principle as having both formal and 
substantive components. This means that the rule of law is intrinsically linked 
to other foundational values listed in Article 2 TEU. “There can be no respect 
for fundamental rights without respects for the rule of law and vice versa”.41 
For example, fundamental rights and general principles of EU Law cannot be 
guaranteed when the judiciary is not independent. The latter is an issue 
surrounding the rule of law crisis in the EU.42 Moreover, it directly violates the 
right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the 
ECHR. This illustrates, as stated by the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
that ‘respecting the rule of law is a pre-requisite for the protection of 
fundamental rights’.43  
The case law of the Court of Justice also reflects a broad 
understanding of the rule of law as a multifaceted concept with both formal 
and substantive components. In the UPA judgment,44 the Court refers to the 
formal and procedural requirements of the rule as “a [Union] based on the 
rule of law in which its institutions are subject to judicial review of the 
compatibility of their acts with the Treaty”, but also emphasises the 
substantive value of the rule of law by stipulating that the EU institutions acts 
should also be compatible with “the general principles of law which include 
 
39 EU enforcement of the values is discussed in chapter 5.  
40 Pech (n 12) 368.  
41 Commission’s Communication (n 22) 4. 
42 See section 4.3. 
43 Council Conclusions on fundamental rights and the rule of law and on the Commission 2012 
Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Justice and 
Home Affairs Council Meeting 6 and 7 June 2013, available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137404.pdf, last 
accessed 19 March 2018, 4.  
44 Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) [2002] ECR I-6677. 
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fundamental rights”.45 Moreover, in the Kadi judgment,46 the Court of Justice 
made it explicitly clear that a fundamental right lens must always be adopted 
for the interpretation of the rule of law and its components, in other words it 
requires a guarantee that fundamental rights are protected in the most 
effective manner:47  
 
the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light of 
fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community 
based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC 
Treaty as an autonomous legal system48 
 
Based on the case law of the Court of Justice49 and the ECtHR, as well as a 
Report by the Venice Commission on the rule of law,50 the Commission 
provided a non-exhaustive list of principles which define the core meaning of 
the rule as a common value of the Union:  
 
The rule of law includes, among others, principles such as legality, implying a 
transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; 
legal certainty; prohibiting the arbitrary exercise of executive power; effective 
judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, effective judicial review 
including respect for fundamental rights; separation of powers; and equality 
before the law.51 
 
The core elements of the rule of law are especially important for the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal law. The 
operation of mutual recognition in this field limits rights and freedoms of EU 
 
45 Ibid, UPA, para 38-39. 
46 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and AL Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351. 
47 Pech (n 22) 373. 
48 Kadi (46) Para 316 (emphasis added).  
49 Some more recent examples of the case law of the Court of Justice include, Case C-72/15 Rosneft, 
EU:C:2017:236; Case C-64 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117; Case C-216/18 
PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:586; Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, 
EU:C:2019:531. 
50 Venice Commission Report on the Rule of Law, adopted at its 86th plenary session (Venice, 25-26 
March 2011) Study No. 512/2009 CDL-AD(2011)003rev.  
51 Commission’s Communication (n 22) Annex 1. See also, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Further Strengthening the Rule of 
Law within the Union - State of play and possible next steps COM (2019) 163 final, 1.  
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citizens and extends judicial decisions of Member States beyond its own 
territory.52 Due to the nature of this policy area and the functioning of mutual 
recognition components of the rule of law such as effective judicial 
protection, respect for fundamental rights and the independency of the 
judiciary are vital. Respect and implementation of the broad rule of law notion 
at national levels across all the Member States allows for and builds 
confidence in other Member States’ judicial systems. It is therefore key that 
the rule of law is observed in all Member States as this justifies and 
maintains mutual trust and as such the legitimacy of mutual recognition.53  
 
4.3 A lack of Commitment to the EU’s Foundational Values: The Rule of 
Law Crisis 
 
A solid commitment to the EU foundational values by all Member States is 
thus necessary to support the normative approach, i.e. trust based on the 
compliance with the Article 2 TEU values, adopted in the mutual recognition 
framework in criminal law matters. However, the EU is currently confronted 
with rule of law violations by some Member States of such a grave and 
fundamental nature which demonstrate a profound lack of commitment to the 
EU values and undermine the EU’s normative and constitutional identity. 
Deficiencies in some rule of law elements is common in most Member 
States.54 In the last decade, more serious concerns, such as in Austria 
regarding Haider’s extreme right-wing party in the government,55 the 
constitutional problems in Romania in 201256 and France’s policies and 
 
52 See Chapter 1.  
53 Commission’s Communication (n 22) 2. 
54 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU. The Pitfalls of 
Overemphasising Enforcement’ RECONNECT Working Paper No. 1 – July 2018, available at: 
https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/RECONNECT-KochenovBard-
WP_27072018b.pdf, last accessed 14 June 2019, 7. 
55 See for a detailed and critical discussion, K. Lachmayer, Questioning the Basic Values – Austria and 
Jörg Haider, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values – Ensuring 
Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017). 
56 See for a detailed discussion, B. Iancu, Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law in Romania: The 
Crisis in Concepts and Contexts, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in 
the European Constitutional Area – Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
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treatment of EU citizens of Romani ethnicity57 all illustrated challenges to the 
rule of law and have, at least to some extent, contributed to the rule of law 
debate in the EU. Moreover, Romania and Bulgaria are two Member States 
where serious and structural rule of law problems due to corruption, 
organised crime and weaknesses in the judiciary58 have been a matter of 
concern ever since they joined the EU.59 Yet, the EU is also faced with 
Member States such as Hungary and Poland where the rule of law was 
largely achieved but has deteriorated very quickly by the rise of illiberal 
regimes and constitutional transformations that conflict with the EU’s 
constitutional order which demonstrate rule of law problems of an entirely 
different calibre.60 Indeed, the fundamental nature of the rule of law problems 
in both Hungary and Poland seriously assault the EU’s foundational values 
and its constitutional identity and as a result the European project as such. 
The fact that the EU is encountering a rule of law crises has been 
acknowledged broadly, both among scholars61 and the Union institutions.62 
The significant problems that the EU is experiencing have been described as 
‘constitutional capture’, a process that seeks to profoundly and systematically 
weaken checks and balances and abuses power through perfectly legal 
 
57 See for more information, M. Dawson and E. Muir, ‘Individual Institutional and Collective Vigilance 
in Protecting Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons From the Roma’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law 
Review 751. 
58 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, On Progress in Bulgaria 
under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 13 November 2018, COM(2018) 850 final, 4 and  
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, On Progress in Romania 
under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, 13 November 2018, COM(2018) 851 final, 7.  
59 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion. 
60 L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3, 12. 
61 See for example, Kochenov and Bárd (n 54); D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and 
Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU; Rhetoric and Reality’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional 
Law Review 512; Pech and Scheppele (n 60).  
62 See for example, former European Commissioner’s speech V. Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law- 
What Next?, Speech 13/677, 4 September 2013, available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm, last accessed 4 June 2019; European Parliament, Report with 
Recommendations to the Commission on the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights [2016] (2015/2254(INL)); Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Strengthening the rule of law within the Union – A 
blueprint for action COM(2019) 343 final.  
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means which makes it very difficult to make genuine changes in power.63 
Others have referred to it as ‘rule of law backsliding’ a ‘process through 
which elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental 
blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal 
checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and 
entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party.’64 It is therefore 
different from individual rights problems and the corruption problems referred 
to above in relation to Romania and Bulgaria,65 because whilst those rule of 
law issues are most certainly serious and challenge the principle of mutual 
recognition, the events in Hungary and Poland are a completely different 
kettle of fish. In both countries, the rogue governments deliberately aim at 
disassembling the liberal democratic state and thus attack the European 
project right in the heart and gravely undermine its identity and functioning.  
 The changes in Hungary and Poland from democratic states who 
generally share the EU’s normative identity and commitment to the rule of 
law to illiberal democracies that no longer safeguard the rule of law occurred 
relatively sudden. Both countries had made significant transformations in 
their political and legal landscape following the 1989 Eastern Europe 
revolutions which led to the fall of the communist-led governments. The 
regime change in the post-communist countries resulted in them joining the 
Council of Europe and signing the ECHR in the early 1990s as well as 
singing the EU Association Agreements around the same time as both 
countries had the aspiration of becoming a Member State. The EU and its 
pre-accession strategies, in which the Copenhagen criteria had a key role, 
played a significant part in Hungary’s and Poland’s transformation and further 
development of the democratisation process.66 At the same time, the Central 
and Eastern Europe enlargement also contributed to the EU’s 
constitutionalisation process in which the values gained a more prominent 
 
63 J-W Müller, ‘Rising to the challenge of constitutional capture: Protecting the rule of law within EU 
member states’ Eurozine, 21 March 2014, available at: https://www.eurozine.com/rising-to-the-
challenge-of-constitutional-capture/, last accessed 23 November 2017. See also, Müller (n 28) 142.  
64 Pech and Scheppele (n 60) 10.  
65 Müller (n. 63) Eurozine, 4.  
66 Kochenov and Bárd (n 54) 7-8.   
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role.67 When Hungary and Poland joined the EU on 1 May 2004 they were 
generally perceived as states where the rule of law was largely achieved and 
the EU’s values were perceived as standards to be pursued on a continuing 
basis.68 
  
4.3.1 Hungary no longer safeguarding the rule of law  
 
In Hungary this changed in April 2010, when the Orbán government came in 
to power as a result of a significant victory during the general elections. 
Prime Minister Orbán’s party Fidesz and the Christian-Democratic People’s 
Party (KNDP) won 52.7% of the votes which translated in just over two-thirds 
of the seats in Parliament and a majority that gave the Orbán government the 
power to unilaterally enact changes in the constitutional system.69 Hungary’s 
constitutional landscape changed rather quickly under Orbán’s government 
and the national mechanisms to secure the effective operation of the rule of 
law and correct violations were seriously impaired.70 The country’s 1989 
Constitution was amended 12 times before Orbán’s regime replaced it with 
the new Fundamental Law which entered into force on 1 January 2012 and 
 
67 See generally for a thorough discussion on this matter, W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the 
Enlargement of Europe (Oxford University Press, 2011). See also, B. de Witte, ‘The Impact of 
Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union’, in M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of 
the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2003) 209.  
68 Pech and Scheppele (n 60) 12 and W. Sadurski, ‘How democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of 
Anti-Constitutional Populist Blacksliding’ (2018) Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
18/01, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491, last accessed 10 
June 2018, 3. 
 For a more detailed discussion on the positive changes and accomplishments in the democratisation 
process in both countries see, J. Batt, ‘The End of Communist Rule in East-Central Europe: A Four-
Country Comparison (1991) 26 Government and Opposition 368; S. Saxonberg, The Fall: A 
Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland 
(Harwood 2001).  
69 KDNP is a very small party which created an alliance with Fidesz before the elections in 2010. For 
an historical overview of Hungary’s constitutional process, see, G. Halmai, The rise and fall of 
constitutionalism in Hungary, in P. Blokker (ed.) Constitutional Acceleration within the European 
Union and Beyond (Routledge 2018). 
70 See for a critical discussion on the constitutional changes, K.L. Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Coups in 
EU Law’, in M. Adams, A. Meeuse and E. Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: 
Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge University Press 2017) and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Understanding 
Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution’, in A. von Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional 
Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
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has also been amended several times already.71 The high numbers of 
constitutional amendments paved the way for the government’s radical policy 
change. One particular amendment to the Constitution was heavily criticised, 
because it incorporated several rules which had previously been held 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and at the same time prevented 
the Constitutional Court to review and annul them.72 The system of check 
and balances on government power was further undermined by the 
constitution-making process itself, which was criticised by EU institutions for 
its lack of transparency, rushed time-framework and lack of including the 
opposition.73   
Moreover, Hungary’s illiberal regime seriously attacked the 
independence of the judiciary which is a key element of the rule of law. First, 
the President of the Supreme Court, Judge Baka, was removed from office 
before the expiry of his mandate in an irregular manner.74 Judge Baka had 
expressed and shared his concerns about the constitutionality of some 
proposed measures extensively. His removal was condemned by the Venice 
Commission which held that ‘although the Law was formulated in a general 
way, its effect was directed against a specific person. Laws of this type are 
contrary to the rule of law’.75 The ECtHR also criticised Judge Baka’s 
removal and held that both his right of access to a court and his freedom of 
 
71 B. Jávor, Letter to Vice-President Mr. Timmermans, A brief summary of the development in 
Hungary since April 2010, which are relevant to ascertaining whether there is a “systemic threat” to 
the rule of law, available at: https://javorbenedek.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/letter_to_vice-
president_timmermans_04052017_annex.pdf, last accessed 26 September 2019, point 2. 
72 Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary Adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 95th Plenary Session, Venice (14-15 June 2013), Opinion 720/2013 CDL-
AD(2013)012. See also, Z. Szente, Challenging the Basic Values – Problems in the Rule of Law in 
Hungary and the Failure of the EU to Tackle Them, in in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values – Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 
2017) 460.   
73 See for example, European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental 
rights: standards and practices in Hungary (2012/2130(INI)) P7_TA(2013)0315, AB-AF; Jávor (n 71) 
point 4; Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th 
Plenary Session, Venice (18-18 June 2011) Opinion 621/2011 CDL-AD(2011)016, para 144. 
74 See for an overview of the amendments of the Hungarian Constitution which led to this, Jávor (n 
71) point 6. 
75 Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 
on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commission at 
its 90th Plenary Session, Venice (16-17 March 2012), Opinion 663/2012 CDL-AD(2012)001, para 112.  
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expression were breached.76 The Court specifically referred to the 
importance of judicial independence for the separation of State power.77 
The constitutional re-design also introduced a new mandatory 
retirement age of judges which was lowered from 70 to 62 and resulted in the 
removal of approximately 10% of the judges. New judges who were loyal to 
Orbán’s regime were appointed by the government and as a result gained 
more control over the judiciary. The Commission launched an infringement 
procedure against Hungary on the basis that the forced early retirement 
infringed EU equal treatment legislation78 and this was upheld by the Court of 
Justice who ruled that it was incompatible with EU law.79 Whilst the Court’s 
ruling led Hungary to amend the law and adopt a new uniform retirement age 
of 65 to be introduced over 10 years and allowed judges who had been 
forced to retire to be reinstated in their posts, many of the judges were 
already replaced by younger hand-picked judges and most judges were 
never reinstated in their senior positions.80 
The independence of the judiciary was further dismantled by the 
establishment of the National Judicial Office (NJO) which centralised the 
administration of the judiciary. Of particular concern was the excessive power 
of the president of the NJO, who acts as a single person and is not subject to 
sufficient checks and balances.81 Another independent institution, the 
ombudsmen for data protection and freedom of information was also 
captured by the new Fundamental Law which abolished the office all 
together. The removal of the ombudsman years before the end of his term 
was held to be in breach with the Directive on data protection82 by the Court 
of Justice because the independence of the national data protection authority 
 
76 ECtHR, Baka v Hungary (23 June 2016) Application no 20261/12. 
77 Ibid, para 172.  
78 More specifically, Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
79 Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2012:687.  
80 Statement by Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Independence of the Judiciary under Attack in 
Hungary, 12 September 2018, OSCE HDIM 2018, Working Session 4: Rule of Law, available at: 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/393824?download=true, last accessed 23 September 2019, 4. 
81 Opinion Venice Commission (n 75), part V in particular.  
82 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31.  
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was undermined.83 Consequently, the government was required to pay 
compensation to the ombudsman who was removed from office. This 
judgement, similar to the infraction procedure regarding the lowering of the 
retirement age for judges is welcome and sends signals to Hungary that the 
EU pays attention to the constitutional changes of the regime and the 
Commission will start an infraction procedure if it is in breach with EU Law. 
However, it does not change the fact that the executive obtained more 
control and further dismantled the rule of law. In this instance, the 
government replaced it with a new data protection authority where the person 
in charge was appointed by the government. 
Furthermore, the government tried to limit criticism of its illiberal 
regime by the curtailment of media pluralism, independence and freedom.  
The disturbing developments are well-documented and attracted a lot of 
criticism.84 Some particularly worrying examples include: the requirement of 
all media content providers to register with the new Media Authority; the lack 
of independence and extensive powers of the Media Council which oversees 
compliance with the vaguely worded content regulations of the press and has 
the authority to impose extremely large fines; the closure of the largest 
newspaper; tax policies targeting one of the few remaining independent 
commercial tv channels and the national broadcaster supporting the 
government’s regime.85 By regulating and limiting freedom of expression and 
information through the media, the autocratic regime controls the information 
 
83 Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:237. 
84 See for example, European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary, 
P7_TA(2011)0094; Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Hungary’s media legislation in 
light of Council of Europe standards on freedom of the media, CommDH(2011)10, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/opinion-of-the-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-hungary-s-media-
legisl/16806daac3, last accessed 22 April 2018; PACE, Motion for a Resolution, State of media 
freedom in Hungary (2016) Doc. 14173, available at: https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=23156&lang=EN, last accessed 12 August 2019; 
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017 – Hungary profile, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/hungary, last accessed 23 June 2019. 
For a detailed study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs, see J. Bayer, et al., Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of 
the rule of law in the EU and its Member States (2019) available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.p
df, last accessed 22 September 2019. 
85 See Venice Commission, Opinion on Media Legislation of Hungary adopted at its 103rd Plenary 
Session, Venice (19-20 June 2015) Opinion 798/2015 CDL-AD(2015)015. 
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that the public receives and reduces the changes of an open and critical 
debate about the government’s policies which could ultimately lead to 
changes aiming at reinstating a democracy where the rule of law is 
respected. Media diversity and independence are thus indispensable for a 
democracy as they serve as another layer of check and balances.86  
Dissent of Orbán’s ideological agenda is not only controlled by 
tackling the media. Freedom of thought and criticism of the government was 
further restricted by Hungary in 2017 with the Higher Education Law87 which 
targeted a private university aiming to force the Central European University 
(CEU) out of the country. At the same time, independent and foreign-funded 
NGO’s credibility were also undermined by a new Law88 and smear 
campaigns were used to turn the public against these civil society 
organisations that were being critical of the government. Overall, the 
extensive measures adopted by Hungary’s government that captured the 
state and the illiberal tactics to shut down any real criticism of its policies 
seriously and systemically violate the rule of law. Hungary’s lack of 
commitment to the foundational values is overwhelming and undermines the 
legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework and its functioning in the 
criminal law sphere where respect for the values is essential.  
  
4.3.2 The problems with the rule of law in Poland  
 
Poland joined Hungary as one of the Member States where the rule of law is 
systemically undermined and the so-called common values of the EU are no 
longer respected in 2015 when the Law and Justice Party, PiS, won the 
parliamentary elections and obtained a majority to govern. The ideological 
roots of the Polish government and the de facto ruler of Poland, Jaroslaw 
 
86 Jávor (n 71) point 10; Kochenov and Bárd (n 54) 8. 
87 Act XXV of 4 April 2017 on the Amendment of Act CCIV of 2011 on National Tertiary Education. For 
a detailed analysis see, Venice Commission, Opinion on Act XXV of 4 April 2017 on the Amendment 
of Act CCIV of 2011 on National Tertiary Education at its 111th Plenary Session, Venice (6-7 October 
2017) Opinion 891/2017 CDL-AD(2017)022. 
88 Act LXXVI of 13 June 2017 on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds. See for 
more detail, Statement by Hungarian NGOs, Independent Civil Society under Attack in Hungary, 22 
September 2017, OSCE HDIM 2017, Working Session 2: Fundamental Freedoms I, available at: 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/339316?download=true, last accessed 4 August 2019. 
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Kaczyński led to some significant transformations in the country’s political 
and legal landscape and desertion of the rule of law. In particular, the 
government’s illiberal regime attacked the judiciary from several angles and 
gravely undermined its independence. The separation of powers and checks 
and balances on the executive and legislative have also been substantially 
weakened.89 
 Whilst the transformations and tactics used by the Polish regime are 
very similar to Hungary’s government there are also some important 
differences. First, on paper the Polish President and Prime Minister are the 
central institutions of power. However, Poland’s real power lies with one 
person, the de facto ruler, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, who as a member of 
parliament does not have any constitutional accountability and 
responsibility.90 As a result, the various attempts by the EU to have a 
constructive dialogue with the Polish government about the systemic rule of 
law violations are to a large degree ineffective and rather frustrating.91 
Second, unlike the Fidesz government in Hungary, the PiS government does 
not have the super-majority necessary to change the constitution and instead 
has endeavoured to do this through the back door. For example, the Polish 
government has on a number of occasions circumvented the constitutional 
rules for amending the Constitution by adopting several statutes which of 
course in itself is in breach of the Constitution and the rule of law.92 Finally, 
unlike Hungary where the government’s ideology suits their interests, 
Kaczyński’s ideology more likely reflects his true believes in terms of 
Poland’s national interests.93 
The government’s capture of the judiciary in Poland affected the entire 
structure of the judicial system. More than 13 laws were adopted which 
resulted in comprehensive legal changes to support and maintain the 
government’s illiberal regime. The common aim of these transformations and 
 
89 See for example, Sadurski (n 68); T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of instutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-
defence’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1753. 
90 Ibid, Sadurski 10-11, where some specific examples are discussed regarding Kaczyński’s control in 
Poland.  
91 See chapter 5. 
92 Kochenov and Bárd (n 54) 13. 
93 Ibid, 9. 
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their combined effect was to systematically enable the executive or legislator 
to ‘interfere significantly with the composition, the powers, the administration 
and the functioning’ of the judicial authorities and bodies.94 It is therefore 
unsurprising that the first target of the PiS regime’s assault was the 
Constitutional Tribunal since the dismantling of its independence and powers 
paved the way for the other legislative changes without scrutiny. The 
Constitutional Tribunal had generally established itself as a defender of 
human rights and democratic governance which stood up against attacks by 
the government on the rule of law, independence of the judiciary and 
separation of powers. It was therefore of the essence for PiS to eliminate the 
possibility that the laws they adopted which reflected their political wishes 
and implemented their illiberal regime could be challenged and held to be 
invalid by the Constitutional Tribunal.95  
The capture of the Constitutional Tribunal by the PiS regime began as 
soon as they came to power. First, three constitutionally elected judges by 
the 7th Sejm (lower house of the Polish Parliament) just before the end of 
term of the previous Parliament where not allowed to take oath and the new 
PiS ruling majority refused to recognise the properly appointed judges for the 
three seats. Instead, after winning the elections, the new Parliament 
dominated by PiS, elected three new judges unconstitutionally who were 
permitted to take oath. Whilst the Constitutional Tribunal in two judgments 
back in December 2015 held that this was unconstitutional and required that 
the three initial judges that were lawfully nominated should take up their 
function, the Polish government did not implement these judgments.96    
Second, the proceedings for appointing the President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal were significantly changed by the adoption of several 
 
94 Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) TEU of the Treaty of the European 
Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland – Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of 
a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, COM(2017) 835 final, 
para 173.  
95 Sadurski (n 68) 17-18. 
96 Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), Opinion 
no. 833/2015, CDLAD(2016)001; Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 108th Plenary Session, (Venice, 14-15 October 2016), Opinion no. 
860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026; Commission Reasoned Proposal, 16-17. See for a detailed account on 
this matter, Sadurski (n 68) 18-22. 
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statutes in 2016. The laws established a new position for an acting President 
which ultimately side-stepped in an unconstitutional manner the Vice-
President of the Tribunal who was still in office and whose role was reduced 
by various legislative changes. The appointment of the new President of the 
Constitutional Tribunal was surrounded by many irregularities and the entire 
procedure has been criticised as fundamentally flawed, contradictory to the 
rule of law and unlawful.97 Moreover, the Vice-President who was rather 
outspoken about the importance of the traditional functions and the 
independence of the Constitutional Tribunal was informed by the new 
President of the Tribunal that he was forced to take his holiday entitled and 
was thus de facto removed from his office before the end of his judicial 
term.98 Overall, the PiS regime completely changed the composition of the 
Constitutional Tribunal in an unconstitutional manner and managed to 
establish a majority on the Tribunal and effectively paralysed this institution 
within 1 year after they won the parliamentary elections.99  
In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal was further undermined by laws 
adopted which considerably decreased its powers and increased the control 
over the Tribunal by the executive and legislative. Some of the newly 
adopted laws that targeted the Tribunal were held to be invalid by the 
Constitutional Tribunal itself. However, the Polish government refused to 
publish some of these judgments whilst the immediate publication is a 
constitutional requirement. This is a serious breach of the rule of law, 
especially if the publication of a judgment is a requirement for it to have legal 
effect as it provides the government with an ex post control regarding the 
legality of the Tribunal’s judgments.100 The tools employed by the autocratic 
regime to assault the Constitutional Tribunal have the combined effect that 
the legitimacy and independence of this once leading judicial actor is 
 
97 Commission’s Reasoned Proposal (n 94) para 57 and section 3.3; Commission Recommendation 
(EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to 
Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, OJ L 22/65. 
98 Sadurski (n 68) 23. 
99 Sadurski (n 68) 18.  
100Commission’s Reasoned Proposal (n 94) section 3.2. See also, Opinion Venice Commission March 
2016 (n 96). 
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seriously weakened and that the constitutionality of the laws is no longer 
guaranteed.101 
After the capture of the Constitutional Tribunal, the government 
focused on the capture of the ordinary judiciary. The new laws on the 
Supreme Court significantly reorganised this judicial actor and empowered 
the PiS regime in a number of ways. Among other changes, similar to what 
happened in Hungary, the retirement age was lowered to 65 which meant 
that almost 40 percent of the Supreme Court judges were prematurely forced 
out of office. In addition, the number of Supreme Court judges was greatly 
increased which in combination of the judges who were forcefully retired 
resulted in the vacancy of around 60 percent of the seats in the Supreme 
Court which were mainly filled by judges who supported the illiberal regime 
because the parliamentary majority selected them.102   
The President of the Republic of Poland was also given more control 
over the Supreme Court by the new laws which seriously undermines the 
principle of separation of powers. For example, the President of the Republic 
is given the power to appoint the First President of the Supreme Court 
without the involvement of the judiciary. Moreover, the judges affected by the 
new retirement law could make a request to prolong their active mandate to 
the President of the Republic who has sole discretion in the matter.103 Finally, 
some other important changes include the reorganisation of the Supreme 
Court chambers by the introduction of two new chambers filled by the new 
judges selected by the PiS government and the establishment of a new 
disciplinary regime for judges which removes certain procedural safeguards 
and provides the parliamentary majority and the President of the Republic 
with more control.104 The Supreme Court changes evidently enhanced the 
powers of the executive over the Court and had a cumulative effect of 
 
101 Ibid, Reasoned Proposal para 109.  
102 Sadurski (n 68) 40-41. This was also criticised by the Venice Commission in its Opinion on Poland 
on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, on the draft Act 
Amending the Act on the Supreme Court Proposed by the President and on the Act on the 
Organisation of Ordinary Courts, Opinion no. 904/2017 CDL(2017)035, para 44-52. 
103 Ibid, Venice Opinion section 5; Commission Reasoned Proposal (n 94) section 4.1.2. 
104 Ibid, Commission Reasoned Proposal, para 133-136. 
  
 
129 
seriously dismantling the independency of the Supreme Court,105 but the 
capture of the judiciary by the PiS regime did not stop there.  
Indeed, an important institution in the Polish judicial system for 
safeguarding the independence of courts and judges, the National Council of 
the Judiciary, was also affected by news laws adopted by the government. 
The key changes that caused concern were the new rules regarding the 
appointment of the judges-members of the National Council of the Judiciary 
which gave the parliamentary majority a high degree of influence by 
providing the Sejm with the power to elect the judges-members. At the same 
time, the law also allowed for the removal of the current judges on the 
Council before the end of their term. These changes significantly weakened 
the independence of the Council with regard to the PiS government.106 
Lastly, among other changes, the Ordinary Courts’ independence was 
undermined by giving the Minister of Justice extensive powers to arbitrarily 
dismiss Court Presidents and Vice-Presidents and appoint new ones.107  
The above enumeration which only highlights some of the key 
features of the judicial capture by the PiS regime, demonstrates that the 
judicial independence and separation of powers, both vital elements of the 
rule of law are significantly dismantled. Similar to Hungary, this seriously 
challenges mutual recognition instruments in the EU criminal law field for 
which mutual trust in Member States’ judicial systems based on a genuine 
commitment to the foundation values is vital. Moreover, the desertion of the 
values and in particular the rule of law, was done deliberately to consolidate 
their autocratic regimes. In this process, both Hungary and Poland relied on 
national sovereignty to legitimise the transformations and abandonment of 
the Article 2 TEU values. Indeed, it was argued that these were national 
matters and the EU would act ultra virus if it interfered.108 Moreover, instead 
of acting in line with the European commitments, attacks on the judiciary 
were justified by referring to their national constitutional identity and Article 
 
105 Venice Commission Opinion (n 102) section 6.  
106Ibid, para 31. For more detail, see also, Sadurski (n 68) 38-40 and Commission Reasoned Proposal 
(n 94) section 4.2.   
107 Ibid, Commission Reasoned Proposal, section 4.3.2. 
108 Kochenov and Bárd (n 54) 10.  
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4(2) TEU.109 Concerns from the EU institutions regarding the changes in their 
landscape have been, in particular by Poland, ignored or bluntly denied.110 
Therefore, not only are Poland and Hungary no longer committed to the rule 
of law value, in order for their autocratic regimes to stay in power it is a 
necessity to maintain this and to move away from the so-called common 
values upon which the EU’s normative and constitutional identity is based. 
The first tier of the mutual recognition framework is thus confronted with 
some substantial fractures.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
The rule of law as a foundational value plays an important role for the EU’s 
normative and constitutional identity. Respect for the rule of law by the 
Member States is important for the EU legal order to work effectively due to 
the mutually interdependent legal relations between Member States and the 
principle of mutual trust. The latter is a fundamental principle of the Union’s 
legal framework and implies a genuine and shared commitment to the values 
stated in Article 2 TEU by all Member States which in turn justifies the trust 
presumption. It is vital that this trust presumption holds since Member States 
are required to recognise each other’s judicial systems as equal under the 
principle of mutual recognition which underpins the AFSJ and serves as the 
basis for EU criminal law integration. Due to the functioning of mutual 
recognition instruments in this field, key elements of the rule of law such as 
an independent judiciary, separation of powers and respect for fundamental 
rights are a requirement for the successful operation and legitimacy of the 
mutual recognition framework. In this context, respect for a broad rule of law 
concept, is thus essential for trust-based EU Law.   
 However, it is abundantly clear that both Hungary and Poland no 
longer pursue the rule of law as a standard to be upheld. In fact, the aim of 
 
109 See for a critical and detailed contribution on this, R.D. Kelemen and L. Pech, ‘Why autocrats love 
constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism Lessons from Hungary and Poland, RECONNECT 
Working Paper No. 2 — September 2018, available at: https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/RECONNECT-WorkingPaper2-Kelemen-Pech-LP-KO.pdf, last accessed 12 
March 2019. 
110 Pech and Scheppele (n 60) 5. 
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both governments was to seriously dismantle it in order to strengthen their 
power, implement their policies, eliminate as far as possible any meaningful 
public debate and critique about their regime and reduce the changes of 
losing their power so that their autocratic regimes stay intact. Therefore, the 
illiberal ideology of both countries makes constitutional and state capture a 
necessity. Hence, the EU is confronted with two Member States which 
intentionally and seriously violate the rule of law and are no longer committed 
to the values upon which the Union is built. As a result, both Hungary and 
Poland do not share the EU’s normative identity based on the values 
anymore. This is problematic, in particular for the principle of mutual trust 
based on the foundational values and undermines not only the functioning 
but also the legitimacy of the EU’s normative approach in the mutual 
recognition framework as a basis for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Consequently, it is essential that the EU has sufficient means to tackle the 
current rule of law crises and breaches of its foundational values. Indeed, 
effective enforcement tools and a normative influence to address this 
situation is necessary to support and justify the mutual recognition framework 
in EU criminal law.  
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5. Enforcement of the EU Values: 
The EU’s Normative Influence Internally to Support the 
Mutual Recognition Framework 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Thus far the thesis has demonstrated that the EU’s normative identity, 
comprising of the foundational values which Member States allegedly share 
and adhere to, is the footing and first tier of the mutual recognition framework 
in EU criminal law. The assumption that Member States are committed to the 
values justifies the second tier of the framework as it allows Member States 
to have mutual trust in each other’s criminal justice systems. The latter is a 
prerequisite for mutual recognition and key for the functioning of trust-based 
EU law instruments in criminal matters.1 Trust, however, as discussed in 
chapter 2, needs to be built on a continuing basis and cannot be forced upon 
Member States. It is therefore essential, especially for the application of 
mutual recognition instruments in the criminal law sphere, such as the EAW, 
that Member States are truly committed to the EU values. Non-adherence to 
the values leads to fractures in the foundation of the mutual recognition 
framework and undermines the trust presumption and thus challenges the 
legitimacy and operation of the entire framework. Indeed, as the two 
proceeding chapters have highlighted, the fundamental rights and rule of law 
violations of Member States have weakened the framework upon which 
mutual recognition is based. The systemic non-adherence to the values 
justifies a lack of trust among Member States. Especially, the rule of law 
crises in Poland and Hungary demonstrate a clear and deliberate non-
commitment to the values.2 This seriously challenges mutual recognition 
instruments, because important fundamental rights such as a fair trial are no 
longer safeguarded.  
 Therefore, in order to support and justify the mutual recognition 
framework and its application throughout the Union, the EU needs to have 
 
1 Discussed in Chapter 1.  
2 Discussed in Chapter 4.  
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effective tools to enforce compliance with the foundational values internally. 
This chapter discusses the EU’s normative influence, i.e. the tools and 
powers available to support the normative approach adopted in mutual 
recognition instruments in EU criminal matters and repair the fractures in the 
mutual recognition framework’s footing. Drawing upon a discussion of Article 
7 TEU and the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, this chapter 
ultimately argues that the EU’s normative influence internally is not sufficient 
to support and justify the mutual recognition framework. In the analysis of 
these enforcement tools, the chapter uses Poland and Hungary as case 
studies. First, it discusses the ineffectiveness of the Article 7 TEU 
mechanisms, which in the current situation of the EU is a completely 
ineffective instrument to address the Union’s values crises and the systemic 
violations and attacks on the rule of law. It also argues that rather than 
contributing to a swift and forceful response, the rule of law initiatives of the 
institutions do exactly the opposite and the assumption of having continued 
dialogues with autocratic regimes is naïve and only allows for the further 
dismantlement of the values (section 5.2). The chapter, then continues its 
assessment of the enforcement instruments by focusing on the infringement 
procedure. It demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Article 258 TFEU to 
address the non-compliance with the foundational values and provides 
examples in relation to the infringement actions against Hungary to support 
this. It then discusses the welcome recent judgments of the Court of Justice 
in relation to the infringement procedures against Poland based on Article 
19(1) TEU. It argues that whilst this improves the effectiveness of Article 258 
TFEU to act against rule of law breaches, this alone is not sufficient to 
provide the EU with the required level of normative influence (section 5.3).  
 
5.2 Enforcement of the values in the EU: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of 
Law initiatives   
 
Member States have ‘empowered’ the EU to protect its constitutional and 
normative identity consisting of the Article 2 TEU values, through the 
procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU. This instrument was first introduced in 
EU primary law by the Amsterdam Treaty and provides the Council with the 
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power under Article 7(2) TEU, to determine a serious and persistent breach 
by a Member State of the EU values laid down in Article 2 TEU and to 
impose sanctions on that Member State in question under Article 7(3) TEU. 
The above provisions form the so-called sanctioning arm of the Article 7 TEU 
procedure. The mechanism was revised by the Nice Treaty which 
complemented the procedure with the introduction of a preventative arm 
which allows for a determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU 
values under Article 7(1) TEU. The inclusion of this public warning was 
perceived as a strengthening of the already existing system under Article 7 
since it allowed for EU intervention earlier on but to a lesser extent.3 It 
provided the Union with more powers to monitor the compliance of Member 
States with the foundational values with the ultimate aim of preventing a 
serious and persistent breach and the activation of the sanctioning 
mechanisms under paragraph 2 and 3.4 The Nice amendment thereby, 
added a bark to the Article 7 TEU enforcement instrument, which prior to that 
only consisted of a bite.5 
The adoption of the Article 7 mechanism is, first of all, a result of the 
EU’s integration and constitutionalisation process. It reflects the transition 
from a mainly economic community to a more political and constitutional 
Union in which values such as fundamental rights and the rule of law 
obtained a more prominent place on the EU’s agenda and became an 
important part of its identity and its policies. Second, the introduction of 
Article 7 is also related to the Union’s biggest enlargement round when the 
EU was preparing itself for 10 Central-Eastern European countries to join.6 
Due to the recent past of the soon to join countries, the already Western 
European members of the EU thought it necessary to incorporate sanctions 
for the violations of the values which allows for the monitoring of a 
 
3 W. Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 
16 Columbia Journal of European Law 385, 397.  
4 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based 
COM(2003) 606 final, 3. 
5 L. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark, and the Howl. Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in in A. 
Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017) 128, 133. 
6 Sadurski (n 3) 386.  
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commitment to these values. This demonstrates that, at the time, there was a 
lack of trust from within the EU regarding the long-term commitment of the 
newly reformed countries to the values and the effectiveness of the pre-
accession conditionality.7 Article 7 was therefore deemed necessary to act as 
a deterrent against any serious breaches post-accession.8  
Importantly, the scope of the Article 7 mechanisms and in particular 
the sanctioning arm make this enforcement tool meaningful in relation to the 
supportive functioning it could potentially have for the mutual recognition 
framework’s foundation based on compliance with the values.9 Unlike, the 
fundamental rights listed in the Charter which in the event of a breach by a 
Member State provides the EU with the competence to enforce these rights 
only when Member States are implementing Union law,10 Article 7 ‘is not 
confined to areas covered by Union law’.11 The Article 2 values are supposed 
to be common to all Member States and should therefore govern the 
exercises of public authority both on a purely national level and within the 
realm of the Union.12 Hence, the Union is also allowed to act ‘in the event of 
a breach in an area where the Member States act autonomously’ because ‘if 
a Member State breaches the fundamental values in a manner sufficiently 
serious to be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very 
foundations of the Union and the trust between its members, whatever the 
field in which the breach occurs.’13 Article 7 is thus unique in the sense that it 
is the sole exception in the Treaties that provides the Union with power to act 
without a specific material competence and thus beyond mere violations of 
the acquis.14 At the same time, the uniqueness of the procedure might 
 
7 See generally, D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession 
Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer Law International 2008). 
8 For a detailed discussion on both these points and the history of Article 7 TEU more generally, see 
Sadurski (n 3). 
9 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU. Legal Mandate and Means’ in C. Closa and D. 
Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University 
Press 2016) 59, 65.  
10 Article 51(1) EUCFR.  
11 Commission’s Communication (n 4) section 1.1, 5. 
12 Besselink (n 5) 141. 
13 Commission’s Communication (n 4) section 1.1, 5. 
14 Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, Commission’s Communication on a 
new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, 27 May 2014, 
doc. 10296/14, para 17.  
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explain the high thresholds to activate the mechanisms under Article 7 and 
its political nature.  
 
5.2.1 The ineffectiveness of Article 7 to tackle the EU’s values crises  
 
The demanding procedural requirements of Article 7 TEU undermine the 
effectiveness of this enforcement instrument to adequately respond to the 
values crisis and influence Member States to adhere to the foundational 
values so that the normative approach in the mutual recognition framework is 
justified. The preventative arm under Article 7(1) TEU requires a reasoned 
proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or 
the European Commission to the Council. The latter, with the consent of the 
European Parliament and with a majority of four-fifths of its members may 
determine that there is indeed a clear risk of a serious breach of the 
foundational values. However, before making such a risk determination, the 
Council is required ‘to hear the Member State in question’ and could ‘address 
recommendations to it’.15   
  The sanctioning arm is separate from the preventive mechanism and 
the determination of a clear risk under 7(1) TEU is not a prerequisite for the 
activation of the sanctioning arm under Article 7(2). It is, however, the 
stringent procedural requirements of a determination of the existence of a 
serious and persistent breach under paragraph 2 that makes this instrument 
particularly ineffective, especially, as discussed below, in the Union’s current 
situation. A determination under paragraph 2 TEU, which is a prerequisite for 
possible sanctions under paragraph 3, may only be reached by the European 
Council who must make this decision unanimously following a proposal by 
one third of the Member States or by the Commission. Before the European 
Council can make a determination under paragraph 2 it needs to obtain the 
consent of the European Parliament and invite the Member State in question 
to submit observations. The institutional choice of providing the European 
Council and not the Council with the power of making this determination 
 
15 Article 7(1) TEU. In addition, this provision requires that once the Council has made a 
determination of a clear risk that it regularly verifies that the grounds on which such a determination 
was made continue to apply.  
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demonstrates the significance of this part of the procedure.16 Although, the 
Member State in question is for obvious reasons not included in the decision-
making process,17 the high threshold of unanimity makes it practically 
impossible to ever reach the possibility of Member States actually be 
sanctioned.   
As already noted, a determination of the existence of a serious and 
persistent breach under the first step of the sanctioning arm is a condition for 
the Council to adopt sanctions under paragraph 3 by a qualified majority. The 
Council, however, is not obliged to sanction a Member State even if it has 
been concluded that a Member State is seriously and persistently breaching 
the Article 2 TEU values.18 In the event that the Council decides to sanction a 
Member State under Article 7(3) TEU, it could ‘suspend certain of the rights 
deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, 
including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that 
Member State in the Council.’ The political nature and high thresholds, 
especially under paragraph 2, are problematic and make the Article 7 
instrument rather ineffective to deal with non-compliance of the foundational 
values.   
 Indeed, the predominately political nature of Article 7 TEU paralyses 
the potential normative influence of the Union and possible benefits that this 
enforcement instrument could have in repairing the fractures of the footing of 
the mutual recognition framework. As chapter 4 has highlighted, Hungary’s 
and Poland’s illiberal regimes seriously dismantled the rule of law, a 
fundamental and essential value to have mutual trust in each other’s criminal 
justice systems and justify the mutual recognition of arrest warrants for 
example. Both countries are no longer committed to the values upon which  
the EU’s normative identity is based and deliberately seek to undermine the 
foundational values. Eventually, the grave situation led, for the very first time 
in the EU’s history, to the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU. First, on the 20 of 
 
16 Besselink (n 5) 132. 
17 Article 7(5) TEU and Article 354 TFEU. Moreover, judicial review of Article 7 TEU by the Court of 
Justice is restricted to only procedural stipulations under Article 269 TFEU.  
18 D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and 
Reality’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 512, 516. 
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December 2017 the European Commission submitted a reasoned proposal 
to the Council to make a decision on the determination of a clear risk of a 
serious breach against Poland.19 Whilst, the serious attacks on the rule of 
law and the dismantlement of this core value in Hungary started several 
years before the PiS regime came to power in Poland,20 it was not until the 
12 of September 2018 that Article 7(1) was triggered against Hungary. Based 
on a report by a member of the European Parliament, Judith Sargentini,21 the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Council to make a 
decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach.22  
 Although the triggering of Article 7(1) against Poland and Hungary 
obtained a lot of media coverage, probably also due to the novelty of the 
situation, actual results are limited. It has now been almost two years since 
the Commission triggered Article 7(1) against Poland and more than a year 
has gone by since the European Parliament’s resolution against Hungary 
and the repair of the foundational values and more specifically the rule of law 
in both countries is far from where it ought to be. In line with the procedural 
requirements of Article 7, the Council (General Affairs) has organised formal 
hearings. However, the Council’s approach to focus extensively on a 
dialogue with the governments of Poland and Hungary is rather frustrating 
and limits the possibility of repairing, however small, rule of law deviations 
under the procedure of Article 7. Indeed, as will be discussed later on in this 
chapter,23 the small corrections achieved in the adherence of the rule of law 
are not due to the accomplishments of this instrument.  
 To date, the Council (General Affairs) has held three formal Article 7 
hearings in relation to Poland. At this stage, it is worth pointing out that the 
 
19 European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with the Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland – Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law 
COM(2017) 835 final.  
20 This is further discussed in section 5.2.2. which criticises the Commission’s lack of action.  
21 European Parliament, Report on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 
7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of 
the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)) A8-0250/2018.  
22 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to 
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a 
serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)) 
P8_TA(2018)0340.  
23 See section 5.3. 
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documentation of these hearings is not automatically made available to the 
public nor are other connected documents to the Article 7 procedure. This 
has been criticised and understandably so, since full transparency should be 
the aim in a situation where the very foundation of the Union is under 
attack.24 The public records of the meetings only provide very limited and 
vague information which confirms the continuous dialogue approach adopted 
by the Council. For example, the outcomes of the General Affairs Council 
meeting of the first formal hearing of the Polish government on the 26 June of 
2018 simply stated that “the hearing offered possibility for ministers to have 
an in-depth exchange with Poland on the concerns identified in the 
Commission’s reasoned proposal”; the records of the second formal Article 
7(1) hearing on the 18 September 2018 held that “Ministers continued their 
in-depth exchange with Poland on the concerns identified in the 
Commission’s reasoned Proposal under Article 7(1) TEU” and the final 
hearing on the 11 December 2018 stated that “The Council will continue the 
Article 7(1) TEU proceedings concerning Poland under the Romanian 
presidency”.25  
Interestingly, the more detailed reports of the hearings that have 
eventually become publicly available demonstrate a significant lack of 
enquiry and interest from the Central and Eastern European Member States. 
Almost none of those countries took the opportunity to ask questions to the 
Polish Government.26 This is an alarming signal, as it indicates not only that 
a common interest within the Council for the Article 7 mechanism is absent, 
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of Poland’s dismantlement of the 
rule of law. It also illustrates political divisions within the Union regarding the 
rule of law crisis despite the fact that every Member State has an obligation 
 
24 L. Pech and P. Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland (Part I)’, Verfassungsblog, 13 January 2019, available at https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-
days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-i/, last accessed 10 April 
2019. 
25 See respectively, Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3629th Council 
meeting, General Affairs (26 June 2018) 10519/18, 7; Council of the European Union, Outcome of 
the Council Meeting, 3636th Council meeting, General Affairs (18 September 2018) 12279/18, 6; 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3663rd Council meeting, General 
Affairs (11 December 2018) 15396/18, 5. 
26 See for example, Council of the European Union, Rule of Law in Poland / Article 7(1) TEU Reasoned 
Proposal – Report on the hearing held by the Council on 11 September 2018, 15469/18.   
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to promote and protect the values of the Union upon which is it founded and 
the trust presumption is built. This not only undermines the potential impact 
and normative influence that the preventative arm could have in restoring the 
rule of law, it also further questions the assumed commitment of sharing and 
maintaining the EU’s normative identity beyond the countries against whom 
Article 7(1) is initiated and therefore the mutual recognition framework itself.       
Moreover, the rotating Presidency of the Council also highlights the 
problematic political nature of the Article 7(1) procedure. When Romania took 
over the Presidency from Austria in January 2019 for a period of six months, 
early signs already indicated that the rule of law was not high on the agenda 
and further procrastination under the Article 7(1) mechanism was expected.27 
During the first General Affairs Council’s meeting under the Romanian 
Presidency the rule of law in relation to Poland and Hungary was, unlike all 
the meetings in 2018, missing on the agenda.28 Moreover, the Romanian 
declaration regarding its priorities during the Presidency merely referred to 
“Europe of Common Values” as its final and fourth priority.29 Indeed, as 
expected no significant progress was made during this time. Considering that 
Article 7(1) was triggered against Hungary several months prior to the start of 
the Romanian Presidency, one certainly expected to have the first formal 
hearing on this matter during the 6 months term of Romania. Unfortunately, 
this turned out to be an illusion. Although this is not surprising, since there 
are serious concerns regarding the state of play of the rule of law in Romania 
and the Commission has warned the government to withdraw several recent 
legislative amendments,30 it demonstrates, yet again, that this highly political 
instrument is ineffective to make any tangible positive changes. When 
 
27 Pech and Wachowiec (n 24); M. Michelot, ‘The ‘Article 7” Proceedings against Poland and 
Hungary: What Concrete Effects?’ Jacques Delors Institut, Europeum Institute for European Policy, 6 
May 2019, available at https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/__trashed/, last accessed 7 August 
2019. 
28 Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3667th Council meeting, General 
Affairs (11 December 2018) 5039/19. See also, A. Brzozowski, ‘Poland gets a pass as Romanian 
presidency struggles with rule of law approach’ Euractiv, 8 January 2019, available at 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/poland-gets-a-pass-as-romanian-
presidency-struggles-with-rule-of-law-approach/, last accessed 25 April 2019. 
29 Ibid, Council Meeting 4.  
30 European Commission, letter Frans Timmermans to Romanian authorities, 10 May 2019, available 
at https://cdn.g4media.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Scrisoare-Timmermans-Rule-of-law-
Framework.pdf, last accessed 24 September 2019. 
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Finland took over the Presidency in July 2019, the first formal hearing 
concerning Hungary was held on the 16 September 2019, which is an 
unwarranted 12 months after Article 7(1) TEU was triggered.31  
Despite the lack of any meaningful results under the procedure of 
Article 7(1), it is important that the procedure is triggered against Poland and 
Hungary. The seriousness of the situation in both countries certainly 
deserves the initiation of the procedure. Moreover, it has led to far-wide 
discussions about the situation in those countries by EU Institutions, scholars 
and the media. This enhances, at least to some extent, the political pressure 
on these governments, contributes to the much needed rule of law debate 
and the importance of adherence of the Union values. It also, forces national 
governments to confront the situation and take a stand regarding the rule of 
law.32 However, in the unlikely event that a determination of a clear risk of a 
serious breach is decided by the Council, one must remember that this does 
not actually change anything. Indeed, Article 7(1) TEU is a mere 
determination of a clear risk and aimed at preventing this risk becoming an 
actual serious and persistent breach. It is, however, clear that both Poland 
and Hungary have passed the stage of a risk and that in fact this has 
become a very obvious reality. Yet, the procedure under Article 7(2) to 
determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach is a dead letter. 
As noted above, the decision requires unanimity in the European Council, but 
both Poland and Hungary have made it abundantly clear to block such a 
vote.33 Therefore, when Article 7 is triggered against more than one 
incriminated country and other countries face being added to the list, such as 
Romania for example, the possibility for any sanctions to be imposed is non-
existing. Amending the procedure, for example, to exclude all countries 
against whom Article 7 has been triggered to vote under paragraph 2, would 
involve a Treaty change. This also requires unanimity and is thus wishful 
thinking and completely unrealistic in the current political climate.34    
 
31 Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3712th Council meeting General 
Affairs, 12111/19.  
32 Pech and Wachowiec (n 24).  
33 L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3, 15.  
34 Article 48 TEU. 
  
 
142 
Moreover, it can also be questioned whether the sanctioning arm 
actually would restore the adherence of the values.35 It is unlikely that the 
suspension of Poland’s and Hungary’s rights would lead to a return of a 
commitment to the EU’s normative identity and thereby repair the fractions in 
the footing and first tier of the mutual recognition framework. In light of this, it 
has been proposed that in a situation where a Member State has turned into 
an illiberal state where the government’s objective is to turn its back to the 
Article 2 TEU values and to never turn around again, there should be a 
possibility to remove a non-compliant Member State from the Union.36 In fact, 
Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe allows for such an action.37 
The potential benefits of this suggestion is that it could work as a form of 
deterrence and since the consequences are enormous it could potentially 
reinforce the effectiveness of less harmful sanctions.38 There are, however, 
strong arguments against this idea. First, it completely undermines the 
justification for the mutual recognition framework which is based on the EU’s 
normative identity grounded on the so-called common values. It therefore 
threatens Article 2 TEU and actually demonstrates that the EU does not have 
the normative influence to support the framework. Second, the EU has a 
responsibility to defend the citizens of the Member State as indicated by 
Article 9 TEU. It would be unethical to throw them out together with the non-
compliant Member State.39   
In any event, despite the vagueness of which rights can actually be 
suspended under Article 7(3) TEU, it is clear that this provision does not 
 
35 A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What is it, What has 
been Done, What can be Done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 59, 84.   
36 J-W. Müller, ‘Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?’ (2015) 
21 European Law Journal 141, 150; C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H Weiler, “Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25, available at: 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/30117/RSCAS_2014_25_FINAL.pdf?sequence=3, 
last accessed: 21 August 2019, 20.   
37 Statute of the Council of Europe (1949, ETS No. 001), Article 8 states that: ‘Any member of the 
Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of 
representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Article 7. If such 
member does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a 
member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine’. In 1969, the triggering 
of this provision led to the withdrawal of Greece before a formal decisions under Article 8 was made. 
38 Closa, Kochenov and Weiler (n 36) 20.  
39 Ibid. 
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authorise the Union to eject a Member State.40 This would thus also require a 
Treaty amendment which, as already noted above, is politically unrealistic 
because it requires unanimity.41 Moreover, to reach the stage of imposing 
sanctions requires a determination under paragraph 2 first which as 
discussed is highly unlikely. As such, the problematic high thresholds and 
political nature of the Article 7 instrument make this a rather ineffective 
instrument and thus does not provide any meaningful and substantial 
contribution to the EU’s normative influence necessary to support the mutual 
recognition framework.  
   
5.2.2 The Rule of Law initiatives by the Union’s Institutions: inadequate 
responses to the crises?  
 
The ineffectiveness of Article 7 to address systemic violations of the rule of 
law and the occurrence of serious breaches and dismantlement of this 
essential value increasing across the Union led to a stronger focus on 
additional rule of law mechanisms. In 2012, José Manual Barroso who at the 
time was the President of the European Commission, specifically referred to 
the need of a ‘better developed set of instruments’ to address the rule of law 
crisis.42 This indirectly assumes that the EU’s available instruments 
comprising of Article 7, which Baroroso in a rather unhelpful phrase 
described as the ‘nuclear option’43 and the Commission’s infringement 
procedure under Article 258 and 260 TFEU were perceived as inadequate to 
deal with the rule of law hurdles the EU was facing at the time and which 
have only become more problematic.44 The need for additional mechanisms 
to protect the foundational values and an increased role for the monitoring of 
 
40 Besselink (n 5) 130; D. Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’, EUI 
Law Working Papers, 2017/10, 11.  
41 Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 35; Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 527.  
42 European Commission, State of the Union 2012 Address by José Manuel Barroso to the European 
Parliament, 12 September 2012, Speech/12/596, 10. 
43 Ibid. This has been heavily criticised as it undermines the practical use of this instrument. See, for 
example, Besselink (n 5) 134; Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 12.   
44 Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 515. The infringement procedure is discussed in section 5.3. 
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the values by the Commission was also supported by 4 Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs45 and the European Parliament most notably in the Tavares Report.46 
 The Commission responded to these requests by introducing a new 
instrument in March 2014, when it adopted ‘a new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law’.47 This complementary instrument to the already 
existing enforcement tools48 aims ‘to address and resolve a situation where 
there is a systemic threat to the rule of law’49 so that further escalation and 
the emerging of a clear risk of a serious breach can be prevented.50 The 
framework is therefore supposed to precede the Article 7 mechanisms and 
acts as an early warning instrument.51 The procedure involves a ‘structured 
exchange’ between the Commission and the Member State concerned with a 
strong focus on a dialogue between the parties. The procedure consists of 
three stages, beginning with an assessment stage during which the 
Commission conducts a preliminary assessment to establish ‘whether there 
are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law’. In the event of 
such indications the Commission will then send a ‘rule of law opinion’ to the 
 
45 Letter of 6 March 2013 sent by 4 Foreign Affairs Ministers to the President of the Commission, 
available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/brieven/2013/03/13/brief-aaneuropese-commissie-over-opzetten-
rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme/brief-aan-europese-commissieover-opzetten-
rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme.pdf, last accessed 12 February 2016. 
46 European Parliament, Rapporteur R. Tavares, Report on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 
2012) (2012/2130(INI)) A7-0229/2013, para 69.  
47 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A New EU 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law COM(2014)158 final. Notably, prior to this, in 2013, the 
Commission introduced the EU Justice Scoreboard which monitors the independence, quality and 
efficiency of the judiciary in Member States and provides comparable data. See, for example, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The 
2018 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2018)364 final. Also, noteworthy, soon after the launch of the 
Commission’s Framework the position of Vice-President of the Commission was established whose 
role is specifically linked to the rule of law and Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
48 The Commission specifically refers to the limits of the infringement procedure and Article 7 to 
address the existing problems concerning systemic threats to the rule of law in the Union. See, ibid, 
Commission’s Communication Rule of Law Framework 5-6.  
49 Ibid, Commission’s Communication Rule of Law Framework 3.   
50 Ibid, Commission’s Communication Rule of Law Framework 6.  
51 Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 521; Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 14. Vivian Reding referred to the 
framework as a ‘pre-Article 7 procedure’, see V. Reding, A new Rule of Law initiative, Press 
Conference, European Parliament, 11 March 2014. For a detailed analysis, see D. Kochenov and L. 
Pech, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Commission’s ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ as a Timid 
Step in the Right Direction’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/24.   
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Member State concerned.52 Under the second stage, if the Member State 
has not taken appropriate action to repair the rule of law, the Commission 
issues a so-called ‘rule of law recommendation’ in which specific indications 
and measures may be included to resolve the situation within a fixed time 
limit.53 The final stage consists of a follow-up of the Commission’s 
recommendation issued under the second stage and monitors the Member 
State’s implementation of it. If the Commission is not satisfied with the 
progress made it may activate the Article 7 procedure.54  
 Whilst the Commission was praised for providing a key meaning of the 
rule of law and listing its main elements;55 for producing a mechanism that 
allows for more monitoring without the need for a Treaty change, and for 
consulting a wide range of already existing expert bodies such as the 
Fundamental Rights Agency and the Venice Commission,56 the 
Commission’s rule of law Framework also received some criticism quite 
quickly after it was launched. Notably, the Council’s Legal Service argued 
that the Commission’s Framework ‘is not compatible with the principle of 
conferral which governs the competences of the institutions of the Union’.57 
However, this is ill-founded as the Framework is merely a pre-Article 7 soft 
law instrument that allows for further monitoring which the Commission is 
already allowed under the preventative arm of Article 7(1) TEU.58 Although 
the Council has not officially endorsed this opinion, it launched its own rule of 
law initiative, discussed below, soon after the Legal Service Opinion. This 
indicates some rivalry between the two Union institutions which is certainly 
not helpful. 
 More convincing and substantiated criticism concerns the lack of 
impartiality of the Commission’s Framework and the non-equal treatment of 
the situations in Hungary and Poland. The rule of law Framework was clearly 
designed for Hungary where at the time the rogue government had already 
 
52 Commission’s Communication Rule of Law Framework (n 47) 7.  
53 Ibid, 8.  
54 ibid.  
55 See chapter 4, section 4.2.2.  
56 Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 525-526 and 531-532.  
57 Opinion of the Legal Service (n 14) para 28. 
58 See for a more detailed discussion, Besselink (n 5) 136-138; Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 531-532.  
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taken considerable steps to dismantle this key value.59 Yet, the Commission 
never activated the procedure against Hungry whilst it was specifically urged 
to do so by the European Parliament on a number of occasions, but first 
initiated the procedure against Poland. Indeed, with the situation in Hungary 
deteriorating further the European Parliament passed a resolution in June 
201560 and December 201561 both calling on the Commission to launch the 
Rule of Law Framework. Unfortunately, the Commission never responded 
positively to these requests for action. Instead, the Commission argued that 
there was no systemic threat to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, 
but acknowledged that there were some concerns which were being 
addressed by infringement procedures. More surprising, it held that the 
Hungarian judiciary also had a role to play in addressing these concerns.62 
The Commission’s reasons for not launching its Framework were rather 
unconvincing. As the European Parliament correctly argued, the infringement 
proceedings fail to accurately respond to the cumulative effect that the 
measures have on the rule of law and fundamental rights and it is necessary 
to take a broad approach in order to accurately address the situation.63 
Moreover, the reference to the Hungarian judiciary has been correctly 
described as ludicrous, because the judiciary had already lost most of its 
independence and impartiality.64  
The Commission’s refusal to initiate the Framework against Hungary 
eventually resulted in the European Parliament adopting a Resolution in May 
2017 to vote for the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU.65 In response to this, Frans 
Timmermans, the Commission’s first Vice-President in an interview provided 
a different justification for the Commission’s consistent refusal to launch its 
 
59 See for more detail Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. 
60 European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary (2015/2700(RSP)) 
P8_TA(2015)0227, para 11. 
61 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2935(RSP)) P8_TA(2015)0461, para 8. 
62 European Parliament Press Release, Hungary: no systemic threat to democracy, says Commission, 
but concerns remain, 2 December 2015. 
63 European Parliament Resolution (n 61) para 7.  
64 Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 23. 
65 European Parliament Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)) 
P8_TA(2017)0216. 
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Framework. He stipulated that the situation in Hungary and Poland is 
different, because Hungary, unlike Poland, was participating in a constructive 
dialogue.66 However, with serious rule of law violations and the further 
dismantlement of this important value clearly continue to happen, the facts 
indicate that this is just a pretence on the Hungarian side of the table.  
Indeed, some scholars in their explanation of the Commission’s non-
activation went as far to argue that the only possible reason could be that 
‘Hungary’s ‘constitutional revolution’ is now over and the consolidation of 
Orbán’s power complete’.67 
 When the Law and Justice Party, PiS, obtained a majority in the Polish 
government in October 2015 the Commission was very keen to use its new 
Rule of Law Framework. Indeed, quickly after the Polish elections, the 
Commission activated the first stage of the Framework in January 2016 and 
entered into a dialogue with Poland. The first activation of this new 
mechanism was based on the judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
in December 2015 which the Polish government did not implement. The legal 
amendments concerning the Constitutional Tribunal also resulted in an 
Opinion by the Venice Commission in March 201668 and a resolution in April 
2016 by the European Parliament in which the Commission was asked to 
enter the second stage if the Polish government did not follow the 
recommendations.69 Due to the absence of any meaningful action by the 
Polish government to resolve the matter, the Commission sent its opinion in 
June 2016 and started the second stage by adopting a recommendation in 
July 2016.70 Rather than addressing these rule of law concerns and engage 
 
66 B. Wieliński, interview with Timmermans, ‘Poland should be a leader in Europe – but it needs to 
cooperate’, Euractiv, 22 May 2017, available athttps://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-
affairs/interview/timmermans-poland-should-be-a-leader-in-europe-but-it-needs-to-cooperate/, last 
accessed 3 September 2019. 
67 D. Kochenov, L. Pech, ‘Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law 
Framework and its First Activation’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 1062, 1069.  
68 Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), Opinion 
no. 833/2015, CDLAD(2016)001. 
69 European Parliament resolution of 13 April 2016 on the situation in Poland (2015/3031(RSP)) 
P8_TA(2016)0123, para 7. 
70 European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law 
in Poland, OJ L 217/53. 
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in a dialogue with the Commission, the Polish government, continued their 
attack on the Constitutional Tribunal in full speed and challenged the legality 
of the Commission’s Framework and threatened to bring the matter before 
the Court of Justice.71 It is needless to say, that the Commission’s 
Framework is a soft law instrument and that therefore its rule of law opinion 
and recommendation cannot be subjected to an annulment action.  
  Since it was apparent that Poland had not taken any satisfactory 
actions to resolve the situation, but instead rudely dismissed and denied the 
overwhelming concerns and hard facts,72 one expected the Commission to 
activate Article 7 TEU. However, this is far from the actual events. Instead, 
the Commission adopted no less than 3 additional Recommendations on 
December 2016, July 2017 and December 2017, the latter finally 
accompanied by a Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the Council on the 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law under 
Article 7(1) TEU.73 This course of action, although perhaps better referred to 
as inaction, was somewhat unforeseen in the Commission’s Communication 
concerning the Framework to strengthen the rule of law. In fact, the approach 
adopted by the Commission to postpone the triggering of Article 7 TEU only 
led to the further deterioration of the rule of law and allowed the Polish 
government to capture the judiciary in plain sight. Moreover, the continuous 
attempts to have a meaningful dialogue with Poland is rather naïve and 
whilst this wishful thinking might indeed be the “the European way of solving 
such disputes”74 it is completely unsubstantiated by the mere fact that Poland 
continuously and openly dismissed the serious concerns regarding the 
complete disregard of the foundational values.  
 
71 J. Cienski and M. de la Baume, ‘Poland and Commission Plan Crisis Talk’, Politico, 30 May 2016, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-and-commission-plan-crisis-talks/ [Last accessed: 22 August 
2018].  
72 Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 17.  
73 See respectively, European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, OJ L 22/65; 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, OJ L 228/19; 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 regarding the rule of 
law in Poland complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 
2017/1520, OJ L 17/50; European Commission Reasoned Proposal (n 19).   
74 Wieliński (n 66).  
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 Thus, whilst the Commission’s rule of law initiative as a guardian of 
the Treaties should be commended, in practice the Commission’s use of the 
Rule of Law Framework shows some significant shortcomings. The focus of 
pre-Article 7 mechanism is on having a dialogue with a Member State where 
the rule of law is undermined, Yet, aiming to have a constructive dialogue 
with rogue governments who deliberately seek to undermine the rule of law 
to stay in power is doomed to fail. Moreover, it only unnecessarily prolongs 
the activation of Article 7 and an attempt to initiate the sanctioning arm. In 
addition, the Commission’s discretion to initiate the procedure on its 
Framework should not lead to a situation where similar events in Member 
States are treated differently. Therefore, due to the lack of legal rigour and 
impartiality of the Commission’s Framework this instrument in practice does 
not really contribute meaningfully to the strengthening of the EU’s normative 
influence to enforce the rule of law.   
In April 2019, the Commission in its Communication on the rule of law 
within the Union notably suggested ‘to set a clearer limit to the duration of the 
dialogue phase’ under the Rule of Law Framework.75 This indicates that the 
Commission might have learned something from its approach adopted in 
relation to Poland. The Commission reiterated the importance of swift actions 
in its July 2019 Communication and specifically stated that ‘time is of the 
essence when addressing a potential rule of law crisis’.76 Moreover, the 
Commission in its Communication in April sought to trigger a debate to 
reinforce the rule of law toolbox and requested the institutions, Member 
States and relevant stakeholders to reflect on three identified pillars, namely: 
‘promoting a rule of law culture, preventing rule of law problems from 
emerging or deepening, and how best to mount an effective common 
response when a significant problem has been identified’.77 The July 
 
75 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and possible next 
steps, 3 April 2019, COM(2019)163 final, 13.  
76 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Strengthening the rule of law within the Union – A blueprint for action, 17 July 2019, COM(2019) 343 
final, 14.  
77 Ibid, 5. For more specific detail on these pillars, see Commission’s Communication of April 2019 (n 
75) 10-14.  
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Communication builds on this request and lists several actions to strengthen 
the rule of law. In light of the prevention pillar, the Commission proposes a 
‘Rule of Law Review Cycle’ which seeks ‘to deepen its monitoring of rule of 
law related developments in the Member States’.78 The scope of the review 
cycle entails the key rule of law elements and interestingly reflects the main 
areas of the rule of law attacks by Poland and Hungary. It further suggests to 
set up a network for national contact points in Member States to discuss the 
rule of law issues and intends to publish an annual rule of law report on the 
situation in Member States.79 The Commission’s recent Communications, 
whilst not tangibly contributing to the Union’s enforcement instruments, 
should nevertheless be praised for their objective to ensure that the rule of 
law stays high on the EU’s political agenda and for clearly stating the 
importance of upholding the rule of law and that this is a shared responsibility 
of all EU institutions and Member States who need to work together to 
‘develop a coordinated and coherent strategic approach’.80 
 The Council, as already noted, was not really supportive of the 
Commission’s instrument, but instead launched its own rule of law initiative 
quickly after the Commission’s 2014 Communication on the Rule of Law 
Framework. To promote and safeguard the rule of law within the Union, the 
Council in December 2014 formally announced that it committed itself to 
establishing an annual dialogue with all the Member States.81 The co-called 
‘Rule of Law Dialogue’ announcement explained in a meagre 7 points, some 
only consisting of 1 simple sentence, the Council’s mechanism. It simply 
states that the annual dialogue is to takes place in the Council’s General 
Affairs configuration; that it ‘will be based on the principles of objectivity,  
non-discrimination and equal treatment of all Member States’; ‘conducted on 
a non partisan and evidence-based approach’; it ‘will be developed in a way 
which is complementary’ of existing instruments and expertise in this field 
 
78 Commission’s Communication of July 2019 (n 76) 9.  
79 Ibid, 9-11.  
80 Ibid, 11 and 16.  
81 Council of the European Union, Press Release, 3362nd Council meeting General Affairs, No. 
16936/14, 16 December 2014, 21.  
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and that the Council may suggest thematic subjects.82 The vagueness of the 
Council’s rule of law initiative and the lack of information regarding, for 
example, monitoring, scrutiny and follow-up questioned the effectiveness of 
this mechanism to have even the smallest contribution in ensuring adherence 
to the rule of law from the very start.83  
As expected, so far, the Council’s dialogues only focus on specific 
topics covering a very tiny part of the rule of law’s significant problems in 
some Member States and the discussion notes and papers are extremely 
general.84 The third annual dialogue which was held in October 2017 focused 
on ‘media pluralism and the rule of law in the digital age’ and after the event 
the Council merely stated as its main result that: ‘ministers discussed 
challenges to the rule of law and fundamental rights in the new media 
environment, the best ways to support high-quality journalism and the need 
to ensure that EU citizens of all ages have adequate media literacy 
skills’.85 The Presidency conclusions of the fourth dialogue are 4 pages long 
filled with general statements and no concrete action points whatsoever.86 
The Council’s rule of law initiative, which is merely a general discussion 
focusing on some small elements of the rule which do not mirror the key 
issues it thus far removed from an effective tool to address the EU’s profound 
rule of law crisis. Indeed, although the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework 
is far removed from a significant contribution to the EU’s normative influence 
to support the foundation of its mutual recognition framework, the Council’s 
Rule of Law Dialogue does not even merit such a consideration.  
 
 
82 Ibid.  
83 See for a more detailed and critical discussion on the Council’s Rule of Law Dialogue, P. Oliver and 
J. Stefanelli, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The Council’s Inaction’ 54 Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2016) 1075-1084; C. Closa, Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law. Normative 
Arguments, Institutional Proposals and the Procedural Limitations, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov, 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge 2016) 15, 32-34. 
84 See for example, Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3427th Council 
meeting, General Affairs (17 and 18 November 2015) No. 14185/15, 3; Council of the European 
Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3467th Council meeting, General Affairs (24 May 2016) No. 
9340/16, 4. 
85 Council of the European Union, General Affairs Council, 17 October 2017, Main Results, available 
at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2017/10/17/, last accessed 26 April 2019. 
86 Council of the European Union, Presidency conclusions after the annual rule of law dialogue on the 
topic “Media pluralism and the rule of law in the digital age”, 24 October 2017, No. 13609/17. 
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5.2.3 Financial sanctions: a possible solution for rule of law deficiencies  
 
The ineffectiveness of the Article 7 mechanisms and continuous gross 
violations by Poland and Hungary of the European values triggered the 
debate of financial sanctions against countries where rule of law deficiencies 
occur and the stronger monitoring of EU funds. Within the Union, the 
supportive camp of this approach argued that this might actually be an 
effective way of influencing the illiberal regimes in Hungary and Poland to 
change their practices.87 Linking EU funding with the compliance of the rule 
of law and EU values in general could indeed have a positive impact, as was 
argued by Commissioner Jourová:   
 
EU funds can support national enforcers and civil society to promote 
fundamental rights in the Member States. But we also need to ensure that 
EU funds bring a positive impact and contribute more generally to promote 
the EU´s fundamental rights and values. That is why I intend to explore the 
possibility to strengthen the "fundamental rights and values conditionality" of 
EU funding to complement the existing legal obligations of Member States to 
ensure the respect of the Charter when implementing EU funds. 88 
 
The opposing camp, however, argues that financial sanctions ultimately 
affect the Polish and Hungarian citizens instead of the countries’ leaders and 
divides the Union further.89 It could also promote populism and anti-European 
views further in the countries being sanctioned and would therefore be 
counterproductive.90  
 Confronted with the deficiencies of the instruments available to 
reinstate respect for the rule of law in both Poland and Hungary and in light 
 
87 European Parliament resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)) 
P8_TA(2017)0216, para 5; G. Halmai, ‘The possibility and desirability of economic sanction: Rule of 
law conditionality requirements against illiberal EU Member States’, EUI Working Papers Law 
2018/06, 16-17.  
88 European Commission, Speech by Commissioner Jourová - 10 years of the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency: a call to action in defence of fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, 28 February 
2017, SPEECH/17/403. 
89 Halmai (n 87) 18. 
90 L. Bachmaier, ‘Compliance with the Rule of Law in the EU and the Protection of the Union’s 
Budget. Further Reflections on the Proposal for the Regulation of 18 May 2018’ eucrim 2/2019, 121.  
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of the next and upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission 
in its Communication regarding the latter held that it is ‘the moment to 
consider how the link between EU funding and the respect for the EU's 
fundamental values can be strengthened’.91 Shortly after its Communication 
the Commission, on the 2 May 2018, proposed a Regulation on the 
protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as 
regards the rule of law in the Member States.92 The legal basis for the 
proposed Regulation is Article 322 TFEU, which means that the proposal is 
adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council acting with a 
qualified majority. This is, unlike the suggestions discussed above 
concerning the amendment of Article 7, not unachievable. In its proposal, the 
Commission justifies the link between the rule of law and financial sanctions, 
by focusing on the financial interests of the Union. The latter, it is argued, is 
seriously undermined by generalised deficiencies of the rule of law in a 
Member State as it requires the proper functioning of national public 
authorities implementing the Union budget and effective judicial control by 
independent courts to investigate, for example, fraud or corruption relating to 
the implementation of the EU’s budget.93 If generalised deficiencies under 
Article 3 of the proposed Regulation are detected the measures that the 
Union could adopt according to Article 4 of the proposal consist of 
suspending, reducing or restricting access to EU funding. The measures 
need to be proportionate taking into account the nature, gravity and scope of 
the rule of law deficiencies.94   
  Whilst linking the adherence of the rule of law with EU funding, might 
indeed be a more effective approach to enforce compliance with the Article 2 
TEU values, the substance of the Commission’s proposal has also received 
some valid criticism. Professor Bachmaier, convincingly argues that the 
objective of the mechanism is not entirely clear. The proposal itself, as noted 
 
91 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European 
Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020, COM (2018) 98 final, 16.  
92 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in 
the Member States, COM (2018) 324 final.  
93 Ibid, see Recital 5, 10 and Article 3 of the Proposal.  
94 Ibid, Article 4(3) of the Proposal.  
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above indicates that the primary aim is the protection of the Union’s financial 
interests. Yet, it provides the Commission with a very broad scope to assess 
the functioning of almost every public authority, even if there is no clear link 
to a potential risk of the EU’s financial interests.95 In addition, the concept of 
‘generalised deficiencies’ is extremely broad and the assessment of this is 
rather complex. The proposal, as it stands to date, risks being applied in a 
selective and politicised way where certain Member States are targeted 
whilst similar potential deficiencies are present in other Member States. This 
could potentially undermine the principle of solidarity and mutual trust.96  
 Currently, the procedure for adopting the proposal is ongoing and the 
Commission in its latest Communication regarding the rule of law urged the 
European Parliament and the Council to adopt the Regulation rapidly.97 
Interestingly, the Commission in the same Communication held that it will 
explore possible avenues to link rule of law conditionality with other policies 
besides the Union’s financial interests.98 This indicates that the Commission 
strongly believes in the results that could be achieved by financial sanctions 
in addressing rule of law violations. Linking EU funding with rule of law 
conditionality might indeed be an approach that actually has some effect in 
addressing the rule of law crises and repairing the adherence of the 
foundational values. This ‘hit them where it hurts’ tactic, although not ideal, 
could under the current circumstances actually be one of the few methods 
potentially strengthening the EU’s normative influence within the Union. 
Moreover, if EU funding is cut for countries with an illiberal regime who have 
completely dismantled the rule of law and are no longer committed to the 
Article 2 TEU values, it might eventually lead to a different outcome in the 
parliamentary elections. If, for example, Hungarian and Polish citizens 
experience the effects of funding cuts this might alter their vote in the 
elections. This might, however, be wishful thinking as it can indeed also 
backfire and feed Euroscepticism.  
 
95 Bachmaier (n 90) 122-123. 
96 Ibid, 123-125. Bachmaier uses the example of the judicial independence to highlight the difficulty 
in assessing this.  
97 Commission’s Communication of July 2019 (n 76) 16.  
98 Ibid, 15. 
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5.3 Enforcing the Article 2 TEU values through infringement 
proceedings  
 
Besides the Article 7 mechanisms and rule of law initiatives another 
instrument in the Union’s toolbox to enforce EU law is the infringement 
procedure which the Commission under Article 258 TFEU can initiate against 
a Member State that fails to comply with EU law. The procedure consists of 
several stages and is initiated by a letter of formal notice that the 
Commission sends to the Member States concerned, informing the latter of 
the breach and allowing the Member State to present its views on the matter. 
If the Member State has not taken sufficient action to remedy the situation 
the Commission then has the option to send a reasoned opinion. This details 
the EU law violations in a more formal manner and includes a time-limit by 
which the Member State needs to comply with the opinion. If the Member 
State has failed to comply with the Commission’s recommendations in the 
reasoned opinion it may bring the matter before the Court of Justice who will 
then provide an official judgment on the matter. If the Member State does not 
comply with this judgment the Commission may bring the matter before the 
Court again who can impose financial sanctions on the Member State under 
Article 260 TFEU. This is an important element of the procedure as it 
provides it with teeth. Without it, there is not much of an incentive for a 
Member State who has been held in breach of EU law to comply with the 
judgment and rectify this matter.  
 Contrary to the political instrument under Article 7, infringement 
proceedings have actually resulted in some small victories in relation to the 
EU’s values crisis. However, the requirements and limitations of this 
enforcement tool undermine the effectiveness of this instrument to 
adequately respond to the profound violations of the values and the rule of 
law in particular. It does not sufficiently contribute to the EU’s normative 
influence to repair the fractions in the footing of the mutual recognition 
framework. In relation to Hungary’s attack on the rule of law, the Commission 
opted for a safe approach under Article 258 TFEU which did not reflect the 
rule of law crisis whatsoever. Instead the Commission labelled cases as 
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something else and more specific whilst the actual problem was not 
identified. More recently, the Commission has been more ambitious with its 
infringement procedures against Poland. Although, this is a step in the right 
direction, in light of the EU’s values crises more is needed to provide the EU 
with the required level of normative influence to justify the mutual recognition 
framework in criminal matters. 
 
5.3.1 The ineffectiveness of infringement procedures to address the values 
crises  
 
The infringements procedures thus also play a part in the enforcement of the 
values and the EU’s normative influence internally in relation to the current 
Member States. The infringement procedure and Article 7 mechanisms 
complement each other in the safeguarding of the Article 2 TEU foundational 
values upon which the first tier of the mutual recognition framework is 
based.99 However, the Commission can only launch an infringement 
procedure against a Member State for a specific violation of the EU acquis. 
Therefore, due to the substantive ambiguity and open-ended nature of the 
Article 2 TEU values, the general view in the academic literature is that this 
provision cannot be the legal basis of an infringement procedure on its 
own.100 This does not mean that the foundational values should be perceived 
as just fundamental ethical and political declarations,101 but simply that the 
Article 2 TEU values in itself are not justiciable under the 258 TFEU 
procedure. Moreover, important elements of the rule of law are covered by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, most notably the right to an effective 
remedy before an independent court,102 yet the application of the Charter is 
 
99 Hillion (n 9) 73.  
100 See for example, L.W. Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’ in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 
2017) 65, 76; O. Mader, ‘Enforcement of EU Values as a Political Endeavour: Constitutional Pluralism 
and Value Homogeneity in Times of Persistent Challenges to the Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law 133, 159; Kochenov and Pech (n 18) 520; J-W. Müller, ‘A Democracy 
Commission of One’s Own, or What it would take for the EU to safeguard Liberal Democracy in its 
Member States’ in in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: 
Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017) 234, 236.  
101 See Introduction and Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. 
102 Article 47 of the Charter.  
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limited in relation to Member States as it only applies when ‘they are 
implementing Union law’.103  
The limitations of this enforcement tool are also recognised by the 
Commission which has interpreted its powers under the Article 258 TFEU 
procedure generally in a narrow manner.104 If Member States violate the 
fundamental values the Commission tends to initiate this procedure in 
individual cases when EU law is not implemented on time or adequately and 
when a specific provision of the acquis is not being applied correctly by a 
Member State. This limits the effectiveness of infringement procedures to 
address the values crises. Indeed, in light of the complete disregard for the 
foundational values of Article 2 TEU in both Poland and Hungary, who have 
deliberately turned their back to the EU’s normative identity upon which the 
first tier of the mutual recognition framework is based, this enforcement tool 
seems to be ineffective to address the magnitude of the situation.105 This 
does not mean that the infringement procedures initiated by the Commission 
against Poland and Hungary are not important. In fact, the procedures 
launched against both countries demonstrate that the situation is high on the 
Commission’s agenda and that the Commission is prepared to act within the 
limits of this enforcement instrument. Moreover, as will be discussed below in 
more detail, the approach adopted by the Commission in relation to the 
infringement procedures launched against Poland should be commended. 
Having said that, the normative influence that the EU has under this 
instrument does not seem sufficient to repair the extent of the fractures in the 
foundation of the mutual recognition framework which seriously undermine 
the required mutual trust among Member States. As such, the infringement 
procedures do not sufficiently contribute to the much-needed normative 
influence of the EU to support the mutual recognition framework in the 
current values crises of the Union.  
In relation to Hungary, for example, the Commission launched an 
infringement procedure against the lowering of the judicial retirement age 
 
103 Article 51(1) of the Charter. See also C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 
EU:C:2013:105. As for general principles of EU Law, see C-55/07 Kücükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21.  
104 Commission’s Communication Rule of Law Framework (n 47) 5; Pech and Scheppele (n 33) 13.  
105 Müller (n 36) 147.  
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which resulted in the compulsory retirement of a large percentage of the 
judiciary and allowed the rogue government to fill these positions with judges 
supportive of its regime.106 This clearly undermined the independence of the 
judiciary which apart from national legislation is also responsible for the 
application and enforcement of EU law and which is a core element of the 
rule of law value. Yet, in line with a narrow reading of its powers under Article 
258 TFEU, the Commission based its procedure on the prohibition of age 
discrimination at the workplace.107 The Court ruled in favour of the 
Commission and the Hungarian Parliament amended its law and allowed 
judges that were forced out of their office to return. However, a significant 
number of judges was already replaced and many judges declined the offer 
to return to office and instead accepted compensation. The Commission after 
its small victory was forced to close the procedure, because Hungary had 
complied with the Court’s judgment.108 This demonstrates that the indirect 
approach adopted by the Commission to tackle this rule of law breach is not 
only far removed from the actual scope of the violation but also that the 
infringement procedure only had a minimal effect in restoring the 
independence of the judiciary. A large percentage of the new appointed 
judges by the illiberal government stayed in their positions.109 
The limited effectiveness of the infringement procedure to enforce the 
foundational values is also apparent in the 258 TFEU procedure against 
Hungary in relation to the dismissal of the Ombudsman for Data Protection. 
The amendments in the law introduced a new data protection officer who 
was appointed by the government. The legal basis for the Commission’s 
action was the Directive on data protection, under which the independence of 
the relevant national authority is required. The Court ruled in favour of the 
Commission and held that Hungary’s actions undermined the independence 
 
106 See for more detail Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. 
107 Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2012:687. 
108 European Commission, Press Release, European Commission closes infringement procedure on 
forced retirement of Hungarian judges’, IP/13/1112, 20 November 2013.  
109 See for a critical note about the alleged number of judges that returned to office according to the 
Hungarian government, K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic 
Infringement Actions’ in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016) 105, 109-110.  
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of this authority.110 However, the Hungarian government was only forced to 
pay compensation to the unfairly dismissed Ombudsman for Data Protection 
and the new authority stayed in place.  
The narrow scope upon which the above actions by the Commission are 
based only address minimal aspects of the effects of the legal amendments 
introduced by the Hungarian government and by far do not reflect the 
complete dismantlement of the rule of law and the constitutional capture by 
the government.111 Indeed, this indirect approach does not tackle the crux of 
the crisis which seriously fractures the footing of the mutual recognition 
framework. More recently, the Commission launched an infringement 
procedure against Hungary’s attempt to close the Central European 
University (CEU) under its amended Higher Education Law on the legal basis 
of a violation of the freedom of establishment and to provide services. In 
December 2017, the Commission referred the matter to the Court of Justice 
due to Hungary’s persistent refusal to bring this law in line with EU law.112 In 
this matter, time was of the essence, because the new law required an 
agreement between Hungary and the country where CEU’s programmes are 
accredited by a certain deadline. Since Hungary was unwilling to sign the 
agreement by the deadline set under its own law, CEU’s license could legally 
be withdrawn. The Court still has not rendered its judgment and CEU has 
announced that it is forced to leave Budapest and will offer its programmes in 
Vienna instead.113 This highlights another aspect of the infringement 
procedure which undermines the effectiveness of this tool to address rule of 
law violations, namely the lengthy duration of the judicial phase under this 
instrument. Therefore, as rightly put by two scholars ‘the considerable delay 
in rendering judgments in rule of law-related cases may culminate in 
 
110 Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary [2014] EU:C:2014:237. 
111 M. Dawson and E. Muir, ‘Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the 
Rule of Law’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal, 1959, 1974. 
112 European Commission, Press Release, ‘Commission refers Hungary to the European Court of 
Justice of the EU over the Higher Education Law’ IP/17/5004, 7 December 2017.  
113 Central European University Press Release, ‘CEU Forced out of Budapest: To Launch U.S. Degree 
Programme in Vienna in September 2019’, 3 December 2018, available at 
https://www.ceu.edu/article/2018-12-03/ceu-forced-out-budapest-launch-us-degree-programs-
vienna-september-2019, last accessed 22 May 2019. 
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irreversible and severe harm by rule of law backsliding, which the final 
judgment rendered in the far future would not be able to remedy’.114  
Thus, although the infringement procedures against Hungary led to 
nominal victories and perhaps most significantly send a message to the 
Member State that the Commission in its role as the Union’s guardian is 
prepared to act against the illiberal regime’s aim to weaken checks and 
balances, the Commission did not identify the true problem explicitly. This 
indirect approach of launching only specific infringements procedures does 
not mirror the many problems that the Hungarian state capture caused in 
relation to the values and the rule of law in particular, let alone reflect their 
cumulative effect.115 More generally, the Commission is forced to carefully 
select its battles under this instrument, because they simply do not have the 
necessary resources and monitoring powers to scrutinise the compliance of 
all Member States.116 This in combination with the lengthy procedures under 
this instrument if the Commission decides to act, undermines the potential 
deterrent effect that the financial sanctions under Article 260(2) TFEU could 
have.117  
The possibility of imposing financial actions when Member States do not 
comply with the Court’s judgment is indeed an important element under this 
enforcement tool. This is even more significant in relation to Hungary and 
Poland where the systemic and chronic violations of the foundational values 
are a result of the governments ideology. A mere statement, even if 
reiterated several times, would unlikely be sufficient to force these Member 
 
114 P. Bárd and A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘Rule of law infringement procedures – A proposal to extend the 
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to Avoid’ Reconnect, Policy Brief – June 2019, https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/RECONNECT-policy-brief-Pech-Kochenov-2019June-publish.pdf [Last 
Accessed: 3 October 2019] 5.  
115 Z. Szente, Challenging the Basic Values – Problems in the Rule of Law in Hungary and the Failure 
of the EU to Tackle Them, in in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values – Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press, 2017)456, 465.  
116 P. Wennerås, ‘Making effective use of Article 260 TFEU’, in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The 
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 
2017) 79, 80.  
117 Ibid.  
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States to comply.118 At the same time, it is also questionable whether 
financial sanctions under Article 260(2) TFEU are an incentive for illiberal 
regimes to change their practice since the serious and persistent breaches of 
the Article 2 TEU values are ideological. Therefore, those countries may 
favour paying rather than complying with EU Law.119 Moreover, the amount 
of the financial sanctions imposed is also criticised because both the penalty 
payments and lump sums are relatively low. The latter has an important role 
in the deterrent function of Article 260(2) and therefore it has been suggested 
that the Commission’s methodology for calculating lump sums should be 
amended.120 This could potentially strengthen, albeit on a small scale, the 
EU’s normative influence in the sanctions phase of the infringement 
procedure and would not require a Treaty amendment.   
One proposal to more effectively address the values crises concerns the 
bundling of infringement cases by the Commission which provides a platform 
to present a case to the Court of Justice for systemic and persistent 
violations of Article 2 TEU.121 Under this approach, Article 2 TEU would 
become justiciable through a systemic infringement procedure under Article 
258 TFEU.122 The bundling of EU law violations to illustrate a bigger pattern 
is not a novel approach under the infringement procedure. For example, the 
Commission adopted this approach in relation to the Waste Directive123 
against both Ireland and Italy and the Court ruled in favour of the 
 
118 D. Kochenov and P. Bárd, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU. The Pitfalls of 
Overemphasising Enforcement’ RECONNECT Working Paper No. 1 – July 2018, available at 
https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/RECONNECT-KochenovBard-
WP_27072018b.pdf, last accessed 14 June 2019, 17. 
119 See for a detailed analysis on this point, B. Jack, ‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial 
Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?’ 19 European Law Journal (2013) 420.  
120 Wennerås (n 116) 89-98. See for a more general discussion on the weaknesses of the financial 
sanctions, P. Wennerås, ‘Sanctions Against Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but not 
Kicking?’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 145.  
121 K.L. Scheppele, ‘What can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic 
Principles of the European Union? The Case for Systemic Infringement Actions’, Verfassungsblog, 22 
November 2013, available at https://verfassungsblog.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/scheppele-
systemic-infringement-action-brussels-version.pdf, last accessed 10 June 2017. 
122 Another approach would be to combine Article 2 TEU with the duty of loyal cooperation under 
Article 4(3) TEU to provide a stronger legal base for systemic infringement actions. See Pech (n 114) 
6.  
123 Council Directive 75/422/EEC on Waste [1995] OJ L 194/39. 
  
 
162 
Commission’s method in both cases.124 This suggestion advocated by 
Scheppele has several advantages. First, it builds on the already exciting 
enforcement instrument under Article 258 TFEU and there is precedent for 
the bundling of infringements. Secondly, unlike the individual infringement 
cases discussed above in relation to Hungary it could actually represent the 
systemic attacks on the foundational values and rule of law more 
specifically.125 Finally, the use of systemic infringement procedures could 
also heighten the deterrent effect of the financial sanctions. For example, the 
waste case against Italy resulted in one of the highest lump sums in EU 
history.126  
However, practice shows that the Commission is reluctant to bundle 
violations of EU law and is more inclined to pursue individual cases. 
Moreover, in some other instances when the Commission pursued this the 
Court ruled against the Commission.127 More importantly, however, is the fact 
that the successful bundling of the waste cases, was based on specific EU 
acquis. It is very unlikely that the Commission will pursue a similar approach 
based on Article 2 TEU and unsure whether the Court would accept this. As 
rightly put by one scholar, the probability ‘of the Commission acting via the 
infringement proceedings route in relation to Article 2 TEU seems little more 
than zero’.128 
Member States themselves could of course also play a role in the 
enforcement of EU law under Article 259 TFEU. In light of ‘the mutually 
interdependent legal relations’ between Member States based on the 
presumption that they all share a commitment to the Article 2 TEU values 
which allows for mutual trust129 and justifies the application of mutual 
recognition, it is understandable why Member States are encouraged by 
 
124 See Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2005:250 and Case C-135/05 Commission v Italy, 
EU:C2007:250 respectively.  
125 See for a more recent discussion on this suggestion, Scheppele (n 109) 105 – 132.  
126 Case C-196/13 Commission v Italy, EU:C:2014:2407.  
127 Wennerås (n 116) 75. Some examples where the Court dismissed this approach include, Case C-
160/08 Commission v Germany, EU:C:2010:230, para 113-123; Case C-34/11 Commission v Portugal, 
EU:C:2012:712, para 41-50.  
128 Gormley (n 100) 78.  
129 See Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) EU:C:2014:2454, para 167-168. 
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scholars to start their own infringement proceedings.130 Direct actions from 
Member States responding to the values crises avoids the criticism of 
allowing the EU institutions to enhance their enforcement powers.131 On this 
basis, Kochenov, by building on Scheppele’s suggestion regarding systemic 
infringement procedures, argues that it is less problematic for Member States 
to use Article 2 TEU as a legal basis to start an action under Article 259 
TFEU by bundling infringements.132 Notwithstanding the Court’s role within 
this procedure, this largely horizontal approach could indeed be a positive 
step in relation to the enforcement of the values. However, practice 
demonstrates that Member States are reluctant to initiate a 259 TFEU 
procedure and are more inclined to wait for the Commission to take action.133 
Therefore, although this call for Member States to take more responsibility in 
the enforcement of the values should be praised, it is slightly unrealistic for 
this to happen. Moreover, in the unlikely event that this route is taken by 
Member States, it is of course still doubtful whether the Court would rule in 
favour of an action based on Article 2 TEU.  
 
5.3.1 Recent events a step in the right direction: effective judicial protection 
as a legal basis for infringement  
 
The Commission has been more courageous in the recent infraction 
procedures against Poland concerning the amendments of the judiciary. In 
relation to the independence of the Polish Supreme Court which the new 
laws regarding the lowering of the retirement age and providing the Polish 
President with the sole power to extend the judicial service upon request 
undermined,134 the Commission initiated an infringement action on the legal 
 
130 See for example, L. Pech and P. Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the 
Rule of Law in Poland (Part II)’, Verfassungsblog, 17 January 2019, available at 
https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-
part-ii/, last accessed 10 April 2019; Pech (n 114) 6; D. Kochenov, Biting Intergovernmentalism: The 
Case For the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ 
(2015) 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 153. 
131 Ibid, Kochenov, 158. 
132 See generally, Ibid.  
133 Some of the limited examples, albeit unsuccessful before the Court of Justice, include, Case C-
145/04 Spain v UK, EU:C:2006:543 and Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, EU:C:2012:630. 
134 See for a more detailed discussion Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
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basis of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter.135 Thus, unlike the 
Hungarian infringement procedure discussed above, concerning the lowering 
of the retirement age which was based on age discrimination, the 
Commission’s action against Poland was more ambitious. This different 
approach adopted by the Commission was most likely triggered by some 
recent encouraging case law of the Court of Justice concerning the 
independence of the judiciary. Most importantly the landmark judgement of 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP).136  
The ASJP judgment has been described as ‘the most important 
judgment since Les Verts as regards the meaning and scope of the principle 
of the rule of law in the EU legal system’.137 The case concerned a reduction 
in the remuneration paid to Portuguese civil servants, including judges of the 
Court of Auditors. ASJP, acting on behalf of the Court of Auditors’ judges, 
challenged these new measures based on a breach of Article 19(1) TEU 
which states that ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’ and the right to 
an effective remedy and fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. In its 
judgment, the Court of Justice avoided the question concerning the 
applicability of Article 47 of the Charter. Instead, it mainly focused on Article 
19(1) TEU and held that the scope of ‘that provision relates to ‘the fields 
covered by Union law’ irrespective of whether the Member States are 
implementing Union law, within in the meaning of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter’.138 It thereby made a distinction between the scope of Article 19(1) 
TEU and Article 47 of the Charter.139 With reference to the Rosneft case 
where it was already held that effective judicial protection is of the essence of 
the rule of law,140 the Court ruled that Article 19 TEU therefore ‘gives  
 
135 Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland [2019] EU:C:2019:531. 
136 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP) v Tribunal de Contas, 
EU:C:2018:117. 
137 L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue in 
the ASJP case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1827.  
138 ASJP (n 136) para 29.  
139 Pech and Platon (n 137) 1832 and for a more detailed discussion, 1837-1843; M. Krajewski, 
‘Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses: The Court of Justice and the Athena’s Dilemma’ (2018) 3 
European Papers 395, 400-406.   
140 Case C-72/15 Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236, para 73; ASJP (n 136) para 36.  
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concrete expression’ to this value listed in Article 2 TEU.141  As such, 
Member States must ensure that any court or tribunal within the meaning of 
EU law, that could potentially have to rule ‘on questions concerning the 
application or implementation of EU law’ must be independent.142 This is 
essential in order to provide effective judicial protection in accordance with 
Article 19(1) TEU.143 The Court of Justice, therefore, established a ‘justiciable 
rule of law clause’144 in relation to the independence of national courts or 
tribunals on the sole basis of Article 19(1) TEU with reference to Article 2 
TEU and the principle of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU. It thereby, 
squashed the argument relied upon by both Poland and Hungary that the 
amendments concerning the judiciary are a national matter and that this falls 
outside the EU’s competences.145 More importantly, this key judgement,146  
gave new life to Article 258 TFEU to respond to the capture of the judiciary in 
Poland where check and balances are dismantled and the independence of 
the judiciary is significantly undermined.  
 The infringement procedure against Poland regarding the 
independence of the Supreme Court thus builds on the newly provided 
significance of Article 19(1) TEU. The Commission referred the matter to the 
Court of Justice in September 2018 and requested the Court to order interim 
measures to suspend the contested new Polish laws pending the judgement 
of the Court under Article 279 TFEU and Article 160(2) and (7) of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Court. The Commission’s application for interim relief is 
most welcome, since rule of law violations require a prompt response in 
order to reduce, as far as possible, the potential harm that the national 
legislation may cause.147 
 
141 ASJP (n 136) para 32. 
142 Ibid, para 37, 40, 41  
143 Ibid, para 40 
144 Krajewski (n 139) 395.  
145 Pech and Platon (n 137) 1828. 
146 In the case itself the Court ruled that because the salary-reductions where a result of the 
excessive budget deficit of the State and were being applied across the public sector on a temporary 
basis, the independence of the Court of Auditors was not impaired in light of Article 19(1) TEU.  
147 The importance of a swift response is also apparent in the Hungarian infringement procedures 
discussed above.  
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Moreover, on 19 October 2018, the Vice-President of the Court 
granted the request before Poland had submitted its observations regarding 
the matter on the basis of an urgent procedure under Article 160(7) of the 
Rules of Procedures of the Court.148 The Grand Chamber confirmed this on 
the 17 December 2018.149 The granting of the interim measures by the Court 
under the urgent procedure, demonstrates the Court’s determination to 
protect the rule of law value.150 The Polish government complied with the 
interim order by repealing the law in question and reinstated the judges that 
were affected.  
 On the 24 June 2019, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in 
the case. For the first time, the Court found a Member State in breach of 
Article 19(1) TEU. The judgment closely followed the opinion of the AG 
Tanchev.151 In relation to the argument submitted by the Polish government 
and supported by Hungary, that the organisation of justice is a national 
matter and falls outside of the EU’s competence, the Court clearly explains 
why this does not suffice. With reference to Article 49 TEU, the Court starts 
with reaffirming the Polish commitment of respecting and promoting the 
foundational values listed in Article 2 TEU when they joined the EU, which 
Poland has done so ‘freely and voluntarily’ when they acceded to the EU.152 
Whilst the Court recognises the that ‘the organisation of justice in the 
Member States falls within the competence of those Member States’, 
Member States are still required to comply with their EU obligations which is 
not the same as ‘claiming to exercise that competence itself’.153 Similar to the 
ASJP judgment, the Court did not assess the applicability of the Charter and 
circumvented the potential limitation under Article 51(1) of the Charter. It 
 
148 Case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:852, order of 19 October 2018 by the Vice-
President of the Court.  
149 Case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:1021, order of the Court (Grand Chamber). 
150 This was also evident in the interim measure granted in relation to the Białowieża forest, where 
the Polish government ignored the interim order to stop cutting trees and as a result the Court 
imposed penalty payments in order ‘to guarantee the effective application of EU law, such 
application being an essential component of the rule of law, a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU and 
on which the European Union is founded’. See, Case C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland,  
EU:C:2017:877, order of the Court (Grand Chamber), para 102. 
151 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, delivered on 11 April 2019, in Case C-619/18, 
EU:C:2019:325. 
152 Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531, para 42. 
153 Ibid, para 52. 
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reiterated, that judicial independence is necessary to ensure effective judicial 
protection enshrined in Article 19(1) TEU,154 but also as a general principle of 
EU law which Article 47 of the Charter only reaffirms.155 The latter statement, 
is interesting, as it confirms that the Article 47 case law, referred to numerous 
times in ASJP as well, is relevant but not determined for the assessment and 
application of Article 19(1) TEU, without having to assess the Charter’s 
applicability. The Court then continued and reaffirmed that Article 19(1) 
covers any court or tribunal that ‘may be called upon to rule on questions 
concerning the application and interpretation of EU law’, an element that the 
Supreme Court clearly meets.156 
 Having confirmed the EU’s competence in the matter, the Court 
proceeded with the first complaint concerning the lowering of the compulsory 
retirement age. It held that although the principle of irremovability of judges is 
not wholly absolute,157 exceptions to this principle are only allowed 
‘if it is justified by a legitimate objective, it is proportionate in the light of that 
objective’ and most importantly restrictions should not ‘raise reasonable 
doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court 
concerned to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests 
before it’.158 The Court, as expected, held that the forced early retirement of 
Supreme Court judges was incompatible with the principle of irremovability of 
judges and that stated that these new laws which are adopted in light of the 
so-called ‘reform’ of the judiciary ‘aim of side-lining a certain group of judges 
of that court’.159 
 In relation to the second complaint concerning the discretionary power 
of the Polish President to extend the mandate of judges affected by the new 
compulsory retirement age, Poland was arrogant enough to argue that this in 
fact aimed at protecting the judiciary form ‘interreference by the legislative 
authority and from that by the executive authority’.160 In its assessment the 
 
154 Ibid, para 47-50. 
155 Ibid, para 49. 
156 Ibid, para 56. 
157 Ibid, para 76. 
158 Ibid, para 79. 
159 Ibid, para 82.  
160 Ibid, para 103. 
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Court focused on whether the conditions and procedural rules governing the 
President’s decision provided sufficient protection to judges and exclude 
political intervention and pressure which could influence the judges’ 
decisions.161 The Court held that the National Council of Judiciary who is 
required to deliver an opinion to the President before the latter adopts a 
decision, is itself not an independent body and their opinions are not 
reasoned and thus do not provide the President with objective information.162 
Therefore, Poland was also held to be in breach of Article 19(1) in relation to 
this complaint.  
 The judgement is not just a mere victory for the Commission in 
relation to the specific complaints regarding the Polish Supreme Court it also 
confirms, albeit indirectly, the systemic undermining of the rule of law in 
Poland. It also sends a strong message to Poland and any other Member 
State trying to weaken the independence of national courts by lowering the 
retirement age. It is not surprising that the Court’s judgment on the 5 
November 2019, in relation to the lowering of the retirement age for Ordinary 
Court judges closely resembles this judgment.163 Moreover, the Court also 
provided some encouraging words in relation to the independence of the 
National Council of the Judiciary, a matter currently raised in a pending 
preliminary reference procedure.164 The Court is most likely to follow the 
Opinion of AG Tanchev, that the National Council of the Judiciary is not 
guaranteed to be independent from the legislative and executive 
authorities.165 Moreover, in its judgement the Court expressed concerns 
regarding the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber and stated that 
 
161 Ibid, para 111 and 112. 
162 Ibid, para 116 and 117.  
163 Case C-192/18 Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:924. In this case, Poland was also held to be in 
breach of Article 19(1) TEU. In addition, this case also involved a complaint regarding sex 
discrimination as a different retirement age was set for women and men, which was held to be in 
breach of Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation OJ L 204/23. AG Tanchev had already held the measures 
to be incompatible with EU Law, see Opinion Advocate General Tanchev, delivered on 20 June 2019, 
in Case C-192/18 Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:529.  
164 For a discussion on the amendments regarding the National Council of the Judiciary, see Chapter 
4, section 4.3.2. 
165 Opinion Advocate General Tanchev, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 Krajowa Rada 
Sądownictwa and Others, EU:C:2019:551.  
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according to the Court’s case-law ‘the rules governing the disciplinary regime 
and, accordingly, any dismissal of those who have the task of adjudicating in 
a dispute must provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk 
of that disciplinary regime being used as a system of political control of the 
content of judicial decisions’166 This can be construed as indirect support for 
the Commission’s latest infringement action against Poland concerning the 
new disciplinary regime launched in April 2019 and referred to the Court of 
Justice on 10 October 2019.167  
 Notwithstanding the significance of this judgment and the welcome 
use of interim measures against Poland, the new laws on the Supreme Court 
also greatly increased the number of judges and this was not addressed in 
the judgment. Therefore, the PiS regime will most likely succeed in obtaining 
a majority of supporting judges and capture the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
no action has been taken yet regarding the arbitrary dismissal of a large 
number of Court Presidents and Vice-President by the Minister of Justice 
who obtained this excessive power as a result of the new laws adopted by 
Poland’s illiberal regime. Similar, the mass dismissal of prosecutors by the 
Minister of Justice has also remained unattended.168 Moreover, no changes 
have been made regarding the Constitutional Tribunal’s capture which was 
the starting point of the PiS regime’s attack on the judiciary.169 This is 
significant since the Constitutional Tribunal has an essential role in providing 
effective constitutional review regarding the compliance of national legislation 
with the Polish obligations under EU law, including the adherence of the 
foundational values. In a recent report, the Council of Europe Commissioner 
of Human Rights held that ‘the independence and credibility of the 
Constitutional Tribunal have been seriously compromised. In particular, the 
 
166 Commission v Poland (n 152) para 77. 
167 European Commission, Press Release, ‘Rule of Law: European Commission refers Poland to the 
Court of Justice to protect judges from political control’, 10 October 2019, IP/19/6033. For a similar 
view see, L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘The beginning of the end for Poland’s so-called “judicial reforms”? 
Some thoughts on the ECJ ruling in Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court 
case)’, EU Law Analysis, 30 June 2019, available at, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-
beginning-of-end-for-polands-so.html, last accessed 12 August 2019.  
168 See for a detailed report on these matters, Council of Europe, Report from the Commissioner of 
Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, Report following her visit to Poland from 11 to 15 March 2019, 28 
June 2019, CommDH(2019)17, section 1.5, 12-15.  
169 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
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Commissioner regrets the persisting controversy surrounding the election 
and the status of the Tribunal’s new President and several of its new 
judges’.170 
 Therefore, although the Court’s acceptance of a broad scope of Article 
19(1) enhances the effectiveness of Article 258 TFEU to address individual 
rule of law issues considerably, the normative influence gained is not 
sufficient to support the mutual recognition framework effectively and repair 
all the fractures in its foundation. Indeed, the Polish government has made it 
quite clear that they will try everything to complete the so-called ‘reform’. It is 
therefore, unlikely that individual infringement procedures as an enforcement 
tool on its own provide the EU with the necessary machinery to restore 
adherence of the foundational values in countries that deliberately seek to 
undermine these. This is illustrated by the fact that although Poland complied 
with the interim measures in the case regarding the lowering of the 
retirement age, shortly after it introduced new laws regarding the disciplinary 
procedures for judges and thus further undermined the rule of law.171 Another 
example of the limited normative influence of the EU in relation to autocratic 
regimes, is the recent preliminary reference from a Hungarian judge asking 
the Court of Justice about the independence of Hungarian courts. Although, 
as rightly argued, the preliminary reference should not have been submitted, 
it is a result of the continuous weakening of checks on the Hungarian 
government and institutions filled with people supporting the government.172 
It therefore demonstrates that ‘all other means to effectively challenge rule of 
law backsliding in Hungary have failed’.173 Indeed, recent events show the 
persistency of the Hungarian government to undermine the rule of law value 
further which has been described as a ‘constitutional crises’.174  
 
170 See for a detailed report on these matters, Commissioner of Human Rights (n 168) 6. 
171 P. Bárd and A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘Rule of law infringement procedures – A proposal to extend the 
EU’s rule of law toolbox’ CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 2019-09, May 2019, 17.  
172 See for a detailed discussion, P. Bárd, ‘Luxembourg as the Last Resort – The Kúria’s Judgment on 
the Illegality of a Preliminary Reference to the ECJ’, Verfassungsblog, 23 September 2019, available 
at https://verfassungsblog.de/luxemburg-as-the-last-resort/, last accessed 2 October 2019. 
173 Ibid.  
174 See, V. Vadász, ‘A Hungarian Judge Seeks Protection from the CJEU – Part II’, Verfassungsblog, 7 
August 2019, available at https://verfassungsblog.de/a-hungarian-judge-seeks-protection-from-the-
cjeu-part-ii/, last accessed 5 September 2019. 
 
  
 
171 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
The EU’s values crises, in particular the complete dismantlement of the rule 
of law in Poland and Hungary, requires effective enforcement machinery to 
address the situation and adequately restore the adherence of the values in 
Member States. Only then can the footing of the mutual recognition 
framework upon which the second tier concerning mutual trust rests be 
restored and mutual recognition in criminal matters be justified. Yet, the main 
tool to address systemic and persistent violations of the Article 2 TEU values 
listed in Article 7 TEU is ineffective due to its political nature and high 
thresholds. Indeed, the likelihood of a decision being reached under 
paragraph 2 is non-existent with more than one Member State deliberately 
seeking to dismantle the rule of law and no longer being committed to the 
EU’s normative and constitutional identity. Suggestions to change the 
procedural requirements also must remain fiction as this requires unanimity 
as well. Moreover, the Commission’s rule of law Framework, albeit a nice 
suggestion initially, has been completely ineffective against Poland and only 
resulted in the further weakening of the rule of law by having extended 
dialogues and numerous recommendations.  
 The other instrument in the EU’s toolbox to enforce compliance with 
the foundational values are infringement proceedings. Although, up until 
recently Article 258 TFEU procedures have been rather ineffective to restore 
the values in autocratic regimes. The judgments of the Court in relation to the 
independence of the Supreme Court and Ordinary Courts has given 
infringement procedures a most welcome boost to address the violations 
more effectively. However, these individual infringement procedures only 
address elements of the rule of law dismantlement and many violations 
remain unaddressed. To prevent the further undermining of the values, it is 
essential that the Commission promptly acts and launches as many 
infringement procedures as possible combined with interim measures. 
Infringement procedures involving the rule of law should automatically be 
fast-tracked because swift action in these situations is necessary. Moreover, 
national courts and Member States also have a role in the protection of the 
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functioning of the EU founded on the common values. Only if all the 
institutions, the Member States and national courts take responsibility and 
act ‘promptly, forcefully and in a coordinated manner’175 could the Union 
possibly address the values crises effectively. Thus far, this has not 
happened. In addition, the EU is currently supporting Member States  
financially where the governments have completely turned their back to their 
EU commitment of respecting and promoting the presumed common values. 
Whilst those countries are heavily reliant on EU funding, the millions that the 
EU gives to these countries cannot be justified in the current situation. In fact, 
the possibility of cutting EU funds for serious and persistent rule of law 
violations, might be the much-needed influence that the EU requires and is 
currently lacking, to support the mutual recognition framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 Pech (n 114) 2. 
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6.  The Pre-accession Policy and the EU’s Normative 
Influence: Building Ground for Mutual Recognition in 
Criminal Matters 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In previous chapters this thesis has discussed the functioning and application 
of the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal law matters among 
current Member States. It thereby focused on whether the mutual recognition 
framework and the normative approach adopted in the framework can be 
justified. It demonstrated that the EU’s internal situation is currently far 
removed from a shared commitment to the article 2 TEU values by all 
Member States. Notwithstanding the seriousness of fundamental rights 
violations which challenge EU trust-based law and thus the application of 
mutual recognition instruments,1 the framework’s legitimacy is currently 
profoundly undermined by Member States with autocratic regimes that do 
everything in their power to dismantle, as far as possible, the EU’s 
foundational values.2 It further showed that the EU does not have the 
necessary influence to enforce compliance with the values and restore the 
foundation of the mutual recognition framework. This chapter, focuses on the 
EU’s normative influence externally vis-à-vis the pre-accession policy. It 
discusses whether the principle of mutual recognition is an exportable 
commodity and whether the pre-accession policy builds ground for mutual 
recognition in the field of EU criminal law by exporting the foundational 
values that European states wishing to join the Union need to respect and 
promote.3  
  The chapter demonstrates that the enlargement process has evolved 
significantly since the start of the European project. While this is unsurprising 
considering the developments of the political and legal framework of the 
 
1 See Chapter 3.  
2 See Chapter 4.  
3 Article 49(1) TEU.  
  
 
174 
Union, it also reflects the experience of previous enlargement rounds. Over 
time, key elements for building trust in the candidate countries’ criminal 
justice systems, such as respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, 
acquired a firm place on the pre-accession agenda. At the same time, the 
EU’s normative influence to transform the countries wishing to join the EU 
strengthened considerably through, for example, benchmarking and the strict 
monitoring of the progress made in the aspiring countries. The prospect of 
future membership is thus a powerful incentive to export the foundational 
values which are fundamental for the application of mutual recognition.  
 First, the chapter discusses the developments adopted in the pre-
accession policy for the fifth enlargement and the introduction of the 
Copenhagen criteria that Member States need to comply with (section 6.2). It 
then focuses on the post-conditionality used by the EU in relation to Bulgaria 
and Romania. It argues that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM) is ineffective and that in recent years the Commission has adopted 
double standards in its approach towards Bulgaria and Romania to the 
detriment of the foundational values (section 6.3). The chapter then 
continues to analyse the developments with reference to the Western 
Balkans and demonstrates that the rule of law and fundamental rights have 
obtained a prominent place in the pre-accession policy. This in combination 
with the robust conditionality employed by the EU builds ground for mutual 
trust in those countries criminal justice systems and thus for the application 
of mutual recognition (section 6.4).  
 
6.2 The developments in the pre-accession strategy: A new approach in 
the Big Bang enlargement  
 
During the first four enlargements4 the role of clearly defined political 
accession criteria5 and the monitoring of the implementation and application 
 
4 The first enlargement was on 1 January 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
became Member States; second enlargement was on 1 January 1981 when Greece joined; third 
enlargement was on 1 January 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined, and the fourth enlargement 
was on 1 January 1995 when Austria, Sweden and Finland acceded. 
5 This refers to the first Copenhagen criteria, known as the political criteria. See below for a more 
detailed discussion.   
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of compliance with these criteria prior to accession was minimal. At the time, 
accession clauses in the Community Treaties did not specifically refer to the 
values now enshrined in Article 2 TEU, but referred to ‘European States’6 
were concepts currently known as the foundational values, such as 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights were derived from.7 
The accession negotiations with Greece, Portugal and Spain were the first to 
include some reference to political conditionality.8 For example, the 
Commission’s opinions on the application for accession of these countries 
held in the Preamble that:  
 
‘Whereas the principles of pluralist democracy and respect for human rights form 
part of the common heritage of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
European Communities and are therefore essential elements of membership of 
the said Communities’9 
  
However, these criteria played a small part in the negotiations with the three 
southern candidates. It was enough for these countries to demonstrate that 
their respective Constitutions guaranteed the existence of these principles.10 
The negotiations with the EFTA countries11 included the first economic 
criteria12 and policies related to the single market were the main focus of this 
enlargement round. As a result of the Maastricht Treaty a chapter on Justice 
and Home Affairs was added, but this was not at the centre of the pre-
accession negotiations. Overall, the fourth enlargement negotiations were 
 
6 Article 237(1) EEC Treaty, Article 205(1) of the Euratom Treaty, Article 98(1) ECSC Treaty.  
7 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession Conditionality in the 
fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer, 2008) 34.  
8 See further, C. Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny, in C. Hillion (ed.) EU 
Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing 2004) 3-6.   
9 Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the application for accession to the European 
Communities by the Hellenic Republic [1979] OJ L 291/3 and Commission Opinion of 31 May 1985 on 
the applications for accession to the European Communities by the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic [1985] OJ L 302/3. Prior to this, the European Council Presidency Conclusions of 
the meeting in Copenhagen in 1978 already stated that: ‘respect for and maintenance of 
representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential elements of 
membership of the European Communities’. See European Council, meeting in Copenhagen (7 and 8 
April 1978), Declaration on Democracy (Annex D) Bulletin EC 3/78, 13.  
10 Kochenov (n 7) 34. 
11 Refers to the countries Austria, Sweden and Finland who were previous members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
12 Hillion (n 8) 7. 
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rather technical in nature, but they were also concluded fairly quickly13 and 
were far removed from the pre-accession strategy adopted in the next 
enlargement rounds. Thus, although the safeguarding of democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for fundamental rights were referred to as requirements 
during the first enlargement rounds by the institutions and already linked to 
the EU’s identity,14 detailed conditionality and scrutiny regarding actual 
adherence to these principles was not part of the accession negotiations. 
This changed significantly when the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries expressed their interest in joining the EU. A new pre-accession 
framework was launched which required a stronger commitment to the EU 
values and introduced several new mechanisms to influence the candidate 
countries to make the necessary transformations.  
After the fall of the Soviet Communism in 1989, the Central and 
Eastern European countries conveyed their desire to join the EU. The 
historical background of these countries combined with the large number of 
Central and Eastern European States led to a new phase in the enlargement 
policy. In June 1993, during the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, 
the renowned Copenhagen criteria were adopted which formally incorporated 
key concepts now listed as foundational values of the Union in Article 2 TEU 
in the accession process.15 The Copenhagen criteria introduced three sets of 
conditions that candidate countries need to satisfy in order to accede to the 
Union.16 First, the so-called political criteria require ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities.’ The second set of conditions are the economic 
criteria under which candidate countries need to ensure ‘a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces’. 
Under the third Copenhagen criteria candidate countries must have the 
‘administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis 
 
13 See for a more detailed discussion on this, A.F. Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union 
(Kluwer Law International 2009) Chapter 4 and in particular, 66-68.  
14 Copenhagen European Council (n 9) 12. 
15 European Council in Copenhagen, Presidency Conclusions (21-22 June 1993) SN 180/1/193, point 7 
(iii). In 1993, the relevant Treaty provisions on accession was Article O TEU, which at the time did not 
refer specifically to the Copenhagen criteria.  
16 In light of the thesis the first and third accession criteria are the focus of this chapter. 
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and ability to take on the obligations of membership’.17 The Copenhagen 
European Council promised the CEE countries, even before they formally 
applied for membership, that they ‘shall become members of the European 
Union’ as soon as they satisfied the accession criteria.18  
 This new approach in the enlargement policy indicated that a simple 
guarantee in the candidate countries’ constitutions regarding fundamental 
rights and the rule of law was no longer enough. Actual compliance with 
these political criteria and the safeguarding of them was required for 
candidate countries to accede to the EU. However, as will be discussed 
below, the broad nature of the political criteria and lack of clarity made the 
assessment on whether the candidate countries fully complied with these 
values a rather challenging operation for the Commission. The importance of 
these concepts was also confirmed by several Treaty amendments that 
followed. The Amsterdam Treaty formally incorporated the political criteria as 
a requirement for membership into the Treaties in Article 49 TEU19 and 
thereby ‘constitutionalised’ them.20 Moreover, the importance of respecting 
these values was also confirmed by the introduction of Article 7 TEU.21 The 
anchoring of these political criteria in the Treaties made them ‘touchstones 
not merely for candidate countries but also for the conduct of the existing 
 
17 Copenhagen European Council (n 15). The Copenhagen European Council also imposed a condition 
on the European Union itself by stating: ‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while 
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries’. For a detailed discussion on the so-
called absorption capacity, see, A. Łazowski, ‘Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s Absorption Capacity’ 
(2010) 19 Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 56.  
18 Copenhagen European Council (n 15). The CEE countries formally applied for EU membership on 
the following dates: Hungary on 31 March 1994; Poland on 5 April 1994; Romania on 22 June 1995; 
Slovakia on 27 June 1995; Latvia on 27 October 1995; Estonia on 24 November 1995; Lithuania on 8 
December 1995; Bulgaria on 14 December 1995; the Czech Republic on 17 January 1996, and 
Slovenia on 10 June 1996.  
19 Under Article 49 TEU membership to the European Union was open to any European State that 
respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU such as liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. At the time, one requirement under the 
Copenhagen political criteria was missing under Article 6(1) TEU, namely respect for and the 
protection of minorities. This obligation did not apply to Member States themselves. See for a critical 
appraisal, C. Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the European Union – The Discrepancy between Membership 
Obligations and Accession Conditions as Regards the Protection of Minorities’ (2004) 27 Fordham 
International Law Journal 715.    
20 Hillion (n 8) 3. 
21 Discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Member States’.22 Indeed, respect for these values was not only essential for 
countries to accede but internally the current Member States of the EU were 
also required to safeguard them. Yet, as already argued in previous 
chapters23 and further discussed below, internally Member States are not 
always adhering to these values and the EU lacks the enforcement 
machinery to address this effectively.24 The EU has thus adopted double 
standards in the pre-accession policy.   
As for the enlargement policy, the European Council committed itself 
to follow the progress in the CEE countries closely,25 the goal of the pre-
accession strategy was ‘to provide a route plan for the associated countries 
as they prepare for accession’.26 The European Union was thus no longer 
going to be a bystander where candidate countries needed to meet the 
requirements themselves, but was going to be actively involved by steering 
and monitoring the pre-accession policy.27 The Commission has a key role in 
this respect and is the driving force behind the developments of the pre-
accession policy and largely responsible for carrying it out. The Commission 
sets the reforms that candidate countries need to comply with and closely 
monitors the progress made by the candidate countries. It produces annual 
reports in which the Commission outlines the outcomes of the assessment it 
has conducted regarding a specific candidate countries’ progress towards 
accession. Based on this extensive examination the Commission then puts 
together a list of recommendations for the candidate country indicating where 
future action is required. The pre-accession policy thus became a strong tool 
to govern accession and with the incentive of future membership a powerful 
 
22 L.W. Gormley, ‘Opening Speech by L.W. Gormely’, in A.F. Kellermann, J. W. de Zwaan, J. Czuczai 
(eds.), EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (T.M.C Asser Institute 
2001) xxix.   
23 See Chapter 3 and 4.  
24 See chapter 5. 
25 Copenhagen European Council (n 15). 
26 European Council in Essen, Presidency Conclusions (9-10 December 1994) Bulletin EU 12-1994, 
Annex IV: Report from the Council to the Essen European Council on a strategy to prepare for the 
accession of the associated CCEE, 20. 
27 R. Janse, ‘Is the European Commission a credible guardian of the values? A revisionist account of 
the Copenhagen political criteria during the Big Bang Enlargement’ (2019) 17 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 43, 47. 
  
 
179 
framework to influence candidate countries to make the necessary 
transformations.  
Moreover, a stricter approach was adopted in relation to the 
implementation of the acquis during this fifth enlargement round, which is 
divided into so-called chapters in the pre-accession policy. Previously, the 
EU had allowed states to accede whilst they had not fully adopted the acquis 
yet and offered them transitional periods.28 The CEE countries, however, 
were required to implement the acquis fully before they could accede.29 
Furthermore, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 introduced another new 
instrument to influence candidate countries to comply with the Copenhagen 
criteria, namely the Accession Partnership which the 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council endorsed soon after30 and which was established by the 
adoption of Regulation 622/98.31 The Accession Partnerships concluded with 
each candidate country set out the principles, the short-term priorities and 
medium term objectives in relation to the adoption of the EU acquis. In 
addition, it linked the pre-accession financial assistance available to 
candidate countries with the progress they made in fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria.32 This made the Accession Partnerships a strong instrument to 
enforce the accession criteria.33 Thus, with the launch of the Copenhagen 
criteria and the developments that followed, the pre-accession policy and the 
various instruments introduced to monitor and guide the candidate countries 
provided the Union with the necessary tools to become a forceful gatekeeper 
and strongly enforce the pre-accession conditionality.  
Apart from the Copenhagen Criteria and the related Copenhagen 
instruments and documents discussed above, the pre-accession framework 
 
28 Commission Communication to the Council, Enlargement of the Community – General 
consideration, Bulletin EC Supplement 2/78, 14.  
29 European Commission, Agenda 2000 – For a stronger and wider Union, COM (1997) 2000 final 
Agenda, 44-45  
30 See, ibid, 52-53 and European Council in Luxembourg, Presidency Conclusions (12 -13 December 
1997) 3-4.   
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the 
framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession 
Partnerships [1998] OJ L 85/1. 
32 Ibid, Article 4.  
33 E. Lannon, K.M. Inglis and T. Haenebalcke, ‘The Many Faces of EU Conditionality in Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean Relations’, in M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (eds.), The EU’s Enlargement and 
Mediterranean Strategies. A Comparative Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 97, 114-115.  
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of the CEE countries also consisted of the Europe Agreements.34 The 
Europe Agreements were introduced shortly after the fall of the communist 
regimes and were bilateral agreements between the CEE countries and the 
EU. Whilst they established an association between both sides, they were 
initially not concluded with the idea of being incorporated as legal 
instruments into the pre-accession framework, but more as an alternative to 
accession. However, over time they obtained a more important role.35 Having 
said that, for the purposes of this chapter and in light of EU criminal matters 
their significance is minimal. The first Europe Agreements were signed 
before the Copenhagen criteria in 1991 and the others, which adopted 
largely the same structure, between 1993 and 1996. At that time EU criminal 
law was still in its infancy and it is therefore unsurprising that the Europe 
Agreements only contain a very small number of provisions relating to EU 
criminal matters which are rather general in nature.36    
In relation to the Accession Partnerships and the third Copenhagen 
criteria, including the related documents and instruments, JHA matters and 
more specifically, EU criminal law matters had a more prominent place. At 
the time, Chapter 24 on ‘Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs’ 
addressed these matters during the accession negotiations. The Commission 
closely monitored the progress made by the candidate countries in this field. 
For example, the Commission’s report on the progress made by Latvia in 
1998, recognised the efforts made to combat corruption. Latvia had adopted 
several new laws since the Commission’s opinion in 199737 to tackle these 
issues and had established a specific body for the prevention of corruption. 
However, the Commission also stated that corruption remained an important 
problem in Latvia and continued efforts were required.38 Further 
 
34 See, European Council in Corfu, Presidency Conclusions, (24-25 June 1994) Bulletin EU 6/1994, 
point I.13.   
35 On this point see, K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-accession 
Reorientation’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1173.  
36 For example, the Europe Agreement of 16 December 1991 establishing an association between 
the European Communities and their member States and the Republic of Poland, addressed money 
laundering in Article 85 and drug related matters were dealt with under Article 94.  
37 European Commission, Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM (1997) 2005 final.   
38 European Commission, Regular Report on Latvia’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (1998) 704 
final, 9.  
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improvements were also required concerning the status and quality of the 
police force.39 Organised crime was also highlighted as a significant problem 
and whilst the Commission commended the recent institutional and legal 
changes made by Latvia40 it also specifically held that it ‘remains to be seen 
how this will translate into operational arms’.41 This shows that legal 
amendments and setting up new bodies to tackle specific JHA matters is not 
enough, there needs to be real evidence that the candidate countries comply 
with the conditionality in practice. From the perspective of the mutual 
recognition framework, this approach supports the building of trust and thus 
the successful application of mutual recognition in criminal matters. 
 When it comes to the Copenhagen political criteria no specific chapter 
in the negotiations was dedicated to them. According to the Commission this 
was because the ‘Copenhagen criteria are broad in political […] terms and go 
beyond the acquis communautaire’, as such it was an ‘unprecedented task’42 
and in relation to the acquis the Commission needed to develop their 
meaning from scratch. Indeed, the political criteria were insufficiently precise 
and it was up to the Commission to clarify their meaning, adopt clear and 
well-defined standards that were able to measure progress in the candidate 
countries and applicable to their different legal and political systems. In the 
academic literature the verdict is largely that the Commission did not 
succeed in this task during the CEE enlargement.43 The Commission in its 
opinions and regular reports created a structure regarding the assessment of 
the political criteria.44 It divided the political criteria into two sub-categories. 
Democracy and the rule of law were combined as well as human rights and 
minority protection. The former was further divided into the sub-categories: 
 
39 Ibid, 39. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Commission Agenda 2000 (n 29) 39. 
43 See generally, Kochenov (n 7) See also, W. Sadurski, ‘Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact 
of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe’ 
(2004) 4 European Law Journal 371, 377-378; T. Marktler, ‘The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria’ 
(2006) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 343, 349-353. 
44 See, for example, European Commission, Opinion on Hungary’s Application for Membership of the 
European Union, COM (1997) 2001 final; European Commission, Opinion on Poland’s Application for 
Membership of the European Union, COM (1997) 2002 final. 
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parliament, the executive, and the judiciary which were being assessed in 
relation to their structure and functioning separately. Anti-corruption 
measures were added to this sub-category as the final element. The 
combination of human rights and minority protection was subdivided into 3 
parts: civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and 
minority rights and the protection of minorities. However, the structure of the 
political criteria that the Commission had adopted did not include explicit 
standards that could be used to evaluate the performance of the candidate 
countries, it simply outlined the areas falling within the political criteria.45  
Moreover, the Commission has been criticised for its general 
statements.46 For example, the Commission has stated that: ‘the candidate 
countries have continued to strengthen the functioning of their democratic 
systems of government’ and ‘further efforts were made to ensure the 
independence, transparency, accountability and effectiveness of the public 
administration’.47 Other criticism relates to the difficulty of interpreting the 
Commission’s statements as it is not always clear whether the Commission 
perceives a development as positive or not in the candidate countries’ 
progress reports.48 The Commission’s poor application and lack of 
consistency and objectivity in relation to its assessment of the political criteria 
have also been a matter of concern.49 For scholars it was ‘difficult to 
understand why on certain sensitive political issues the Commission seems 
unable to perform its reporting function in a truly objective and independent 
manner’.50 Thus, the lack of clearly defined criteria and measurable 
standards, as well as the issues surrounding the Commission’s application of 
the political criteria undermines the legitimacy of the pre-accession policy.  
 
45 Janse (n 27) 54. 
46 Marktler (n 43) 350; E. Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in 
M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2003) 105, 126. 
47 European Commission, Making a success of enlargement. Strategy Paper and Report of the 
European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries, COM 
(2001)700 final, 12.  
48 D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen façade. The meaning and structure of the Copenhagen 
political criterion of democracy and the rule of law’ (2004) 10 European Integration Online Papers 1, 
15.  
49 Kochenov (n 7) 311.  
50 M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-Accession’, in M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 9, 34.  
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However, notwithstanding the many shortcomings of the Commission 
in the pre-accession policy regarding the political criteria, in light of the EU’s 
rule of law crises and the serious attacks on the values by certain CEE 
countries, it is important to point out that the Commission did formulate key 
aspects in relation to these criteria which are currently heavily undermined by 
Hungary’s and Poland’s illiberal regimes and strongly condemned those 
practices.51 For example, from the beginning the Commission specifically 
stated that the rule of law requires that the judiciary is independent and 
impartial.52 According to the Commission this includes, among other things, 
the proper training of judges and prosecutors, providing good working 
conditions, the selection process for the appointment of judges needs to be 
transparent, the transfer of judges cannot involve the government, generally 
judges cannot be appointed for a fixed time limit, and bodies that are 
responsible for the appointment of judges and the disciplinary regimes need 
to be completely independent from the government.53 In relation to the 
functioning of the executive, the Commission made it clear that the executive 
needs to be aware of the boundaries of its powers and is required to ‘fully 
respect the role and responsibilities of the other institutions’.54 Furthermore, 
the Commission has expressed the importance of media independence and 
freedom of expression numerous times.55 It requires, among other things, 
that there is an equal presence in the media of government parties during the 
election campaign,56 a supervisory body of the public service media that is 
 
51 See Chapter 4. 
52 Commission Agenda 2000 (n 29) 40.  
53 See for example, European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, 
COM(2002) 700 final, 24-26; European Commission, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards 
Accession, SEC (2001) 1753, 20-21. 
54 Commission Agenda 2000 (n 29) Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the 
European Union, 16. 
55 European Commission, Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession, SEC (2001) 
1748, 20; European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, COM 
(1999) 501 final, 14; Commission Report Romania (n 53) 32. 
56 Commission Report Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (2002) 700 final, 29 
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independent of the government,57 and non-interference by the government of 
programme content and the general management of the media.58 
When the Accession Treaty was signed in April 2003,59 the CEE 
countries, including Poland and Hungary, were largely complying with the 
political criteria. Although, further changes in these areas were still being 
made, the countries had no significant rule of law problems.60 After the 
successful ratification of the Accession Treaty, the countries joined the EU on 
1 May 2004. In relation to JHA matters, the Act of Conditions of Accession61 
included a new feature. Article 39 provided for a JHA safeguard clause under 
which the EU could suspend measures for a period of up to three years after 
the CEE countries acceded to the Union, including mutual recognition 
instruments in the area of criminal law under Title VI of the EU Treaty, if there 
were serious shortcomings in the transposition, state of implementation or 
application of these instruments by the new Member States. This created an 
anomalous situation as there were no measures available to the EU to 
enforce compliance with the mutual recognition instruments in criminal law 
matters in relation to the old Member States up until the 1 December 2014 
when the transitional period ended.62 In practical terms this meant that the 
EU could have triggered the safeguard clause when the Polish and Cypriot 
 
57 Commission Report Hungary (n 55) 72. 
58 European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (99) 501 
final, 14; European Commission, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession, COM 
(2002) 700 final, 33. 
59 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian 
Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, 
the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic, concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union [2003] OJ L 236/17. 
60 A. Łazowski, EU Criminal Law and EU enlargement, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. 
Konstadinides (eds.) Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016), 512. 
61 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the 
adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded [2003] OJ L 236/33. 
62 See Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions [2008] OJ C 115/322, Article 10. Discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
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Constitutional Courts ruled against the national implementing act concerning 
the FD EAW, but had no enforcement mechanism against Germany where 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht had also objected against the national 
implementing act.63 This is thus a situation where the EU created double 
standards in relation to old and new Member States. 
 
6.3 Post-accession conditionality for Romania and Bulgaria   
 
The fifth enlargement was completed on 1 January 2007 when Bulgaria and 
Romania became Member States of the EU. Although their accession was 
‘part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process’64 it involved 
the introduction of some unprecedented features. An extra safeguard clause 
was incorporated in the Accession Treaty, which provided the EU with the 
possibility to postpone the accession of Bulgaria and Romania by one year. 
More importantly, at least for the purposes of this chapter, it marked the 
extension of the EU’s conditionality machinery by introducing the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) under which the EU 
continued the monitoring after the countries’ accession to the Union in 
relation to specific areas where further progress needed to be made.  
This instrument thus provided the EU with a new type of influence to address 
issues in specific areas where further transformation was required, namely 
that of post-accession conditionality. Although, at the time, the introduction of 
the CVM might be understandable, it is safe to say that it has been a largely 
ineffective instrument. Moreover, as will be discussed below, in recent years 
it has developed into an instrument that contributed, albeit indirectly, to the 
decline of respect for the values in Bulgaria by ignoring clear signs of rule of 
law issues. The Commission’s positive reports on Bulgaria, which do not 
represent a true picture of the actual events and ‘progress’ in relation to the 
values contrast sharply with the Commission’s heavy criticism regarding 
Romania, Hungary and Poland. This demonstrates the Commission’s double 
standards in the safeguarding of the EU’s foundational values and if this 
 
63 Discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
64 European Council in Thessaloniki, Presidency Conclusions (19-20 June 2003) SN 200/03, para 37.  
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hypocrisy continues under the von der Leyen Commission it will actually 
further undermine the very notion of the Union founded on values.  
 When the successful conclusion of the accession negotiations with the 
ten countries that joined in 2004 was formally announced in December 2002, 
Bulgaria and Romania did not yet comply with the membership criteria. 
Several chapters remained open, including chapter 24 on justice and home 
affairs matters where both countries were facing challenges in particular and 
further progress was required to align the areas in this field with the EU.65 
The further monitoring and guiding66 of these countries continued within the 
same parameters of the pre-accession framework that was used for the other 
CEE countries. Whilst Romania and Bulgaria made some progress in the 
years that followed, doubts remained whether they would satisfy all the 
criteria before the objective that was set during the 2002 Copenhagen 
European Council of them becoming members of the EU in 2007.67 This 
expectation, as already briefly mentioned, led to the introduction of some 
novelties that their accession was subject to. Bulgaria and Romania needed 
to accept a new type of safeguard clause which allowed for a one-year delay 
of their accession under Article 39 of the Protocol concerning the conditions 
and arrangements for admission of both countries.68 Similar to the CEE 
countries that joined in 2004, their accession was also subject to a safeguard 
clause in the area of justice and home affairs which was available for up to 
three years after their accession.69  
The Accession Treaty was signed in April 200570 and although the 
inclusion of the postponement clause did not lead to the speeding up of 
 
65 See Commission Report Romania (n 53) 108-115 and Commission Report Bulgaria (n 53) 107-112. 
66 The European Commission developed a specific roadmap for both countries that indicated the 
main steps that both countries needed to take. See, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2002) 624 final.  
67 European Council in Copenhagen, Presidency Conclusions (12-13 December 2002) 15917/02, para 
14. 
68 Protocol Concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the republic of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the European Union [2005] OJ L 157/29. 
69 Ibid, Article 38. In addition, Article 36 provided for an economic safeguard clause and Article 37 for 
an internal market safeguard clause.  
70 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, 
the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
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making progress in the areas highlighted by the Commission and was clearly 
ineffective as a preventive sanction, the clause was never activated. The 
Commission in its 2006 Communication covering the state of preparedness 
of both countries, held that a ‘considerable degree of alignment’ with the 
criteria was reached by both countries.71 Yet, there were still areas of serious 
concern, including the judiciary, the fight against fraud and corruption.72 
Instead of activating the postponement clause, which could jeopardise the 
progress already made by Bulgaria and Romania and slow down the speed 
of reform further due to the growing level of frustration of these countries with 
the pre-accession process,73 the Commission relied on the other safeguard 
clauses and the CVM as a remedial mechanism post-accession and 
recommended against the triggering of the postponement clause.74 This 
decision has been described as ‘a reflection of wider security imperatives 
which led the EU to allow the accession of ‘imperfect’ new Member States 
instead of risking the unpredictable costs of their exclusion’.75 Although, this 
decision at the time might have been made with the best intentions, after 
accession the EU loses its most significant influence to push for reform, 
namely the incentive of future membership. The fact that the CVM is still in 
place to date for both countries demonstrates this. 
The CVM established by the Commission for Bulgaria focused on 
addressing specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform, the fight 
against corruption and organised crime.76 Romania’s CVM covered the same 
 
Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of 
the European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, concerning the accession of the 
Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union [2005] OJ L 157/11. 
71 Communication from the Commission, Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU 
membership of Bulgaria and Romania COM(2006) 214 final, 4 and 7. 
72 Ibid, 5-6 and 9. 
73 F. Trauner, ‘Post-accession compliance with EU Law in Bulgaria and Romania: a comparative 
perspective’ (2009) 13 European Integration Online Papers 1, 6.  
74 Commission Monitoring report (n 71). 
75 D. Papadimitriou, and E. Gateva, ‘Between Enlargement-led Europeanisation and Balkan 
Exceptionalism: an appraisal of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry into the European Union’ (2009) 25 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24197/1/GreeSE_No25.pdf [last accessed: 17 
March 2017] 22. 
76 Commission Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for 
cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of 
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first two areas but not that of organised crime.77 The remaining issues 
identified by the Commission which required further reforms are essential for 
having mutual trust in those countries’ criminal justice systems. Therefore, in 
the absence of swift action that effectively addresses these issues the 
successful application of mutual recognition instruments in EU criminal 
matters is undermined. This is also apparent in the preamble of the 
Commission’s decision establishing the CVM in which it states that, the area 
of freedom, security and justice is ‘based on the mutual confidence that the 
administrative and judicial decisions and practices of all Member States fully 
respect the rule of law. This implies for all Member States the existence of an 
impartial, independent and effective judicial and administrative system 
properly equipped, inter alia, to fight corruption’.78 Unfortunately, but at the 
same time unsurprisingly, the first progress reports of June 2007 concluded 
that ‘progress achieved in the judicial treatment of high-level corruption cases 
is still insufficient’ in Bulgaria and Romania.79 By 2008 it became clear that 
 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime [2006] OJ L 354/58. The 
Commission set 6 benchmarks that needed to be addressed by Bulgaria: Adopt constitutional 
amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial 
system; Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a 
new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of these new laws 
and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase; Continue the 
reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability and efficiency. Evaluate 
the impact of this reform and publish the results annually; Conduct and report on professional, non-
partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption; Report on internal inspections of 
public institutions and on the publication of assets of high-level officials; Take further measures to 
prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and within local government; Implement a 
strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money laundering as well as on the 
systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, 
indictments and convictions in these areas. 
77 Commission Decision 2006/928/EC (of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for 
cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption [2006] L 354/56. The specific benchmark set for 
Romania were as follows: Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notably by 
enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor 
the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes; Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency 
with responsibilities for verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for 
issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken; Building on 
progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan investigations into 
allegations of high-level corruption; Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, 
in particular within the local government. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Bulgaria 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2007) 377 final, 13 and Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania under the Co-
operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2007) 378 final, 15.  
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that the required level of reforms to be met was going to be a long and 
painful process. The Commission in its reports that year mentioned that 
‘progress has been slower and more limited than expected’ and that ‘the 
continuation of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism will be needed 
for some time.80 
 In 2009 the Commission’s progress reports were equally disappointing 
and held that ‘continuous pressure for delivery is needed’.81 At this point, one 
might have thought that the JHA safeguard clause under Article 38 of the 
Accession Treaty would have been triggered. Especially, since the JHA 
safeguard clause was only available up until the end of 2009, three years 
after accession, but once activated the measures adopted would stay in 
place as long as the shortcomings persisted. Moreover, the CVM specifically 
mentions that if Bulgaria and Romania:  
 
‘fail to address the benchmarks adequately, the Commission may apply 
safeguard measures based on Articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession, 
including the suspension of Member States' obligation to recognise and 
execute, under the conditions laid down in Community law, Bulgarian [and 
Romanian] judgments and judicial decisions, such as European arrest 
warrants’.82 
 
Thus, whilst the preventative function of the JHA safeguard clause was 
obviously ineffective, the clause as a remedial sanction could have 
suspended the application of mutual recognition which under the 
circumstances would certainly have been justifiable, if not expected. Yet, this 
was depending on the actual triggering by the Commission who had made it 
clear that it considered ‘support to be more effective than sanctions and will 
not invoke the safeguard provisions set out in the Accession Treaty’.83 Even 
 
80 See respectively, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2008) 495 final, 2 and 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2008) 494 final, 7.  
81 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Bulgaria 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2009) 402 final, 8. 
82 Commission Decision 2006/929/EC (n 76) and Commission Decision 2006/928/EC (n 77) recitals 7. 
83 Commission Report Bulgaria (n 80) 6. 
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after a motivated request was sent to the Commission as outlined in Article 
38 of the Accession Treaty, by Frans Timmermans, who at the time was the 
Dutch EU Affairs Minister,84 the Commission never activated the JHA 
safeguard clause. An empirical study conducted by Gateva which included 
the interviewing of EU officials provides two main arguments against the 
triggering of the JHA safeguard clause. First, it would have suspended 
cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs and in particular the 
application of the European Arrest Warrant.85 Secondly, ‘the imposition of 
any of the safeguard provisions would have damaged severely not only the 
reputation of Bulgaria and/or Romania but also the reputation of the 
Commission. Furthermore, it would have discredited the EU’s decision to let 
Bulgaria and Romania become members in 2007 and would have weakened 
the otherwise declining support for the ongoing enlargement with Turkey and 
the Western Balkans’.86 While these arguments certainly have merit, both 
Romania and Bulgaria still had serious problems with high-levels of 
corruption and their judicial systems which are key matters for the 
justification of the application of the EAW. Thus, the non-activation of the 
postponement clause and the JHA safeguard clause demonstrate that 
political arguments at the time were prevailing the actual safeguarding of the 
EU’s values and the protection of the mutual recognition framework.  
 Without rewards available in the pre-accession policy, such as the 
opening and closing of chapters and the perspective of membership, the 
EU’s influence to enforce progress is minimal.87 As a result, years went by 
with critical reports of the Commission under the CVM indicating that both 
Romania and in particular Bulgaria, needed to make further progress in 
areas that are so crucial for the application of the principle of mutual 
 
84 See Euractiv, the Netherlands gets tough on Bulgaria, Romania, 18 June 2009, available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/netherlands-gets-tough-on-bulgaria-
romania/802136/, last accessed 12 April 2017. 
85 Eli Gateva, ‘Post-Accession Conditionality. Support Instrument for Continuous Pressure?’ (2010) 
working paper KFG, Freie Universität, available at: http://www.transformeurope.eu, last accessed 16 
April 2018, 18. 
86 Ibid, 19. 
87 For a detailed study regarding the incentive structure for Bulgaria and Romania, see E. Gateva, 
European Union Enlargement Conditionality (Palgrave Macmillan 2015), in particular chapter 3, 80-
123.  
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recognition in criminal matters.88 Interestingly, the January 2016 report on 
Romania sent a largely positive message. The Commission commended 
Romania on its track record in addressing high-level corruption and ‘in 
building up the credibility and professionalism of the judicial system’.89 Whilst 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption still required further reform ‘to 
ensure the irreversibility of progress’,90 the significant improvements made by 
Romania led to a statement by the President of the Commission Jean-
Claude Junker, that the CVM could be lifted for Romania.91 The Council 
made a similar suggestion when it stated that:  
 
‘Romania, by maintaining the current positive trends of reform and 
consolidation of progress and by internalizing the CVM objectives with 
national policies and strategies, is on its way to ensuring the necessary 
sustainability and irreversibility of reforms which would allow Romania to 
attain the objectives of the Mechanism.’92 
 
However, commenting on the fruitfulness of the CVM which had finally 
appeared after 9 years since Romania acceded to the EU, would be overly 
enthusiastic. A few years down the line and the Commission’s latest report 
shows a completely different picture.  
Indeed, in the October 2019 progress report, Romania is highly 
criticised for the backtracking of the progress that was made in previous 
years which was ‘a source of great concern’.93 The rise of serious rule of law 
issues was already noted in the November 2018 report which concluded that 
 
88 The reports in January 2015 clearly indicate that further reforms are required, especially in 
Bulgaria.  See, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress 
in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2015) 36 final and Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania under the Co-
operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2015) 35 final. 
89 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2016) 41 final, 3, 10 and 12. 
90 Ibid, 2. 
91 G. Gotev, ‘Juncker: Romania could see its monitoring lifted before Bulgaria’, Euractiv, 16 February 
2016, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/juncker-romania-can-
see-its-monitoring-lifted-before-bulgaria/, last accessed 26 January 2019.  
92 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism as adopted by the Council (General Affairs) on 15 March 2016, 7118/16, para 6. 
93 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2019) 499 final, 17. 
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developments in relation to the judicial independence and the fight against 
corruption had reversed and as a result the Commission made 12 additional 
recommendations, because the 8 recommendations set out in its report in 
2017 were no longer sufficient to lift the CVM.94 The changes made to the 
Justice laws, which were adopted very quickly and lacked proper 
consultation, were especially problematic and undermined the rule of law 
because they weakened the legal guarantees for judicial independence.95  
The concerns regarding Romania’s legislative amendments and the 
safeguarding of the rule of law were also confirmed by the European 
Parliament,96 the Venice Commission97 and the Council of Europe’s Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO).98 The seriousness of the situation led to 
a strong message from the Commission in a letter addressed to the 
Romanian authorities, in which it stated:  
‘The process undertaken for these key legislative changes is symptomatic of 
broader rule of law concerns about the principle of legality, which implies a 
transparent, accountable, democratic, stable and pluralistic process for 
enacting laws, legal certainty, the separation of powers and loyal 
cooperation between different powers of the state. 
 
94 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in Romania 
under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2018) 851 final, 17-18. 
95 The Commission highlighted several problematic provisions which were likely to undermine the 
independence of judges and prosecutors, namely: ‘the establishment of a special prosecution 
section for investigating offences committed by magistrates, new provisions on material liability of 
magistrates for their decisions, a new early retirement scheme, restrictions on the freedom of 
expression for magistrates and extended grounds for revoking members of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy’. The Concentration of power in the hands of the Minister of Justice was also raised as 
particularly problematic as well as the amendments to Romania’s Criminal Codes. See ibid, 4; 5-7 
and 8-10 respectively.  
96 See, European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in Romania 
(2018/2844(RSP)), P8_TA-PROV(2018)0446. 
97 See, Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 
Romania – Opinion on Amendments to Law No. 303/2004 on the Statute of judges and Prosecutors, 
Law No. 304.2004 on Judicial Organization, and Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Council for 
Magistracy, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 116th Plenary Session (Venice, 19-20 October 
2018) Opinion No. 924/2018, CDL-AD(2018)017 and Council of Europe, European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Romania – Opinion on Amendments to the Criminal 
Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 116th Plenary 
Session (Venice, 19-20 October 2018) Opinion No. 930/2018, CDL-AD(2018)021. 
98 Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Ad hoc Report on Romania (Rule 
34), adopted by GRECO at its 79th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 19-23 March 2018), Greco-
AdHocRep(2018)2. 
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In view of these major concerns, and if the necessary improvements are not 
made shortly, or if further negative steps are taken, such as promulgation of 
the latest amendments to the criminal codes, the Commission will trigger the 
Rule of Law Framework without delay.’ 99 
These recent events in Romania demonstrate the Member State’s departure 
from the required commitment to the values under Article 2 TEU and that it 
no longer fully shares the EU’s normative and constitutional identity upon 
which the mutual recognition framework is built. This undermines trust in 
Romania’s criminal justice system and the successful and justified 
application of mutual recognition instruments such as the EAW. It also 
confirms the ineffectiveness of the CVM to address remaining concerns and 
enhance trust post-accession. The Commission’s warning of triggering the 
Rule of Law Framework, which would temporarily replace the CVM, also 
shows that this post-accession instrument is not regarded as an effective 
mechanism to address rule of law issues and shortcomings in the criminal 
justice systems. However, there are also significant deficiencies with the 
Rule of Law Framework to effectively and swiftly address the non-adherence 
of the EU values.100 Moreover, the events in Romania highlight, yet again, 
how quickly adherence to the values can move from one side of the 
spectrum to the other and therefore, reiterates the need for more effective 
instruments to address the non-compliance with the values and assure their 
safeguarding.101                                                                                             
Unlike Romania’s latest progress report, the CVM report on Bulgaria, 
is very positive and full with praises.102 Whilst in relation to the progress 
made under the CVM in the past, Bulgaria had always been behind in 
 
99 European Commission, letter Frans Timmermans to Romanian authorities, 10 May 2019, avialble 
at: https://cdn.g4media.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Scrisoare-Timmermans-Rule-of-law-
Framework.pdf, last accessed 24 September 2019. 
100 Discussed in chapter 5.  
101 The swift decline of safeguarding the foundational values in Hungary and Poland is discussed in 
chapter 4. The lack of an effective enforcement machinery is addressed in chapter 5.  
102 See, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in 
Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2019) 498 final. 
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comparison to Romania,103 a strong change in tone clearly appeared in 
November 2018. In the previous year, the Commission had issued 17 key 
recommendations and if they were properly addressed by Bulgaria the CVM 
would be lifted.104 The 2018 report concluded that Bulgaria had ‘continued its 
efforts to implement the recommendations’ which led to the provisional 
closure of the benchmarks: judicial independence, legal framework and 
organised crime.105 This conclusion puts Bulgaria on track to meet the 
Commission’s President Jean-Claude Juncker’s objective when he started 
his term of office, to complete the CVM before the end of the Commission’s 
mandate.106  The Commission, in its October 2019 progress report stated 
that it considered ‘that the progress made by Bulgaria under the CVM is 
sufficient to meet Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time of its accession 
to the EU’ and that it will take into account the Council’s and European 
Parliament’s observation before making a final decision’.107 
However, in reality the CVM reports are not a correct representation of 
the actual events in Bulgaria where the rule of law is very much under attack 
and judicial independence and corruption are still serious problems. The 
latter is clearly apparent in the Transparency International’s 2018 index, 
where Bulgaria, in comparison with all the other EU Member States, is listed 
as the country with the highest level of corruption.108 A prominent example of 
this trend, is the so-called Yaneva Gate from 2015, which involved the 
 
103 E. Gateva, ‘On different tracks: Bulgaria and Romania under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism’, LSEE blog, 2 March 2016, available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2016/03/02/on-
different-tracks-bulgaria-and-romania-under-the-cooperation-and-verification-mechanism/, last 
accessed 15 July 2018. 
104 See, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on progress in 
Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2018) 850 final, 1. For the 
November 2017 report see, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism COM(2017) 750 
final.  
105 Ibid, Commission Report Bulgaria, 11. 
106 See, European Commission, Press Release, European Commission reports on progress in Bulgaria 
under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (Strasbourg, 13 November 2018) IP/18/6364. 
107 Commission Report Bulgaria (n 102) 13. 
108 See, Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, available at: 
http://transparency.bg/en/transp_indexes/indexes/perceptions-index-corruption/corruption-
perception-index-2018/, last accessed 17 September 2019. Transparency International is a non-
governmental organisation dedicated to the fights against corruption.   
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leaking of recordings between high-level judges revealing that Bulgaria’s 
Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and the General Prosecutor, regularly try to 
influence judges and put pressure on the judiciary to steer court decisions in 
a way that serve their interests.109 As a result of the recordings, Bulgarian’s 
President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Lozan Panov, who is a strong 
defender of judicial independence and has publicly revealed that he is put 
under pressure and threatened numerous times, called for an independent 
investigation.110 However, the Bulgarian authorities avoided an investigation 
by stating that the recordings were manipulated.111 Although, the 
Commission’s technical working document that accompanies the CVM report 
refers to the Yaneva Gate scandal and recommended an independent 
investigation, it never responded to the fact that this did not happen nor did it 
acknowledge the disturbing allegations of the President of the Supreme 
Court of Cassation.112 In fact, the Commission has commended Bulgaria on 
its proposal for a new accountability mechanism for the Presidents of the 
Supreme Courts and General Prosecutor that has been heavily criticised for 
further threatening the judicial independence and targeting the outspoken 
Lozan Panov.113 
Moreover, other recent examples of Bulgaria’s non-adherence to the 
Union’s values include, a report from the United Nations Committee against 
 
109 See, B. Thavard, ‘Why do foreign investors leave Bulgaria as if it where the Titanic?’, Euractiv, 11 
February 2019, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/opinion/why-do-
foreign-investors-leave-bulgaria-as-if-it-were-the-titanic/, last accessed 3 September 2019 and R. 
Vassileva, ‘Sweet Like Sugar, Bitter Like a Lemon: Bulgaria’s CVM Report’, Verfassungsblog, 16 
November 2018, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/sweet-like-sugar-bitter-like-a-lemon-
bulgarias-cvm-report/, last accessed 27 August 2019. 
110 Ibid. See also, R. Vassileva, ‘The Disheartening Speech by the President of Bulgaria’s Supreme 
Court Which Nobody in Brussels Noticed’ Verfassungsblog, 11 July 2018, available at: 
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-disheartening-speech-by-the-president-of-bulgarias-supreme-court-
which-nobody-in-brussels-noticed/, last accessed 25 May 2019. 
111 Thavard (n 109) and Vassileva (n 109).   
112 Commission Staff Working Document, Bulgaria: Technical Report, SWD(2016) 15 final. See also, 
Vassileva (n 109).  
113 See, S. Stoychev, ‘This is how Bulgarian Judicial Independence Ends … Not with a Bang but with a 
Whimper’, Verfassungsblog, 3 June 2019, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/this-is-how-
bulgarian-judicial-independence-ends-not-with-a-bang-but-a-whimper/, last accessed 9 September 
2019 and R. Vassileva, ‘CVM Here, CVM There: The European Commission in Bulgaria’s Legal 
Wonderland’, Verfassungsblog, 16 June 2019, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/cvm-here-
cvm-there-the-european-commission-in-bulgarias-legal-wonderland/, last accessed 9 September 
2019. 
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Torture, which disclosed that a very large percentage of detained individuals 
are not given access to a lawyer from the start of the criminal proceedings 
against them and that some people have no legal representation throughout 
the proceedings.114 A report by the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights, in which Bulgaria is selected as a country where 
new and serious threats to the rule of law have occurred also indicates the 
worrying decline of the independence of the judiciary.115 In addition, the April 
2019 EU Justice Score Board, presented by the European Commissioner 
Vera Jourová, demonstrated that the perceived judicial independence by the 
Bulgarian public was one of the lowest amongst the EU Member States 
whilst the interference or pressure from government and politicians as a 
reason for the perceived lack of independence scored very high.116  
Thus, the Commission’s findings in the most recent CVM reports, are 
in stark contrast with the actual events in Bulgaria that heavily undermine the 
rule of law, question the lack of separation of powers and weaken the 
independence of the judiciary. Some referred to it as ‘a slap in the face of the 
rule of law’ and ‘a farewell gift [by Juncker’s Commission] rather than an 
objective evaluation’.117 Indeed, as the latter statement already suggests, 
political motives influenced the Commission’s misleading conclusions about 
Bulgaria’s regime and its disregard of the rising rule of law problems. This 
has everything to do with the fact that Bulgaria’s majority-government 
belongs to the European People’s Party (EEP), which is the same political 
affiliation as key members of the Juncker Commission, including the 
President himself and has a strong majority in the Commission. Thus, the 
 
114 United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Concluding observations against the sixth periodic report of Bulgaria, 15 December 
2017, (CAT/C/BGR/CO/6) 3, point 9(b). 
115 Council of Europe, report from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, New threats to 
the rule of law in Council of Europe member States: selected examples, 25 September 2017, Doc. 
14405, 10-12. 
116 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the 
2019 EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2019) 198 final, 48-50.  
117 Quoted in, R. Vasileva, ‘So Why Don’t we Just Call the Whole Rule of Law Thing Off, Then?’, 
Verfassungsblog, 24 October 2019, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/so-why-dont-we-just-
call-the-whole-rule-of-law-thing-off-then/, last accessed 2 November 2019.  
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Commission’s approach towards Bulgaria, shows that political alliances 
outweigh the protection of the EU values. Moreover, it confirms yet again, the 
ineffectiveness of the CVM as an instrument to enforce compliance with the 
political criteria and values post-accession. However, rather than the failure 
of the CVM to ensure progress in the areas highlighted by the Commission, 
in Bulgaria’s case the Commission plainly ignored and sugar-coated signs of 
the non-adherence to the values. It thereby contributed to the decline of the 
foundational values, in particular the rule of law and instead of strengthening 
the mutual recognition framework it weakened it. Furthermore, whilst the 
Commission’s unequal treatment of Hungary and Poland was already 
criticised in the previous chapter, the Commission’s actions and omission 
under the CVM in relation to Romania and Bulgaria is a clear example of 
double standards that the EU in the current values crises really cannot afford. 
Moreover, it also questions the credibility and to some extent the legitimacy 
of the EU to vigorously employ rule of law based pre-accession 
conditionality.  
6.4 An increasing role for fundamental rights and the rule of law in the 
pre-accession policy  
 
Compliance with the Union’s foundational values has become a key 
requirement in the pre-accession policy. Therefore, along with the growing 
importance of the development of the EU as an AFSJ, regional cooperation 
in the Western Balkans in the JHA field became a main priority in the pre-
accession policy. When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 
2007, the Western Balkans, a term used to designate the South Eastern 
Europe countries Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, are 
completely surrounded by EU Member States. Due to war legacies, political 
instability and a political climate in which organised crime, corruption, 
irregular migration and trafficking in human beings are common, the Western 
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Balkans developed into an area of concern for the EU.118 The instability of 
the region and uncertain transitions to democracy led to the development of 
a new and more ambitious strategy for the Western Balkans. To address the 
concerns the EU used the incentive of membership.   
 In May 1999, after a proposal by the Commission, the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP) was adopted,119 this constituted the new 
framework for EU negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The SAP 
aims particularly to support the countries of the Western Balkans to adopt 
and implement EU law by stabilising the countries and encouraging their 
swift transition, by promoting regional cooperation, all with the prospect of 
eventual membership of the EU. The SAP is based on an ever-closer 
partnership with the EU and offers improved trade concessions, economic 
and financial assistance, assistance for reconstructing, development and 
stabilisation, cooperation in justice and home affairs and most importantly, 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), a tailor made category of 
legally binding agreements between the EU and each country of the Western 
Balkans. At the Santa Maria da Feira Council in 2000, the European Council 
expressed the possibility of the Western Balkans countries joining the EU 
and confirmed the importance of JHA matters: 
 
The European Council confirms that its objective remains the fullest possible 
integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic 
mainstream of Europe through the Stabilisation and Association process, 
political dialogue, liberalisation of trade and cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU 
membership.120 
 
The Zagreb Summit, in November 2000, was essential in securing the 
agreement of the regional countries to a clear set of objectives and 
 
118 European Commission, Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, a policy priority for the 
European Union (2005) available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf, last accessed 23 March 2018.  
119 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Stabilisation and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe COM (1999) 235 final.   
120 European Council in Santa Maria da Feira, Presidency Conclusions (19-20 June 2000) point 67.  
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conditions.121 The Final Declaration Stated that ‘democracy and regional 
reconciliation and cooperation on the one hand, and the rapprochement of 
each of these countries with the European Union on the other, form the 
whole’.122 Furthermore, the SAP countries committed themselves to ‘close 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, in particular for the 
reinforcement of justice and the independence thereof, for combating 
organized crime, corruption, money laundering, illegal immigration, trafficking 
in human beings and all other forms of trafficking’.123  
At the EU Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003 it 
was reaffirmed that ‘rapprochement with the EU will go hand in hand with the 
development of regional cooperation’ and that the ‘SAP will remain the 
framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the 
way to their future accession’.124 Similar to the Accession Partnerships for 
the CEE countries, European Partnerships were launched for the SAP 
countries, to identify priorities for action in supporting the efforts of each 
specific country to move closer to the EU. The Thessaloniki Council 
conclusions also confirmed the growing importance of tackling key issues 
relevant for the AFSJ and the successful application of the principle of mutual 
recognition upon accession. It was held that:  
Organised crime and corruption are real obstacles to democratic stability, sound 
and accountable institutions, the rule of law, and economic development in the 
Western Balkans and a source of grave concern to the EU. Combating them must 
constitute a key priority for the governments of the region. Particular focus should 
be placed upon fighting all forms of trafficking, particularly of human beings, drugs 
and arms, as well as smuggling of goods. Although the SAP countries have made 
some progress, continued efforts at all levels will be crucial to advance further in 
fighting organised crime. Their commitment must be sustained through effective 
 
121 Milica Delevic, ‘Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans’, (2007) Institute for Security Studies 
European Union, Chaillot paper No. 104, available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/regional-
cooperation-western-balkans, last accessed 22 May 2017. 
122 Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000, Final Declaration, available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/Declang4.doc.html, last 
accessed 24 August 2019, para 2. 
123 European Council (n 120) para 3. 
124 For the text of the Thessaloniki Agenda, see Annex A to Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003, 
Press Release No. 10369/03 (Presse 166). 
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implementation of all instruments necessary in this combat, including improved 
administrative and judicial capacity.125 
Thus, with the incentive of future membership, the EU’s pre-accession policy 
is a very powerful tool to export the values upon which the Union is founded 
and build ground for mutual trust and mutual recognition in criminal law 
matters. This approach is also apparent in the Council’s 2005 external 
strategy concerning JHA matters where it was stated that ‘the prospect of 
enlargement is an effective way to align with EU standards in justice and 
home affairs in candidate countries and those with a European perspective, 
both through the adoption and implementation of the acquis and through 
improvements in operational contracts and cooperation’.126 
The SSA between the EU and Croatia was signed in October 2001 
and came into force on 1 February 2005.127 Strict conditionality played an 
important role during the negotiations of the SSA and the rule of law, in 
particular the independence of the judiciary and its effectiveness, as well as 
preventing and combating crime, were key elements in the field of JHA 
cooperation.128 Shortly after the SSA was signed, the Commission, as 
required under the  Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development 
and Stability (CARDS) programme,129 adopted a strategy paper for Croatia 
which outlined the EU’s financial assistance for the 2002-2006 period and 
 
125 Ibid. 
126 Council of the European Union, A strategy for the External Action of JHA: Global Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Brussels 15446/05, 6 December 2005.  
127 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part [2005] OJ L 26/3. Croatia 
formally applied for membership on 21 February 2003. The Commission issued a positive Opinion in 
April 2004. See, Communication from the Commission, Opinion on Croatia's Application for 
Membership of the European Union COM(2004)257 final. The Council confirmed Croatia as a 
candidate country in June 2004. See, Council of the European Union, Brussels Presidency Conclusions 
(17-18 June 2004) 10679/04, 7-8.  
128 Ibid, Article 75 and Article 80. For example, the former article stated that ‘in their cooperation in 
justice and home affairs the Parties will attach particular importance to the consolidation of the rule 
of law’.  
129Council Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2000] OJ L 306/1. 
This was replaced in July 2006 by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) covering the 
period of 2007-2013. See Commission Regulation (EC) 718/2007 establishing an instrument for pre-
accession assistance (IPA) [2007] OJ L 170/1. For the latest IPA II, covering the period of 2014-2020, 
see Regulation (EU) 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) [2014] OJ L 77/11.   
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focused on key objectives and priority fields based on the country’s 
assessment.130 The EU’s financial support mechanisms are of course a 
strong tool to enforce reforms in the areas identified and this is even further 
enhanced if it is linked to specific conditionality upon which the financial 
assistance is dependent. In relation to Croatia, JHA was high on the list of 
priority fields and specific conditionality for financial support was adopted for 
the prevention of corruption and the fight against organised crime as well as 
the reform of the judiciary.131  
The robust conditionality approach and importance of the political 
criteria during this enlargement, is also apparent by the framework adopted 
by the Council in 2005 for the pre-accession negotiations with Croatia.132 It 
specifically stated that ‘the Union expects Croatia to continue to fulfil the 
political criteria’ and to further improve the safeguarding of the values and to 
make more progress in relation to the reform of the judiciary and the fight 
against corruption.133 Remarkably, the negotiating framework allowed the EU 
to suspend the pre-accession negotiations in case of serious and persistent 
breaches of the foundational values.134 Although, in practice this mechanism 
was never used, it demonstrates the increased role of respect for the rule of 
law and human rights in the pre-accession policy and provided the EU with 
more influential tools to enforce compliance with the values which build 
ground for the application of mutual recognition instruments.  
 An important development in Croatia’s pre-accession negotiations in 
relation to the third Copenhagen criteria, which as discussed focuses on the 
effective implementation of the EU acquis, was the introduction of a new 
chapter entitled ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ which became chapter 23. 
The chapter on ‘justice, freedom and security’ was renumbered and became 
 
130 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper for Croatia 2002-2006, adopted on 18 December 
2001, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/croatia_strategy_paper_e
n.pdf, last accessed 9 September 2018.  
131 Ibid, 46-51.  
132 European Council, Negotiating Framework, 3 October 2005, available at: 
https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/croatia_ec_negotiation_framework_2005.pdf, last accessed 23 
November 2017.  
133 Ibid, para 12.  
134 Ibid.  
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chapter 24. Both chapters cover important rule of law issues and therefore 
play a key role in the building of trust in candidate countries’ criminal justice 
systems. Chapter 23 covers more general matters in the 4 main areas 
addressed under the chapter which are the judiciary, anti- corruption, 
fundamental rights and EU citizen rights and is thus closely connected to the 
political criteria. Chapter 24 is more directly linked to the ‘hard’ acquis of the 
EU and covers, inter alia, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police 
cooperation and the fights against organised crime.135  
 To influence Croatia in making progress in these areas the 
Commission used numerous benchmarks and monitored the developments 
closely. In order to start the negotiations in these chapters the Commission 
adopted opening benchmarks which were created on the basis of the 
screening process. The closing benchmarks for the chapters focused on 
whether the implementation of the EU acquis was adequate. A new 
requirement during the accession negotiations was that the apart from the 
satisfactory implementation of the acquis, Croatia also needed to 
demonstrate that the acquis was properly applied, and that present positive 
developments were ongoing over a period of time in order to assess the 
sustainability of the reforms that were made.136 In addition, the Commission 
relied greatly on sub-benchmarks within the opening and closing benchmarks 
which increased the number of actions required from Croatia and evidence to 
be presented to demonstrate their progress and compliance. In the context of 
chapter 23 which covers a broad range of issues the benchmarks were 
particularly demanding. Croatia needed to meet 3 opening benchmarks and 
10 closing benchmarks. This in combination with the fact that chapter 23 was 
one of the last chapters to be opened during the pre-accession negotiations 
made this a particularly challenging task for Croatia.  
Indeed, the chapter was opened on 30 June 2010 and in order for the 
chapter to be closed provisionally Croatia was required, among other things 
to:  
 
135 Łazowski (n 60) 520. 
136 M.F. Feketija and A. Łazowski ‘The Seventh EU Enlargement and Beyond: Pre-Accession Policy vis-
à-vis the Western Balkans Revisited’ (2014) 10 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1, 14. 
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update its Judicial Reform Strategy and Action Plan and ensure effective 
implementation; to strengthen the independence, accountability, impartiality and 
professionalism of the judiciary; to improve the efficiency of the judiciary; to 
improve the handling of domestic war crimes cases; to establish a track record 
of substantial results in the fight against organised crime and corruption at all 
levels including high level corruption, and in vulnerable sectors such as public 
procurement; to establish a track record of strengthened prevention measures in 
the fight against corruption and conflict of interest; to strengthen the protection of 
minorities, and to settle outstanding refugee return issues and to improve the 
protection of human rights.137 
 
 In light of the expectation to show concrete progress and compliance in 
practice which was simply not possible within the short time-framework,138 
the Accession Treaty included a clause which allowed for the continues 
monitoring in these important areas for the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition up until Croatia acceded to the EU on 1 July 2013.139 The 
Commission reported every six months on the progress made in the areas 
which required further efforts. Rule of law and fundamental rights related 
priority actions were the focus of the Commission’s monitoring and in total 
ten priority actions were identified in those areas.140 For example, the 
Commission in 2012 held that ‘increased efforts are needed to continue 
strengthening the rule of law, by improving administration and the judicial 
system, and to fight and prevent corruption effectively’.141 The final report 
prior to accession, in March 2013, stated that Croatia had completed the ten 
priority actions that were identified and that the Commission was confident 
that Croatia will be ready for membership on 1 July 2013.  
 The experience of Croatia’s pre-accession negotiations led to a new 
approach in the pre-accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
137 Council of the European Union, Accession Conference at Ministerial level closes negotiations with 
Croatia (30 June 2011) 12332/11, 2.  
138 Łazowski (n 60) 523.  
139 See, Article 36 of Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the 
adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [2012] OJ L 112/21. 
140 See Communication form the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state of preparedness for EU 
membership COM (2012) 601 
141 Ibid, 7.  
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Chapter 23 and 24 are now opened at an early stage of the negotiations 
which allows for more robust monitoring and a more detailed assessment of 
the sustainability of the transformations in the candidate countries. In relation 
to both candidate countries the Screening Reports for chapters 23 and 24 
contain numerous benchmarks. For example, Montenegro’s Screening 
Report for chapter 23 contains a long list of recommendations concerning the 
independence, impartiality and accountability of the judiciary; the fights 
against corruption, and safeguarding of fundamental rights.142 However, the 
generic language used in the Screening Reports for chapters 23 make it 
difficult for the candidate countries to know exactly what is required of them. 
It has therefore been argued that instead of embracing terms like ‘improving’, 
‘strengthening, and ‘ensure’, the EU needs to develop detailed performance 
indicators to improve the transparency of the pre-accession policy and its 
legitimacy.143 This is less problematic in the Screening Reports for chapters 
24 because progress requirements are more closely connected to the 
approximation and implementation of secondary legislation. Overall, the 
foundational values and matters concerning the AFSJ, have acquired a 
central place in the pre-accession policy. This in combination with the 
different features of conditionality employed by the EU build ground for the 
application of mutual recognition when candidate countries eventually join 
the EU.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
The pre-accession policy has developed significantly. This is the result of the 
increasing integration of the EU, but the shortcomings in previous 
enlargement rounds have also contributed to this. Generally, enlargement 
 
142 Screening Report Montenegro, Chapter 23 (12 November 2012), available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/montenegro/screening_reports/20130218_screening_report_mon
tenegro_ch23.pdf, last accessed 23 November 2018. See for the recommendations concerning the 
judiciary, corruption and fundamental rights, 21-22; 23-26 and 32-33 respectively. The Screening 
Report on Serbia in 2015 also contains numerous recommendations in these areas. See Screening 
Report Serbia, Chapter 23 (15 May 2015), available at: 
http://www.europa.rs/upload/2014/Screening-report-chapter-23-serbia.pdf, last accessed 23 
November 2018. 
143 Łazowski (n 60) 527. 
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has become a strong transformative policy144 and has been correctly 
described as a member state ‘creation exercise’.145 The values upon which 
the Union is founded and the mutual recognition framework built are 
nowadays at the centre of the pre-accession policy. Key issues in relation to 
the rule of law and fundamental rights are now covered in chapter 23 and 24 
of the pre-accession negotiations and candidate countries are required to 
demonstrate that the progress made in these fields is maintained, further 
developed and properly applied in practice. The experience with Croatia 
demonstrated that these chapters cover some of the most difficult areas and 
that establishing a track record in these fields takes time. The EU therefore 
adopted a new approach in relation to these chapters which are now opened 
at a much earlier stage of the pre-accession negotiations and one of the last 
chapters to be closed. The different aspects of conditionality used in the    
pre-accession policy provide the EU with some very strong tools to influence 
candidate countries to make changes and enforce the foundational values so 
that upon accession the countries are committed to the EU’s normative 
identity. As such the pre-accession policy builds ground for the application of 
mutual recognition.  
However, the chapter also demonstrated that Poland and Hungary 
largely complied with the rule of law aspects that are currently brutally 
violated. This demonstrates that adherence to the values by Member States 
can change very quickly, especially because of the EU’s insufficient 
enforcement tools to address this adequately. As such, in the long term the 
internal situation could undermine the achievements obtained in the pre-
accession policy through symbolic transmission of the non-adherence by 
existing Member States. Moreover, the prominent position of the values and 
strict conditionality used by the EU while the current Member States do not 
comply with the foundational values raises concerns regarding the EU’s 
double standards. This in combination with the vague language used in the 
Progress and Screening Reports and lack of performance indicators could 
 
144 C. Hillion, EU Enlargement, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 194; Janse (n 27) 47. 
145 Łazowski (n 60) 508. 
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undermine the credibility of the EU as an exporter of these values and 
question the legitimacy of the pre-accession policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis examined the principle of mutual recognition. It was introduced as 
the cornerstone to enhance judicial cooperation in EU criminal matters. From 
the perspective of effectiveness to fight terrorism, combat cross-border crime 
and the development of an AFSJ, it appears to be a reasonable choice and 
has certainly made EU integration in this field more effective. The EAW, for 
example, under which the surrender of an individual happens much more 
quickly, involves less formalities and contains fewer refusal grounds is 
undoubtedly an improvement from this perspective, in comparison to the 
traditional extradition system. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that 
the framework upon which this principle is built has become increasingly 
problematic. Indeed, considering the values crises that the EU is 
experiencing, this thesis has advanced the following arguments: first, it has 
argued that the normative approach adopted in the mutual recognition 
framework cannot be justified and undermines the legitimacy of the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition. From a constitutional point 
of view, protecting the effectiveness of the FDEAW by enforcing mutual 
recognition upon Member States to enhance judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters cannot prevail if the foundational values are seriously attacked and 
deliberately no longer safeguarded by Member States. Fundamental rights 
layed down in primary EU law should not be sacrificied to safeguard the 
effectiveness of secondary mutual recognition instruments. Moreover, 
upholding the application of mutual recognition in those circumstances would 
go directly against the framework upon which the principle of mutual 
recognition is built and justified by the EU.  
Secondly, the thesis argued that robust pre-accession conditionality 
builds ground for trust in the candidate countries’ criminal justice systems 
and thus upon accession supports the application of mutual recognition in 
this field. In line with the higher levels of EU integration and as a result of the 
expererience encountered by the EU in previous enlargemens rounds the 
pre-accession policy has been developed significantly. Fundamental rights 
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and the rule of law have obtained an important place in the enlargement 
policy and compliance with these values is heavily monitored by the 
Commission. Nevertheless, the profound violations of the foundational values 
by some Member States could undermine the trust that the newly acceded 
countries have in the existing Member States’ criminal justice systems. 
Moreover, the lack of effective enforcement instruments to address the non-
adherence to the values, which is necessary to legitimately justify the 
enforcement of the application of mutual recongtion and thereby protect the 
effectiveness of trust-based EU law to enhace judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, could undermine the achievements of the enlargement process in 
the long term through symbolic transmission of the non-compliance with the 
values.  
 The first stage of the thesis applied a cross-policy analysis between 
the internal market where the principle of mutual recognition to enhance 
integration was initially introduced and the AFSJ. This demonstrated three 
significant differences between the two policy fields: first, that the level of 
integration in the internal market was further advanced than the AFSJ when 
the principle of mutual recognition was introduced. Second, in the internal 
market the principle of mutual recognition was introduced by the Court of 
Justice, whereas the Council embraced it for the purposes of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. National courts, therefore, who need to apply 
it might be less supportive of the adoption of mutual recognition in the AFSJ. 
Most importantly, the functioning of the principle is fundamentally different in 
both policy areas. In contrast with the internal market where the application 
of mutual recognition supports and serves the individual’s freedom, in the 
AFSJ it limits the individual’s freedom and serves the state. As a result of the 
differences, the thesis argued that a much higher level of trust among 
Member States based on compliance with the foundational values is required 
for the successful application of the principle.1 Whilst effectiveness is at the 
heart of the introduction of mutual recognition in criminal matters and can be 
the driving force for the application of the principle in a situation that involves 
minor and infrequent violations of the values, the legitimacy of this is 
 
1 Chapter 1. 
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significantly undermined if fundamental rights and rule of law breaches by 
Member States are more serious.2  
 The thesis then focused more thoroughly on the principle of mutual 
trust as the second tier of the mutual recognition framework. It argued that 
trust in other Member States’ criminal justice systems based on their 
compliance with the foundational values as the first tier of the mutual 
recognition framework cannot be presumed. Enforcing trust to safeguard the 
effectiveness of mutual recogntition as a tool to enhance judicial cooperation 
when this is not sufficiently supported by adherence to the values 
undermines the legitimacy of the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition. It is therefore essential that Member States share the EU’s 
normative identity which is based on the Article 2 TEU values and are fully 
committed to their safeguarding.3 Especially, adherence to the fundamental 
rights and the rule of law values are of importance for judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. However, the analysis of the EAW and the related case law 
showed a lack of trust. Especially, the insufficient human rights guarantees in 
the body of the Framework Decision have challenged the trust that Member 
States have in this mutual recognition instrument. As a result the Court of 
Justice has the challenging task to balance the effectiveness of this mutual 
recognition instrument by adopting a strict trust presumption with the 
protection of fundamental rights. The thesis demonstrated that, inter alia, 
case law from the ECtHR, documents from the Council of Europe and the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture indicate serious and persistent 
fundamental rights violations by Member States. Therefore, it was argued 
that the lack of trust is justified and that the execution of an arrest warrant 
when fundamental rights are seriously at stake undermines the legitimacy of 
the mutual recognition framework and should not be enforced upon Member 
States to protect the effectiveness of this mutual recognition instrument.4  
 Moreover, examples of the rule of law violations by Poland and 
Hungary where illiberal regimes deliberately aim at dismantling this 
foundational value are of such severity that they gravely assault the EU’s 
 
2 Chapter 3 and 4.  
3 Chapter 2.  
4 Chapter 3.  
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normative and constitutional identity. Indeed, the constitutional and state 
capture by both governments has weakened the independence of the 
judiciary, the separation of powers and respect for fundamental rights which 
are all key elements of the rule of law and essential for the successful 
functioning and legitimacy of the mutual recognition framework as a basis for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.5 As a result, the foundation of the 
mutual recognition framework based on the compliance with the EU’s 
foundational values is seriously fractured and no longer supports the 
assumption of mutual trust among Member States to safeguard the 
effectiveness of trust-based EU law.  
 It follows that in order to justify the normative approach adopted in the 
mutual recognition framework and legitimately maintain the effectiveness of 
mutual recognition instruments, it is necessary for the EU to have effective 
enforcement instruments and a sufficiently high level of normative influence 
to address the profound non-adherence to the values and restore the footing 
of the framework. The thesis showed that the main tool provided for in the 
Treaties to address the rule of law crisis that the EU is experiencing, namely 
Article 7 TEU, is completely ineffective. Due to its political nature and high 
thresholds, especially the determination of a serious and clear breach under 
Article 7(2) TEU, which is a prerequisite for any sanctions under Article 7(3) 
TEU to be imposed, makes this an ineffective instrument because it requires 
a unanimous vote by the European Council. The thesis therefore argued that, 
in the current situation where more than one Member State aims at 
dismantling the rule of law and has turned its back to the EU’s normative and 
constitutional identity makes the possibility of Article 7 TEU having any 
meaningful contribution to restore the first tier of the mutual recognition 
framework impossible.6  
  Secondly, the thesis argued that prior to the Court’s recent judgments 
concerning the independence of the Polish Supreme Court and Ordinary 
Courts,7 infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU were also a rather 
 
5 Chapter 4.  
6 Chapter 5. 
7 Case C-619/18, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531; Case C-192/18, Commission v Poland, 
EU:C:2019:924. 
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ineffective influence tool to enforce compliance with the foundational values 
and thereby support the justification for the normative approach adopted in 
the mutual recognition framework. In the Polish Supreme Court judgement, 
which the Ordinary Court judgment closely resembles, the Court of Justice 
for the very first time held a Member State to be in breach of Article 19(1) 
TEU under which they have an obligation to ‘ensure effective legal protection 
in the fields covered by Union law’. The thesis argued, that although this is a 
welcome step, the normative influence gained is not sufficient to support the 
mutual recognition framework effectively and repair all the fractures in its 
foundation. The individual infringement procedures do not address all the 
rule of law violations, do not respond rapidly enough to these breaches which 
can have irreparable damage quickly and the ongoing rule of law attacks in 
the EU also indicate that the normative influence is limited.8 Hence, while 
infringement procedures provide the Court with the possibility to impose 
penalties for failure to transpose a somewhat meaningless and technical 
legislative Directive, at the same time, it does not provide the Court with the 
jurisdiction to do just the same for rule of law breaches upon which the Union 
is founded. Whilst this is certainly problematic from a broader constitutional 
point of view, in relation to the mutual recognition framework, more robust 
enforcement tools could actualy increase the EU’s normative influence and 
thereby legitimately protect the effectviness of mutual recongtion 
instruments.   
 From a pre-accession perspective the thesis showed that the 
combination of the increasing levels of integration in the EU, and the 
experience of previous enlargement rounds, led to a prominent role for the 
rule of law and fundamental rights in the enlargement policy by the 
introduction of chapter 23 on the judiciary and fundamental rights in the 
negotiating framework. This chapter, as well as the renumbered chapter 24 
cover key rule of law and fundamental rights issues relevant for the building 
of trust in the candidate countries’ criminal justice systems. The prominent 
place of both chapters in the pre-accession policy is also evident by the so-
called ‘new approach’ where both chapters are opened at an early stage of 
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the negotiations. The thesis argued that while there is a lack of ‘hard acquis’ 
especially in chapter 23, generally the robust pre-accession conditionality 
that is vigorously employed on candidate countries addresses the key issues 
that allow for trust in the prospective Member States’ criminal justice 
systems. The pre-accession policy thus provides the EU with some powerful 
tools to influence candidate countries and export the values so that upon 
accession they share the EU’s normative identity upon which the mutual 
recognition framework is built.9   
 Thus, while the essential values necessary for the application of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters to be justified are forcefully employed 
upon candidate countries the thesis has established that the existing Member 
States do not adhere to the values10 and that the EU lacks the necessary 
normative influence to address this adequately.11 The EU thus employs 
double standards in relation to the foundational values and this could 
undermine its credibility as an exporter of those values. Surely, from a 
candidate country’s perspective it is reasonable to presume that upon 
accession they can also trust the already existing Member States’ criminal 
justice systems, but unfortunately this presumption is unfounded. Moreover, 
the thesis has demonstrated that adherence to the foundational values can 
change quickly depending on the majority government of the Member States. 
The non-compliance that undermines the legitimacy of the mutual recognition 
is apparent in Poland, Hungary, and visible in Bulgaria and Romania.12 The 
values upon which the Union is founded and which lie at the heart of its 
normative identity are thus very vulnerable and the EU does not have the 
means to protect them sufficiently. Therefore, the thesis has argued that the 
results achieved in the pre-accession policy regarding the adherence of the 
foundational values which should support other Member States to have trust 
in the newly acceded fellow member, can easily be lost by the symbolic 
transmission of non-compliance with the EU values. This undermines not 
 
9 Chapter 6.  
10 Chapters 3 and 4.  
11 Chapter 5.  
12 Chapter 4 and 6. 
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only the justifiability for the mutual recognition framework in criminal matters 
but also more generally questions the suitability of EU trust-based law.  
 
Recommendations and pathways for future research 
 
In light of the ineffective enforcement machinery available to address the 
values crises adequately and support the foundation of the mutual 
recognition framework, it is recommended that recital 10 of the FDEAW is 
amended. It currently allows for the suspension of a EAW if a decision of a 
serious and persistent breach has been made under Article 7(2) TEU.13 This 
is as discussed, an unreasonably high threshold to protect the adherence to 
the values, especially in combination with the unlikelihood that the 
requirement of unanimity in the European Council changes as this requires a 
Treaty amendment which in turn also requires a unanimous vote. It is 
therefore suggested that the triggering of Article 7(1) should suffice to 
suspend the FDEAW. This approach is not only supported by the framework 
on which mutual recongtion in criminal matters is built by the EU it could also 
lead to more trust by the Member States in the mutual recognition instrument 
itself. In addition, it would ease the Court’s task of balancing the 
safeguarding of the effectiveness of the of EAW with the protection of 
fundamental rights and therefore reduce the criticism of the Court’s case law 
in those situations. It could also trigger a more forceful and effective debate 
within the Council which could result in reaching a decision on Article 7(1) 
quicker and contribute to its deterrent effect.  
Moreover, building on the most recent case law from the Court of 
Justice and the triggering of Article 7(1) as a basis for the automatic 
suspension of the FDEAW, this could be complemented with the possibility to 
suspend the excecution of an arrest warrant on the basis of an infringement 
procedure started by the Commission for an alleged breach of Article 19 
TEU. The triggering of Article 7(1) against Poland and in particularly against 
Hungary took a very long time whilst the serious attacks on the rule of law 
were abandantly clear. The response by the EU institutions demonstrates a 
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political division and lack of uniformity in the actions taken which is highly 
problematic in the current climate and contributes to the challenging of the 
mutual recognition framework. This approach could therefore promote trust 
and acceptance of the application of mutual recognition among Member 
States if the Commission has not initiated an infringement procedure on the 
legal basis of Article 19 TEU. This might also encourage the Court of Justice 
to move away from the second requirement of the Aranyosi test14 in 
preliminary rulings concerning the EAW and the possibility to suspend the 
surrender of the individual in question based on rule of law deficiencies in a 
Member State where the independence of the judiciary is no longer 
guaranteed.  
While the scope of the research was limited to judicial cooperation in 
EU criminal matters, with a particular focus on the EAW, the consequences 
of the values crises in the EU are far reaching. With the quick developments 
surrounding the rule of law crises, it provides for many interesting routes for 
future research. The need to enhance the EU’s normative power to address 
the rule of law violations is most urgent. In this context, it would be of value to 
analyse the Commission’s proposed Regulation15 that allows for financial 
sanctions if Member States violate the rule of law further.16 Guiding questions 
include: how should the concept of ‘generalised deficiencies’ be assessed 
and the rule of law conditionality be applied in order to ensure the 
objectiveness, transparency and legitimacy of such an instrument? What are 
the limitations of such an approach to effectively restore adherence to the 
rule of law?  
 It would equally be valuable to conduct empirical research to explore 
the consequences of the rule of law crisis in the pre-accession policy. This 
would require the interviewing of government officials of candidate countries 
in order to explore their view on how the rule of law is enforced in the pre-
accession policy in comparison to the lack of effective means to address the 
 
14 Criticised in chapter 2 and 3.  
15 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in 
the Member States, COM(2018) 324 final. 
16 Chapter 5.  
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crisis internally. How do they perceive trust-based law? What are the effects 
(if any) on their efforts to comply with the relevant acquis?  
A final consideration at the end of this project is that the ongoing and 
spreading rule of law crisis, not only challenges the principle of mutual trust, 
and EU criminal law integration, but strikes at the very heart of the European 
project and questions the Union’s existence. As such, the EU as it is known 
today and how it operates might be very different in the future.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
216 
Bibliography 
 
 
1) Legislation  
 
a) Primary Legislation  
 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/02. 
 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 115/1. 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ 
C 340/1. 
 
Treaty of Maastricht on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1. 
 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom 
of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the 
Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic 
of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, 
the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, 
the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the 
European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, concerning the 
accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union 
[2005] OJ L 157/11. 
 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, 
the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the 
European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the 
Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the accession of the 
  
 
217 
Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic to the European Union [2003] OJ L 236/17. 
 
Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and 
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded 
[2003] OJ L 236/33. 
 
The Convention of 27 September 1996 relating to extradition between 
Member States of the European Union, OJ C-313/11. 
 
The Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure 
between Member States of the European Union, OJ C-78/1. 
 
The Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 
14 June 1985, OJ L-239. 
 
 
b) Secondary Legislation  
 
Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial in criminal 
proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1.  
 
Directive (EU) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are 
suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 132/1. 
 
Directive (EU) 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant 
proceedings [2016] OJ L 297/1. 
 
Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal 
matters [2014] OJ L 130/1. 
 
Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal 
proceedings and in European Arrest Warrant Proceedings, and on the right 
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate 
with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty 
[2013] OJ L 294/1. 
  
 
218 
 
Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings 
[2012] OJ L 142/1. 
 
Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the 
organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the 
criminal record between Member States [2009] OJ L 93/23. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the 
application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle 
of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative 
to provisional detention [2009] OJ L 294/20. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation 
decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and 
alternative sanctions [2008] OJ L 337/102. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal 
matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ 
L 327/27. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents 
and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters [2008] OJ L 350/72. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking 
account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the 
course of new criminal proceedings [2008] OJ L 220/32. 
 
Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L 
204/23. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties [2005] 
OJ L 76/16. 
  
 
219 
 
Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution 
in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence [2003] OJ L 196/3. 
 
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the 
European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31.  
 
Council Directive 75/422/EEC on Waste [1995] OJ L 194/39. 
 
 
2) List of Cases and Opinions of Advocates General 
 
a) EU Case Law 
 
Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, EU:C:2019:531. 
 
Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, EU:C:2018:586. 
 
Case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:852. 
 
Case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2018:1021 
 
Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de 
Contas, EU:C:2018:117. 
 
Case C-490/16 A.S. v Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2017:585.  
 
Case C-646/16 Jafari, EU:C:2017:586. 
 
Case C-441/17 R, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2017:877.  
 
Case C-72/15 Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236.  
 
Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert 
Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198. 
 
Case C-63/15 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid and 
Justitie, EU:C:2016:409. 
  
 
220 
 
Case C-155/15 George Karim v Migrationsverket, EU:C:2016:410. 
 
Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan, 
EU:C:2015:474. 
 
Joined Cases C-317/13 and C-679/13 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:223. 
 
Case C-540/13 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:224. 
 
Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:237. 
 
Case C-196/13 Commission v Italy, EU:C:2014:2407.  
 
Case C-43/12 Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:298. 
 
Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicillia, EU:C:2014:216. 
 
Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, EU:C:2013:813. 
 
Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39. 
 
Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105.  
 
Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107 
 
Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. v Premier ministre, EU:C:2013:358. 
 
Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39. 
 
Case C-399/11 Melloni, EU:C:2013:107. 
 
Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F v Premier Minister, EU:C:2013:358. 
  
Case C-192/12 PPU Melvin West, EU:C:2012:404. 
 
Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2012:472. 
 
C-192/12 PPU West, ECLI:EU:C:2012:404. 
 
Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2012:687. 
 
Case C-34/11 Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2012:712.  
  
 
221 
 
Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, EU:C:2012:630. 
 
Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S and M.E. and Others v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2011:865. 
 
Case C-55/07 Kücükdeveci, EU:C:2010:21.  
 
Case C-160/08 Commission v Germany, EU:C:2010:230. 
 
Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello, EU:C:210:683,  
 
Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg, EU:C:2009:616. 
 
Case C-411/06 Commission v Parliament and Council, EU:C:2009:518. 
 
Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519. 
 
Case C-388/08 PPU Artur Leymann and Aleksi Pustovaroc, EU:C:2008:669. 
 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and AL Barakaat [2008] ECR 
I-6351. 
 
Case C-297/07 Bourquain [2008] ECR I-9425.  
 
Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, 
EU:C:2007:261. 
 
Case C-135/05 Commission v Italy, EU:C2007:250.   
 
Case C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333. 
 
Case C-467/04 Gasparini and others [2006] ECR I-9199 
 
Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] EU:C:2006:543. 
 
Case C-150/05 Van Straaten [2006] ECR I-9327. 
 
Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2005:250. 
 
Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2003:87. 
 
Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677. 
  
 
222 
 
Case 13/68 SpA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade [1986] ECR 453. 
 
Case C-294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
 
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
(Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
 
Case 43/75 Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne 
[1976] ECR 455. 
 
Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
 
Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631. 
 
Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5. 
 
Case 39/73 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer 
Westfalen-Lippe [1973] ECR 1039. 
 
Case 29/72 Marimex SpA v. Italian Finance Administration [1972] ECR 1309. 
 
Case 18/71 Eunomia v Italy [1971] ECR 811. 
 
Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193. 
 
Cases 2 and 3/69 Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. SA Ch. 
Brachfeld & Sons [1969] ECR 211. 
 
Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 423. 
 
Case 57/65 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarlouis [1966] ECR 205. 
 
Case 10/65 Deutschmann v. Germany [1965] ECR 469. 
 
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 
[1963] ECR 1. 
 
 
b) Opinions of Advocates General 
 
Opinion Advocate General Tanchev, Case C-192/18 Commission v Poland, 
EU:C:2019:529.  
  
 
223 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, Case C-619/18 Commission v 
Poland, EU:C:2019:325. 
 
Opinion Advocate General Bot, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:140. 
 
Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston, Case C-396/11 Radu, 
EU:C:2012:648. 
 
Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-127/07 Société Arcelor Atlantique 
et Lorraine v. Premier Minister, EU:C:2008:292.  
 
Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer, Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de 
Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad, EU:C:2006:552. 
 
 
c) ECHR Case Law 
 
Baka v Hungary, App No 20261/12. (ECtHR 23.06.2016). 
 
Varga and Others V Hungary, App nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 
34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13 (ECtHR 10.03.2015). 
 
Tarakhel v Switzerland, App no 29217/12 (ECtHR 4.11.2014). 
 
Torreggiani and Others v Italy, App no. 43517/09 (ECtHR 8.01.2013). 
 
Orchowski v Poland, App no 17885/04 (ECtHR 22.01.2010). 
 
Sulejmanovic v Italy, App no 22635/03 (ECtHR 16.07.2009). 
 
Savenkovas v Lithuania, App no 871/02 (ECtHR 18.11.2008). 
 
Peers v Greece, App no 28524/95 (ECtHR 19.04.2001). 
 
M.S.S v Belgium and Greece, App no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21.01.2001). 
 
Soering v The United Kingdom, App no 14038/88 (ECtHR 7.07.1989). 
 
 
d) National Case Law  
 
  
 
224 
Court of Appeal, Administrative Court, 21 January 2016, GS & Ors v Central 
District of Pest Hungary & Ors [2016] EWHC 64 (Admin). 
 
England and Wales High Court, Administrative Court, 11 March 2014, Badre 
v Italy [2014] EWHC 614 (Admin).  
 
High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 28 October 2009, Sandru v 
Government of Romania [2009] EWHC 2879 (Admin). 
 
 
3) Official Documents of the EU or Other International Organisations 
 
a) European Commission  
 
 
European Commission, Press Release, ‘Rule of Law: European Commission 
refers Poland to the Court of Justice to protect judges from political control’, 
10 October 2019, IP/19/6033. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, Further Strengthening the Rule of Law 
within the Union - State of play and possible next steps COM (2019) 163 
final. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Strengthening the rule of law 
within the Union – A blueprint for action COM(2019) 343 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the 2019 EU Justice 
Scoreboard, COM(2019) 198 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2019) 499 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2019) 498 final. 
 
  
 
225 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2018) 851 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2018) 850 final.  
 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, A new, modern 
Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers 
efficiently on its priorities post-2020, COM(2018) 98 final.  
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The 2018 EU Justice 
Scoreboard, COM(2018) 364 final.  
 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case 
of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, 
COM(2018) 324 final.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, European Commission reports on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(Strasbourg, 13 November 2018) IP/18/6364. 
 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 
2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to 
Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, OJ 
L 17/50. 
 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 
regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendations 
(EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, OJ L 228/19. 
 
European Commission Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with the Article 
7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland. 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a 
serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law COM (2017) 835 
final, 2017/0360 (NLE).  
 
  
 
226 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2017) 750 final.  
 
European Commission, Press Release, ‘Commission refers Hungary to the 
European Court of Justice of the EU over the Higher Education Law’ 
IP/17/5004, 7 December 2017.  
 
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 
2016/1374, OJ L 22/65. 
 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland, OJ L217/53. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2016) 41 final. 
 
Commission Staff Working Document, Bulgaria: Technical Report, 
SWD(2016) 15 final.  
 
European Commission, Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 
2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendation 
(EU) 2016/1374, OJ L 22/65. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2015) 35 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law COM (2014) 
158 final. 
 
Commission’s Communication, ‘Making progress on the European Union 
Agenda on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects or Accused Persons – 
Strengthening the Foundation of the European Area of Criminal Justice’ 
COM (2013) 820 final. 
 
Commission Recommendation on procedural safeguards for vulnerable 
persons suspected or accused in criminal proceedings [2013] OJ C 378/8  
 
  
 
227 
Commission Recommendation on the right to legal aid for suspects or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings [2013] OJ C 378/11. 
 
European Commission, Press Release, European Commission closes 
infringement procedure on forced retirement of Hungarian judges’, 
IP/13/1112, 20 November 2013.  
 
European Commission, State of the Union 2012 Address by José Manuel 
Barroso to the European Parliament, 12 September 2012, Speech/12/596, 
10. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States COM (2011) 175 final. 
 
European Commission, Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial 
area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in 
the field of detention COM (2011) 327 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission, ‘Delivering an area of freedom, 
security and justice for Europe’s citizens. Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme’, COM (2010) 171 final. 
 
European Commission Meeting of Experts, Implementation of the Council 
Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant- The 
Issue of Proportionality, 5 November 2009. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2009) 402 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2008) 495 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2008) 494 final.  
 
Report from the Commission on the implementation since 2005 of the 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
  
 
228 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States 
[SEC(2007)979] COM (2007) 407 final, 8. 175 final. 
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2007) 377 final.  
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism 
COM(2007) 378 final.  
 
Communication from the Commission, Monitoring report on the state of 
preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2006) 214 
final. 
 
Commission Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to 
address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption and organised crime [2006] OJ L 354/58.  
 
Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to 
address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption [2006] OJ L 354/56.  
 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The Hague 
Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The partnership for 
European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 
184 final. 
 
Green Paper from the Commission, ‘Procedural Safeguards for Suspects 
and Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union’, 
COM (2003) 75 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and 
promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final.  
 
European Commission, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards 
Accession, COM(2002) 700 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2002) 624 final.  
 
  
 
229 
European Commission, Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards 
Accession, SEC (2001) 1753. 
 
Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters [2001] OJ C 12/10. 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM 
(2000) 495 final. 
 
European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards 
Accession, COM (1999) 501 final. 
 
Communication from the Commission, ‘Towards an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’, COM (1998) 459 final. 
 
European Commission, Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union, COM (1997) 2002 final.  
 
European Commission, Opinion on Hungary’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union, COM (1997) 2001 final. 
 
European Commission, Agenda 2000 – For a stronger and wider Union, 
COM (1997) 2000 final. 
 
European Commission, Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union, COM (1997) 2005 final.   
 
European Commission, Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (1997) 2004 final. 
 
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Completing the 
Internal Market, COM (1985) 310 final.  
 
Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the application for accession to the 
European Communities by the Hellenic Republic [1979] OJ L 291/3.  
 
Commission Opinion of 31 May 1985 on the applications for accession to the 
European Communities by the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic [1985] OJ L 302/3. 
 
  
 
230 
Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of the 
judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 
(‘Cassis de Dijon’), OJ C 256/2. 
 
Commission Communication to the Council, Enlargement of the Community 
– General consideration, Bulletin EC Supplement 2/78. 
 
European Commission, Making a success of enlargement. Strategy Paper 
and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession 
by each of the candidate countries, COM (2001)700 final. 
 
European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards 
Accession, COM (99) 501 final. 
 
b) European Parliament  
 
European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in 
Romania (2018/2844(RSP)), P8_TA-PROV(2018)0446. 
 
European Parliament, Report on a proposal calling on the Council to 
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the 
existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on 
which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)) A8-0250/2018.  
 
European Parliament Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary 
(2017/2656(RSP)) P8_TA(2017)0216. 
 
European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling 
on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary 
of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)) 
P8_TA(2018)0340.  
 
European Parliament, Report with Recommendations to the Commission on 
the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights [2016] (2015/2254(INL)). 
 
European Parliament Resolution of 5 October 2017 on prison systems and 
conditions (2015/2062(INI)). 
 
European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the situation in Hungary 
(2015/2700(RSP)) P8_TA(2015)0227. 
 
  
 
231 
European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in 
Hungary (2015/2935(RSP)) P8_TA(2015)0461. 
 
European Parliament Press Release, Hungary: no systemic threat to 
democracy, says Commission, but concerns remain, 2 December 2015. 
 
European Parliament Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommendations 
to the Commission on the review of the European Arrest Warrant 
(2013/2109(INL)), P7_TA_(2014)0174. 
 
European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of 
fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (2012/2130(INI)) 
P7_TA(2013)0315, AB-AF. 
 
European Parliament, Rapporteur R. Tavares, Report on the situation of 
fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the 
European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)) A7-
0229/2013.  
 
European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in Hungary, 
P7_TA(2011)0094.  
 
European Parliament’s White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference Volume II: Summary of the positions of the Member States of the 
European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
 
 
c) Council of the European Union  
 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3667th 
Council meeting, General Affairs, 5039/19.  
 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3712th 
Council meeting General Affairs, 12111/19.  
 
Council of the European Union, Presidency conclusions after the annual rule 
of law dialogue on the topic “Media pluralism and the rule of law in the digital 
age”, 24 October 2017, No. 13609/17. 
 
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism as adopted by the Council (General Affairs) on 15 
March 2016, 7118/16. 
 
  
 
232 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3467th 
Council meeting, General Affairs, 24 May 2016, No. 9340/16, 4. 
 
Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3427th 
Council meeting, General Affairs, 17 and 18 November 2015, No. 14185/15. 
 
Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, Commission’s 
Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law: 
Compatibility with the Treaties, 27 May 2014, doc. 10296/14. 
 
Council of the European Union, Press Release, 3362nd Council meeting 
General Affairs, No. 16936/14, 16 December 2014.  
 
Council of the European Union, Follow-up to the Evaluations Reports on the 
Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations: Practical Application of the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Relevant Surrender Procedures between Member 
States, 18 November 2011, document 15815/1/11, 13. 
 
European Council ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting citizens’ [2010] OJ C 115/01. 
 
Council of the European Union, Revised version of the European Handbook 
on how to issue a European Arrest Warrant, 17 December 2010, document 
17195/1/10, 14. 
 
Council of the European Union, Follow-up to the recommendation in the final 
report on the fourth round of mutual evaluations, Council Conclusions, 28 
May 2010, document 8436/2/10. 
 
Council of the European Union Evaluation Report on the fourth round of 
mutual evaluation “The practical application of the European Arrest Warrant 
and corresponding surrender procedure between Member States” – report on 
Italy. 18 March 2009, 5832/2/09 REV 2 (5832/1/09 REV 1 Restreint UE 23 
February 2009). 
 
Resolution of the Council on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights 
of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ C 295/1. 
 
Council of the European Union, Evaluation Report on the Fourth Round of 
Mutual Evaluations “The Practical Application of the European Arrest 
Warrant and the Corresponding Surrender Procedures Between Member 
States” Report on Romania, document 8267/2/09, 20 May 2009. 
 
  
 
233 
Press No 12/08, A New Procedure in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: The Urgent Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 3 March 2008. 
 
Council of the European Union Evaluation Report on the fourth round of 
mutual evaluation “The practical application of the European Arrest Warrant 
and corresponding surrender procedure between Member States” – report on 
Greece. 3 December 2008, 13416/2/08 REV2 (13416/1/08 REV1 Restreint 
UE 28 September 2007), 38. 
 
European Council, ‘The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security 
and justice in the European Union’ [2005] OJ C 53/01. 
 
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in 
criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, COM (2004) 328 final.  
 
European Council in Thessaloniki, Presidency Conclusions (19-20 June 
2003) SN 200/03.  
 
European Council in Copenhagen, Presidency Conclusions (12-13 
December 2002) 15917/02. 
 
Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 
1999. 
 
Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 June 1998, 
doc SN 150/11/98 Rev 1. 
 
European Council in Essen, Presidency Conclusions (9-10 December 1994) 
Bulletin EU 12-1994, Annex IV: Report from the Council to the Essen 
European Council on a strategy to prepare for the accession of the 
associated CCEE, 20. 
 
European Council in Corfu, Presidency Conclusions, (24-25 June 1994) 
Bulletin EU 6/1994.   
 
European Council in Copenhagen, Presidency Conclusions (21-22 June 
1993) SN 180/1/193. 
 
d) Other Official Documents  
 
Former European Commissioner’s speech V. Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule 
of Law- What Next?, Speech 13/677, 4 September 2013, 
  
 
234 
<https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm> accessed 
4 June 2019. 
 
Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme 
on strengthening freedom, security and justice [2005] OJ C 198/1.  
 
EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), 
Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its 
member states 2002. See in particular, Chapter I of the report concerning 
Dignity, 44-62 and Chapter VI concerning Justice, 243-262. 
 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe, CPT 
Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1. 
 
House of Lords and House of Commons. Joint Committee on Human Rights. 
The Human Rights Implications of UK Extradition Policy: Written Evidence 
(2011), <https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/JCHR_EXT_Written_Evidence_11.pdf > accessed 19 May 2019. 
 
House of Lords, Committee on Extradition Law, Oral and Written Evidence 
(2015) and in particular the Chief Magistrate’s Office – Written Evidence 241-
248 and the answers to questions 9 and 10 in particular, 
<https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/extradition-
law/SELECT%20COMMITTEE%20ON%20EXTRADITION%20LAW.pdf> 
accessed 23 July 2019. 
 
United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Concluding observations against the 
sixth periodic report of Bulgaria, 15 December 2017, (CAT/C/BGR/CO/6) 3, 
point 9(b). 
 
Venice Commission, Opinion on Act XXV of 4 April 2017 on the Amendment 
of Act CCIV of 2011 on National Tertiary Education at its 111th Plenary 
Session, Venice (6-7 October 2017) Opinion 891/2017 CDL-AD(2017)022. 
 
Venice Commission, Opinion on Media Legislation of Hungary adopted at its 
103rd Plenary Session, Venice (19-20 June 2015) Opinion 798/2015 CDL-
AD(2015)015. 
 
Opinion on Poland on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the National 
Council of the Judiciary, on the draft Act Amending the Act on the Supreme 
  
 
235 
Court Proposed by the President and on the Act on the Organisation of 
Ordinary Courts , Opinion no. 904/2017 CDL(2017)035, para 44-52. 
 
Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional 
Tribunal of Poland, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary 
Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), Opinion no. 833/2015, 
CDLAD(2016)001. 
 
Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 108th Plenary Session, (Venice, 14-15 October 2016), 
Opinion no. 860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026. 
 
Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional 
Tribunal of Poland, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary 
Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), Opinion no. 833/2015, 
CDLAD(2016)001. 
 
Venice Commission Report on the Rule of Law, adopted at its 86th plenary 
session (Venice, 25-26 March 2011) Study No. 512/2009 CDL-
AD(2011)003rev.  
 
Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 95th Plenary Session, Venice (14-
15 June 2013). Opinion 720/2013 CDL-AD(2013)012. 
 
Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of 
Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of 
Courts of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 90th Plenary 
Session, Venice (16-17 March 2012), Opinion 663/2012 CDL-AD(2012)001, 
para 112.  
 
Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary Adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 87th Plenary Session, Venice (18-18 June 2011). Opinion 
621/2011 CDL-AD(2011)016, para 144. 
 
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), Romania – Opinion on Amendments to Law No. 
303/2004 on the Statute of judges and Prosecutors, Law No. 304.2004 on 
Judicial Organization, and Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Council for 
Magistracy, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 116th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 19-20 October 2018) Opinion No. 924/2018, CDL-AD(2018)017 and 
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), Romania – Opinion on Amendments to the Criminal 
  
 
236 
Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, adopted by the Venice Commission 
at its 116th Plenary Session (Venice, 19-20 October 2018) Opinion No. 
930/2018, CDL-AD(2018)021.  
 
E.U. Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), 
Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its 
Member States 2002, 45-60. 
 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe, CPT 
Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1, 17-25. 
 
Council of Europe, Report from the Commissioner of Human Rights, Dunja 
Mijatović, Report following her visit to Poland from 11 to 15 March 2019, 28 
June 2019, CommDH(2019)17, section 1.5, 12-15.  
 
Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Ad hoc 
Report on Romania (Rule 34), adopted by GRECO at its 79th Plenary 
Meeting (Strasbourg, 19-23 March 2018), Greco-AdHocRep(2018)2.  
 
Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Overuse of the 
European Arrest Warrant – A Threat to Human Rights’ Press Release 15 
March 2011. 
 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation to Member 
States concerning foreign prisoners, on 10 October 2012, CM/Rec (2012) 12. 
 
Council of Europe European Committee on Crime Problems, White Paper on 
Prison Overcrowding of 30 June 2016, PC-CP (2015) 6 rev 7. 
 
Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics, SPACE I – Prison Populations 
Survey 2015, published on 14 March 2017, PC-CP (2016) 6. 
 
Council of Europe, report from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, New threats to the rule of law in Council of Europe member States: 
selected examples, 25 September 2017, Doc. 14405. 
 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation concerning 
prison overcrowding and prison population inflation on 30 September 1999, 
CM/Rec (99) 22. 
 
Fair Trials International, ‘The European Arrest Warrant Seven Years On – 
The Case for Reform’ (2011) 
  
 
237 
<https://www.fairtrials.org/documents/FTI_Report_EAW_May_2011.pdf > 17 
May 2018.  
 
Fair Trials International, ‘The European Arrest Warrant Eights Years On – 
Time to Amend the Framework Decision?’ (2012) 
<http://www.fairtrials.net/publications/article/the-european-arrest-
warranteight-years-on> 16 May 2018. 
 
 
4) Academic Literature  
 
a) Monographs and Edited Collections  
 
Alegre S and Leaf M, European Arrest Warrant, A Solution Ahead of its 
Time? (2003 London: Justice ). 
 
Allan TRS, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford University Press 2003). 
 
Augenstein D (ed), ‘Integration Through Law’ Revisited: The Making of the 
European Polity (Routledge 2016).  
 
Barnard C, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms ( Oxford 
University Press 2016). 
 
Cappelletti M, Seccombe M and Weiler J (eds.) Integration through Law: 
Europe and the American Federal Experience. Volume 1: Methods, Tools 
and Institutions (Walter de Gruyter 1986).  
 
Chalmers D, Davies G, and Monti G, European Union Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). 
 
Corstens G and Pradel J, European Criminal Law (Kluwer 2002). 
 
Cotterrell R, Law’s Community. Legality Theory in Sociological Perspectives 
(Clarendon Press 1995). 
 
Fairhurst J, Law of the European Union (Pearson 2016). 
 
Fichera M, The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the 
European Union: Law, Policy and Practice (Intersentia 2011). 
 
  
 
238 
Gateva E, European Union Enlargement Conditionality (Palgrave Macmillan 
2015). 
 
Graig P and De Burca G, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2015). 
 
Guild E (ed), Constitutional Challenges to the European Arrest Warrant (Wolf 
2006). 
 
Herlin-Karnell E, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law 
(Hart Publishing 2012).  
 
Janssens C, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
 
Keijzer N and van Sliedrecht E (eds.), The European Arrest Warrant in 
Practice (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009). 
 
Kochenov D, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. Pre-
accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2008). 
 
McClean D, International Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters (Oxford 
University Press 2002). 
 
Mitsilegas V, EU Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009). 
 
Neuman M (ed.) Democracy Promotion and the Normative Power Europe 
Framework. The European Union in South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (Springer 2019). 
 
Peers S, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law. Volume II: EU Criminal Law, 
Policing, and Civil Law (Oxford University Press 2016). 
 
Peers S, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
 
Raz J, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 2009). 
 
Sadurski W, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2011).  
 
Saxonberg S, The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland (Harwood 2001).  
  
 
239 
 
Tamanaha BZ, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge 
University Press 2004). 
 
Tatham AF, Enlargement of the European Union (Kluwer Law International 
2009). 
 
van Ballegooij W, The Nature of Mutual Recognition in European Law Law 
(Intersentia 2015). 
 
Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen G, Surano L and Weyembergh A (eds.), The 
Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters (Éditions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles 2009). 
 
Whitman R (ed.), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical 
Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
 
Woods L and Watson P, Steiner & Woods EU Law (Oxford University Press 
2014). 
 
b) Journal Articles  
 
Adler-Nissen R, ‘Opting Out of an Ever Closer Union: The Integration Doxa 
and the Management of Sovereignty’ (2011) 34 West European Politics 
1092. 
 
Adler-Nissen R, ‘Behind the scenes of differentiated integration: 
circumventing national opt-outs in Justice and Home Affairs’ (2009) 16 
Journal of European Public Policy 62. 
 
Adler-Nissen R, ‘The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to 
National Integration Strategies’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 
663. 
 
Alegre S and Leaf M, ‘Mutual recognition in European judicial cooperation: A 
step too far too soon? Case Study – The European arrest warrant’ (2004) 10 
European Law Journal 200. 
 
Bachmaier L, ‘Compliance with the Rule of Law in the EU and the Protection 
of the Union’s Budget. Further Reflections on the Proposal for the Regulation 
of 18 May 2018’ eucrim 2/2019.  
 
  
 
240 
Balducci G, ‘The Limits of Normative Power Europe in Asia: The Case of 
Human Rights in China’ (2010) 27 East Asia 35. 
 
Bárd P and Śledzińska-Simon A, ‘Rule of law infringement procedures – A 
proposal to extend the EU’s rule of law toolbox’ CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe, No. 2019-09. 
 
Batt J, ‘The End of Communist Rule in East-Central Europe: A Four-Country 
Comparison’ (1991) 26 Government and Opposition 368. 
 
Bermann G, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 
332. 
 
Blackstock J, ‘Procedural Safeguards in the European Union: A Road Well 
Travelled?’ (2012) 2(1) European Criminal Law Review 20. 
 
Bonelli M, ‘From a Community of Law to a Union of Values. Hungary, Poland, 
and European Constitutionalism’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law 
Review 793. 
 
Bovend’Eerdt K, ‘The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A New Limit to 
the Mutual Trust Presumption in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ 
(2016) 32(83) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 112. 
 
Carrera S, Guild E and Hernanz N, ‘Europe’s Most Wanted? Recalibrating 
Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System’ (2013) 55 CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe. 
 
Chesterman S, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal 
of Comparative Law, 331. 
 
Craig PP, ‘Formal and Substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an 
analytical framework’ (1997) Public Law 467.  
 
Curtin D, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and 
Peaces’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 17. 
 
Dawson M and Muir E, ‘Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU 
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal, 
1959. 
 
  
 
241 
Dawson M and Muir E, ‘Individual Institutional and Collective Vigilance in 
Protecting Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons From the Roma’ (2011) 
48 Common Market Law Review 751. 
 
de Bondt W and Vermeulen V, ‘The Procedural Rights Debate: A Bridge too 
Far or Still Not Far Enough?’ (2010) 4 EUcrim 163. 
 
den Heijer M, ‘Case Comment on Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S 
and M.E.’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1735. 
 
Diez T, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
“Normative Power Europe” ’ (2005) 33 Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 613. 
 
Dungard J and Van den Wyngaert C, ‘Reconciling extradition with human 
rights’ (1998) 92(2) American Journal of International Law 187. 
 
Efrat A, ‘Assessing mutual trust among EU members: evidence from the 
European Arrest Warrant’ (2019) 26 Journal of European Public Policy 656. 
 
Endicott TAO, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 1. 
 
Feketija MF and Łazowski A, ‘The Seventh EU Enlargement and Beyond: 
Pre-Accession Policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans Revisited’ (2014) 10 
Croation Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1. 
 
Fichera M and Herlinn-Karnell E, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Test and 
Balancing in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice: A Proportionate 
Answer for a Europe of Rights?’ (2013) 19(4) European Public Law 759. 
 
Forsberg T, ‘Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis 
of an Ideal Type’ (2011) 49(6) Journal of Common Market Studies 1183.  
 
Geyer F, ‘European Arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. Judgment of 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de 
Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional 
Law Review 149.  
 
Guild E, ‘Crime and the EU’s Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 218. 
 
  
 
242 
Haggenmüller S, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and the European Arrest 
Warrant’ (2013) 3(1) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 95. 
 
Hillion H, ‘Enlargement of the European Union – The Discrepancy between 
Membership Obligations and Accession Conditions as Regards the 
Protection of Minorities’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 715.    
 
Hyde-Price A, ‘ “Normative” Power Europe: A realist Critique’ (2006) 13 
Journal of European Public Policy 217. 
 
Inglis K, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-
accession Reorientation’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1173.  
 
Jack J, ‘Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the 
Enforcement of Judgments?’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 420.  
 
Janse J, ‘Is the European Commission a credible guardian of the values? A 
revisionist account of the Copenhagen political criteria during the Big Bang 
Enlargement’ (2019) 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 43. 
 
Janssens C, ‘Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van 
de Ministerraad’ (2007) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 169.  
 
Kochenov D, ‘Behind the Copenhagen façade. The meaning and structure of 
the Copenhagen political criterion of democracy and the rule of law’ (2004) 
10 European Integration Online Papers 1.  
 
Kochenov D, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case For the Reinvention of 
Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’ (2015) 7 
The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 153. 
 
Kochenov D and Pech L, ‘Better Late than Never? On the European 
Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First Activation’ (2016) 54 
Journal of Common Market Studies 1062. 
 
Kochenov D and Pech L, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in 
the EU; Rhetoric and Reality’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 
512. 
 
Koncewicz TT, ‘Of instutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-defence’ (2016) 
53 Common Market Law Review 1753. 
 
  
 
243 
Krajewski M, ‘Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses: The Court of 
Justice and the Athena’s Dilemma’ (2018) 3 European Papers 395.   
 
Lavenex S, ‘Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the 
Single Market Analogy’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 762. 
 
Lavenex S and Wagner W, ‘Which European Public Order? Sources of 
Imbalance in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2007) 16 
European Security 225. 
 
Lazowski A, ‘Poland. Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish 
Citizens Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005. Case 
Note’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 569. 
 
Łazowski A, ‘Treaty of Lisbon and the EU’s Absorption Capacity’ (2010) 19 
Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 56. 
 
Mader O, ‘Enforcement of EU Values as a Political Endeavour: Constitutional 
Pluralism and Value Homogeneity in Times of Persistent Challenges to the 
Rule of Law’ (2019) 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 133. 
 
Mancano L, ‘The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters’, (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 215.  
 
Manners M, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 235.  
 
Manners I, ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’ (2008) 84 
International Affairs 45. 
 
Manners I, ‘The Social Dimension of EU Trade Politics: Reflections from a 
Normative Power Perspective’ (2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 
782. 
 
Marktler T, ‘The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria’ (2006) Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy 343.  
 
Mitsilegas V, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and 
Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 6(4) New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 457. 
 
  
 
244 
Mitsilegas V, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow 
Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 319. 
 
Mitsilegas V, ‘The Constitutional  Implications of Mutual Recognition in 
Criminal Matters in the EU’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277. 
 
Monar J, ‘Justice and home affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: reform at the 
price of fragmentation’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 320. 
 
Moreno-Lax V, ‘Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S v Belgium and 
Greece’ (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 1. 
 
Möstl M, ‘Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ (2010) 47 
Common Market Law Review 405. 
 
Müller JW, ‘Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside 
Member States?’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 141. 
 
Nicolaidis K, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through Mutual 
Recognition’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 682. 
 
Nicolaidis K and Shaffer G, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance Without Global Government’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 263. 
 
Nunes I, ‘Civilian, Normative and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and EU 
Discourses’ (2011) 16 European Foreign Affairs Review 1. 
 
O’Keeffe D, ‘Recasting the Third Pillar’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law 
Review 893.  
 
Oberg J, ‘Subsidiarity and EU Procedural Criminal Law (2015) 5(1) European 
Criminal Law Review 19. 
 
Oliver P and Stefanelli J, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law in the EU: The 
Council’s Inaction’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 1075. 
 
Ostropolski T, ‘The CJEU as a Defender of Mutual Trust’ (2015) 6(2) New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 166.  
 
  
 
245 
Ouwekerk J, ‘Mutual Trust in the Area of Criminal Law’, in Meijers Committee 
(Forum 2011)  The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration 
and Criminal Law 38. 
 
Pace M, ‘The Construction of EU Normative Power’ (2007) 45 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 1041. 
 
Padfield N, ‘The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in England 
and Wales’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 253. 
 
Pech L, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the 
Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 European 
Constitutional Law Review 359. 
 
Pech L and Platon S, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of 
Justice to the rescue in the ASJP case’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law 
Review 1827. 
 
Pech L and Scheppele KL ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the 
EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3. 
 
Peers S, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has 
the Council got it Wrong?’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5.  
 
Raz J, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195. 
 
Sadurski W, ‘Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU 
Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and 
Eastern Europe’ (2004) 4 European Law Journal 371.  
 
Sadurski W, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, 
and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 385.  
 
 
Schmidt S, ‘Mutual Recognition as a new Mode of Governance’ (2007) 14 
Journal of European Public Policy 667. 
 
Shaw J, ‘Flexibility in a “Reorganized” and “Simplified Treaty”’ (2003) 40 
Common Market Law Review 279. 
 
Sjursen H, ‘The EU as a ‘Normative Power’: How Can This Be?’ (2006) 13 
Journal of European Public Policy 235. 
 
  
 
246 
Stein E, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ 
(1981) 75 The American Journal of International Law 1.  
 
Swaine ET, ‘Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court 
of Justice’ (2000) 41(1) Harvard Internal Law Journal 53. 
 
Tamanaha BZ, ‘The history and elements of the rule of law’ (2012) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 232. 
 
Tinsley A, ‘The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When does the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights Require Non-Execution of a European 
Arrest Warrant?’ (2012) 2 European Criminal Law Review 338. 
 
Trauner F, ‘Post-accession compliance with EU Law in Bulgaria and 
Romania: a comparative perspective’ (2009) 13 European Integration Online 
Papers 1.  
 
Van Ballegooij W and Bard P, ‘Mutual Recognition and Individual Rights. Did 
the Court get it Right?’ (2016) 7 New Journal of European Criminal Law 439. 
 
Ventrella M, ‘European Integration or Democracy Disintegration in Measures 
Concerning Police and Judicial Cooperation? (2013) 4(3) New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 290. 
 
Vogel J and Spencer JR, ‘Proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant’ 
(2010) Criminal Law Review 474. 
 
von Bogdandy A and Ioannidis M, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: 
What is it, What has been Done, What can be Done’ (2014) 51 Common 
Market Law Review 59.   
 
von Danwitz T, ‘The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ’ 
(2014) 37(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1311. 
 
Weiler JHH, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 
2403. 
 
Waldron J, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in 
Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137.  
 
Waldron J, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law 
Review 1. 
 
  
 
247 
Wennerås P, ‘Sanctions Against Member States under Article 260 TFEU: 
Alive, but not Kicking?’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 145.  
 
Weyembergh A, ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, The Constitutional Treaty 
and The Hague Programme’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1567. 
 
Weyembergh A, ‘The Functions of Approximation of Penal Legislation Within 
the European Union’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 149. 
 
Weyembergh A, Armada I and Brière C, ‘European Added Value 
Assessment - The EU Arrest Warrant, Critical Assessment of the existing 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision’ (2014) European Added 
Value Unit 34. 
 
Williams A, ‘Mutual Trust as a Term of Art in EU Criminal Law: Revealing its 
Hybrid Character’ (2016) 9 European Journal of Legal Studies 211. 
 
Xanthopoulou E, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal and Asylum Law: 
Three Phases of Evolution and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust’ 
(2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 489. 
 
Xanthopoulou E, ‘The Quest for Proportionality for the European Arrest 
Warrant: Fundamental Rights Protection in a Mutual Recognition 
Environment’ (2015) 6 New Journal of Criminal Law 32.  
 
Young AL, ‘The Rule of Law in the United Kingdom: Formal or Substantive?’ 
(2012) 6 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 259. 
 
Young R, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External 
Identity’ (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 415. 
 
Zanghellini Z, ‘The Foundation of the Rule of Law’ (2016) 28 Yale Journal of 
Law & the Humanities 213. 
 
c) Chapters in Edited Volumes  
 
Armstrong KA, ‘Mutual Recognition’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law 
of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 
2002).  
 
Besselink L, ‘The Bite, the Bark, and the Howl. Article 7 TEU and the Rule of 
Law Initiatives’, in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU 
  
 
248 
Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University 
Press 2017). 
 
Bose M, ‘Human Rights Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on 
the European Arrest Warrant’ in S Ruggeri (ed), Human Rights in European 
Criminal Law (Springer 2015).  
 
Closa C, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring in the Rule of Law. Normative 
Arguments, Institutional Proposals and the Procedural Limitations’ in C Closa 
and D Kochenov (eds). Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
 
de Witte B, ‘The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European 
Union’ in M Cremona (ed), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2003).  
 
Gormley LW, ‘Infringement Proceedings’ in A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017). 
 
Gormley LW, ‘Opening Speech by L.W. Gormely’, in AF Kellermann, JW de 
Zwaan, J Czuczai (eds.), EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU 
and National Level (T.M.C Asser Institute 2001) xxix.   
 
Guild E, Carrera S and Balzacq T, ‘The Changing Dynamics of Security in an 
Enlarged European Union’, in D Bigo, S Carrera, E Guild and R Walker 
(eds), Delivering Liberty, Europe’s 21st Century Challenge (Ashgate 
Publishing 2010). 
 
Halmai G, ‘The rise and fall of constitutionalism in Hungary’, in P Blokker 
(ed), Constitutional Acceleration within the European Union and Beyond 
(Routledge 2018). 
 
Herlin-Karnell E, ‘Constitutional Principles in the EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ in D Acosta and C Murphy (eds), EU Security and 
Justice Law (Hart Publishing 2014). 
 
Hillion C, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU. Legal Mandate and Means’ 
in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
 
Hillion C, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny’ in C Hillion (ed.) EU 
Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing 2004).   
  
 
249 
 
Iancu B, ‘Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law in Romania: The Crisis 
in Concepts and Contexts’, in A von Bogdandy and P Sonnevend (eds), 
Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area – Theory, Law and 
Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart Publishing 2015). 
 
Jimeno-Bulnes M, ‘The Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on 
Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings Throughout the European 
Union’ in E Guild and F Geyer  (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in the European Union (Ashgate Publishing 2008). 
 
Konstadinides T, ‘The Europeanisation of Extradition: How Many Light Years 
Away to Mutual Confidence?’ in C Eckes and T Konstadinides (eds), Crime 
Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order 
(Cambridge University Press 2011).  
 
Lachmayer K, ‘Questioning the Basic Values – Austria and Jörg Haider’, in A 
Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values – 
Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017). 
 
Lannon E, Inglis KM and Haenebalcke T, ‘The Many Faces of EU 
Conditionality in Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Relations’, in M Maresceau and E 
Lannon (eds.), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies. A 
Comparative Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan 2001).  
 
Łazowski A, EU Criminal Law and EU enlargement, in V Mitsilegas, M 
Bergström and T Konstadinides (eds) Research Handbook on EU Criminal 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016). 
 
Manners I, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Transdisciplinary Approach to 
European Studies’ in C Rumford (ed) The SAGE Handbook of European 
Studies (SAGE 2009). 
 
Manners I, ‘The Normative Power of the EU in a Globalised World’ in Z Laïdi 
(ed) EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social 
Preferences (Routledge 2008). 
 
Maresceau M, ‘Pre-Accession’, in M. Cremona (ed), The Enlargement of the 
European Union (Oxford University Press 2003).  
 
Mitsilegas V, ‘Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights 
after Lisbon’ in V Mitsilegas, M Bergström and T Konstadinides (eds), 
Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).  
  
 
250 
 
Mitsilegas V, ‘Trust-building measures in the European judicial area in 
criminal matters: Issues of competence, legitimacy and interinstitutional 
balance’ in S Carrera and T Balzacq (eds), Security Versus Freedom? A 
Challenge for Europe’s Future (Ashgate Publishing 2006). 
 
Müller JW, ‘A Democracy Commission of One’s Own, or What it would take 
for the EU to safeguard Liberal Democracy in its Member States’ in A Jakab 
and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring 
Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017).  
 
Murphy C, ‘The European Evidence Warrant: Mutual Recognition and Mutual 
(Dis)trust’ in C Eckes and T Konstadinides (eds), Crime Within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order (Cambridge 
University Press 2011). 
 
Scheppele KL, ‘Constitutional Coups in EU Law’, in M Adams, A Meeuse and 
E Hirsch Ballin (eds), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging 
Idealism and Realism (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
 
Scheppele KL, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic 
Infringement Actions’ in C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
 
Scheppele KL, ‘Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution’, in A von 
Bogdandy  and P Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
 
E Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in 
M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2003). 
 
Szente Z, ‘Challenging the Basic Values – Problems in the Rule of Law in 
Hungary and the Failure of the EU to Tackle Them’, in A Jakab and D 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values – Ensuring 
Member States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017).   
 
Vermeulen G, ‘Flaws and Contradictions in the Mutual Trust and Recognition 
Discourse: Casting a Shadow on the Legitimacy of EU Criminal Policy 
Making and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters?’ in N Persak (ed), 
Legitimacy and Trust in Criminal Law, Policy and Justice (Ashgate Publishing 
2014). 
  
 
251 
 
Vermeulen G, ‘Where do we currently stand with harmonisation in Europe?’ 
in A Klip and H van der Wilt (eds), Harmonisation and Harmonising 
Measures in Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands Academy of Science 2002). 
 
Vogel J, ‘Why is the harmonisation of penal law necessary? A Comment’ in A 
Klip and H van der Wilt (eds), Harmonisation and Harmonising Measures in 
Criminal Law (Royal Netherlands Academy of Science 2002). 
 
von Bogdandy A, ‘Constitutional Principles’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2006). 
 
Wennerås P, ‘Making effective use of Article 260 TFEU’, in A Jakab and D 
Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member 
States’ Compliance (Oxford University Press 2017).  
 
d) Working Papers  
 
Closa C, Kochenov D and Weiler JHH, ‘Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union’EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25, 
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/30117/RSCAS_2014_25_FIN
AL.pdf?sequence=3> accessed 21 August 2019. 
 
De Búrca G, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ 
(1999) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 7/1999. 
 
Fichera M,  ‘Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law’ (2009) 10 University of 
Edinburgh Working Paper Series 19. 
 
Gateva E, ‘Post-Accession Conditionality. Support Instrument for Continuous 
Pressure?’,(2010) working paper KFG, Freie Universität, 
<http://www.transformeurope.eu> accessed 16 April 2012. 
 
Halmai G, ‘The possibility and desirability of economic sanction: Rule of law 
conditionality requirements against illiberal EU Member States’ EUI Working 
Papers Law 2018/06.  
 
Hinarejos A, Spencer JR and Peers S, ‘Opting out of EU Criminal law: What 
is actually involved?’CELS Working Paper, September 2012, 
<www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk> accessed 8 July 2019. 
 
Kelemen RD and Pech L, ‘Why autocrats love constitutional identity and 
constitutional pluralism Lessons from Hungary and Poland’RECONNECT 
  
 
252 
Working Paper No. 2 — September 2018, <https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/RECONNECT-WorkingPaper2-Kelemen-Pech-LP-
KO.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019. 
 
Kochenov D, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’ 
EUI Law Working Papers, 2017/10.  
 
Kochenov D and Bárd P, ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of 
the EU. The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement’ RECONNECT 
Working Paper No. 1 – July 2018, <https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/RECONNECT-KochenovBard-WP_27072018b.pdf> 
accessed 14 June 2019. 
 
Kochenov D and Pech L, ‘Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the 
Commission’s ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ as a Timid Step in the Right 
Direction’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/24.   
 
Mitsilegas V, ‘Conceptualising Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law: The 
Evolving Relationship Between Legal Pluralism and Rights-Based Justice in 
the European Union’, in  Brouwer E and D. Gerard D (eds.) Mapping Mutual 
Trust: Understanding and Framing the Role of Mutual Trust in EU Law (2016) 
EUI Working Paper MWP 2016/13 Max Weber Programme, 
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/41486/MWP_2016_13.pdf?se
quence=1> accessed  29 August 2019. 
 
5) Blogs and Others  
 
Lenaerts K, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ The Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever Lecture All Souls 
College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, 
<www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recogntion_in_t
he_area_of_fr eedome_judge_leanaerts.pdf > accessed 20 March 2017. 
 
Bárd P, ‘Luxembourg as the Last Resort – The Kúria’s Judgment on the 
Illegality of a Preliminary Reference to the ECJ’, Verfassungsblog, 23 
September 2019<https://verfassungsblog.de/luxemburg-as-the-last-resort/> 
accessed 2 October 2019]. 
 
Central European University Press Release, ‘CEU Forced out of Budapest: 
To Launch U.S. Degree Programme in Vienna in September 2019’, 3 
December 2018, <https://www.ceu.edu/article/2018-12-03/ceu-forced-out-
budapest-launch-us-degree-programs-vienna-september-2019> accessed  
22 May 2019.  
  
 
253 
 
E. Gateva, ‘On different tracks: Bulgaria and Romania under the Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism’, LSEE blog, 2 March 2016, 
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2016/03/02/on-different-tracks-bulgaria-and-
romania-under-the-cooperation-and-verification-mechanism/> accessed: 15 
July 2018. 
 
Pech L and Wachowiec P, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding 
the Rule of Law in Poland (Part I)’, Verfassungsblog, 13 January 2019, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-
the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-i/> accessed 10 April 2019. 
 
Scheppele KL, ‘What can the European Commission Do When Member 
States Violate Basic Principles of the European Union? The Case for 
Systemic Infringement Actions’, Verfassungsblog, 22 November 2013, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/scheppele-
systemic-infringement-action-brussels-version.pdf> accessed10 June 2017. 
 
Stoychev S, ‘This is how Bulgarian Judicial Independence Ends … Not with a 
Bang but with a Whimper’, Verfassungsblog, 3 June 2019, available at: 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/this-is-how-bulgarian-judicial-independence-
ends-not-with-a-bang-but-a-whimper/> accessed 9 September 2019. 
 
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, 
<http://transparency.bg/en/transp_indexes/indexes/perceptions-index-
corruption/corruption-perception-index-2018/> accessed 17 September 2019.  
 
Vadász V, ‘A Hungarian Judge Seeks Protection from the CJEU – Part II’, 
Verfassungsblog, 7 August 2019, available at: <https://verfassungsblog.de/a-
hungarian-judge-seeks-protection-from-the-cjeu-part-ii/> accessed 5 
September 2019. 
 
R. Vasileva, ‘So Why Don’t we Just Call the Whole Rule of Law Thing Off, 
Then?’, Verfassungsblog, 24 October 2019, <https://verfassungsblog.de/so-
why-dont-we-just-call-the-whole-rule-of-law-thing-off-then/> accessed 2 
November 2019.  
 
Vassileva R, ‘CVM Here, CVM There: The European Commission in 
Bulgaria’s Legal Wonderland’, Verfassungsblog, 16 June 2019, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/cvm-here-cvm-there-the-european-commission-
in-bulgarias-legal-wonderland/> accessed 9 September 2019. 
 
Vassileva R, ‘Sweet Like Sugar, Bitter Like a Lemon: Bulgaria’s CVM 
Report’, Verfassungsblog, 16 November 2018, 
  
 
254 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/sweet-like-sugar-bitter-like-a-lemon-bulgarias-
cvm-report/> accessed 27 August 2019. 
 
Vassileva R, ‘The Disheartening Speech by the President of Bulgaria’s 
Supreme Court Which Nobody in Brussels Noticed’ Verfassungsblog, 11 July 
2018, <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-disheartening-speech-by-the-
president-of-bulgarias-supreme-court-which-nobody-in-brussels-noticed/> 
accessed 25 May 2019
  
 
255 
 
